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This research is focused upon the availability and suitability of intellectual property 
protection for developments in underutilized crop species.  It has been suggested that 
intellectual property protection should be a positive tool for addressing food security 
concerns, by incentivizing innovation and rewarding breeders.  Equally, access and benefit 
sharing mechanisms, which exist to regulate access to genetic material and redistribute 
the benefits arising from its use, also play a significant role in the development of new 
crop species.  Thus, this research explores the extent to which states are obliged to provide 
intellectual property protection for plant-based innovations, and whether these are 
compatible with developments in underutilized crop species.  It also considers the overlap 
between systems of intellectual property protection and access and benefit sharing 
regimes.  This is explored by examining the relevant international norms pertaining to 
intellectual property protection (the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property and the Conventions of the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties 
of Plants) and the regulation of access to genetic resources (the Convention on Biological 
Diversity and its Nagoya Protocol, the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture).  This is developed by exploring how the principles derived from 
these regimes relate to one another and by drawing upon examples developed in distinct 
jurisdictions. 
 
The research considers Malaysia not only as a genetically rich state that is reliant 
upon external inputs to meet national food security, but one that is host to research and 
development activities involving underutilized crop species.  It is focused upon analysing 
the models of intellectual property protection and access and benefit sharing that have 
been implemented in Malaysia and evaluating their utility for innovations in underutilized 
crops by incorporating the perspectives of stakeholders in underutilized crops and 
comparing the aspects of the Malaysian approach with alternatives.  It concludes by 
analysing whether in this context, intellectual property protection it is likely to be a useful 
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Chapter one: Introduction 
1.1.1 Background: The challenges of achieving food security 
Managing to provide enough nutritious food for continued survival and maintenance 
of health is the most fundamental challenge to human existence; and historically speaking, 
one that on a global scale we have consistently fallen short of.  The scale of this challenge 
has only been compounded by an increase of 90% in the global population over the last 
four decades of approximately 3.3 billion people and is expected to reach 9.1 billion by 
2050,1 the majority of which are expected to be in the developing world.2  At present, it 
is estimated that around 795 million people are undernourished globally.3  Thus, we find 
ourselves faced with the significant challenge of raising overall food production by 70%, 
in order to ensure universal food and nutritional security. 
 The need to address food security concerns has long been recognised by both 
national governments and supra national organisations. In 1974, in the wake of the large-
scale famine in Bangladesh that had taken place over the previous year, and in recognition 
of previous great famines the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) held 
the first World Food Conference in Rome.  The 135 states represented adopted the 
Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition,4 which held that: 
 
 ‘Every man, woman and child has the inalienable right to be free from hunger and 
malnutrition in order to develop fully and maintain their physical and mental faculties.’5  
 
The Conference recognised that, among other economic, political and 
environmental factors, the main cause of the famine was a lack of access to sources of 
food and the affordability of what food was available; thus, in addressing food security 
 
1 FAO, ‘Global Agriculture Towards 2050’, available at  
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/wsfs/docs/Issues_papers/HLEF2050_Global_Agriculture.pdf (accessed 
15th July 2020) at 1 
2 ibid 
3 FAO, IFAD & WFP, The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2015- Meeting the 2015 International Hunger 
Targets: Taking Stock of Uneven Progress (Rome, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, 
2015) at 8 
4 16th November 1974, Endorsed by UN General Assembly Resolution 3348 (XXIX) of 17th December 1974 




concerns, emphasis was to be on food production and supply. The following decades 
witnessed a dramatic increase in food production, thanks in part to the successful uptake 
of the technologies made available by the Green Revolution;6 to the extent to which, food 
security concerns appeared to fall by the wayside of the global development agenda.7  
Despite this, the numbers of people with adequate access to food supplies and levels of 
malnutrition failed to improve.  
The need to revisit the issue led to the World Food Summit taking place is 1996.  
The Summit produced the World Declaration on Food Security, which in addition to 
reaffirming the right to be free of hunger also set out a plan of action to reduce the number 
of malnourished people in the world by half before 2015.  The plan of action included, inter 
alia, a commitment to research into sustainable methods of short and long term food 
production, with emphasis on improving food security at the national and household level.8  
Nonetheless, improvements in malnutrition levels continued to fall considerably short of 
the target.9   The causes have been attributed insufficient access to food, as a result of 
economic instability and inadequate infrastructure; the loss of harvests to environmental 
disasters such as drought, flood or major pest outbreak10 often considered to be a result 
of climate change and the high cost of commercially developed varieties and their 
associated inputs, amongst other factors.  This suggests that alternative approaches to 
improved food production and increased access to nutritionally rich food need to be 
considered.  The challenge is not simply to produce enough food, as presently there 
enough food produced in terms of calorific content to meet the needs of even the current 
 
6 ‘The Green Revolution’ refers to the large scale increase in food production that began in the interwar years 
and rapidly expanded between the 1960s and 1980s.  The Revolution was the product of several projects 
systematically studying crop yields and breeding programmes that resulted in high yield crop varieties 
(examples include maize in Mexico and rice in Japan, China and Thailand).  The uptake of these varieties and 
farming techniques delivered annual increases in food production; among its successes was the doubling of the 
global cereal yield between 1960 and 1985.  Without the Green Revolution the numbers of hungry people 
would unquestionably be far greater today.  However, the success of these high yield varieties is dependent 
upon an increased amount of inputs, including fertilizers and pesticides and suitable growing conditions.  What 
is more, the cost associated with purchasing high yield varieties and the various inputs are high.   They are 
also associated with a high environmental cost of cultivation.  Consequently, high yield crop varieties are a 
powerful but limited technology. (see Conway, n11 below, chapter 4 and Conway, n7 below, chapter 3) 
7 Gordon Conway, One Billion Hungry: Can we feed the World? (Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press, 2012) at ix 
8 Rome, 1996 at 30  
9 n3 above, at 17 




global population.11  Rather, it is to engage with an alternative and more accessible means 
of food production that is adaptable to less than ideal conditions for cultivation. 
1.1.2 A brief history of human agriculture and the decline of agrobiodiversity 
The emergence of human agriculture approximately 10,000 years ago caused 
disruption in the natural balance of numerous ecological systems; however due to slow 
speed of the development and expansion of agriculture, ecological systems were able to 
adapt and achieve a new equilibrium.12  During this period, genetic diversity was 
maintained due to the relatively minimal impact of subsistence agriculture on extant 
biodiversity and the inclusion of a new portfolio of genetic material from human cultivation 
and subsequent recombination and development of new varieties.  In addition, adaptation 
to local climate and soil conditions took place so that plants could continue to survive. 
In the last five hundred years, the expansion of civilizations led to the development 
of international trade and the intentional exchange of germplasm.  The expansion of 
agriculture alongside the Industrial Revolution also marks the starting point for the 
downturn in agrobiodiversity, as higher yielding varieties became more widely cultivated.  
This process was accelerated by the Green Revolution and the advent of industrial 
agriculture.    The industrialisation of agriculture saw the transformation of the agricultural 
landscape in many parts of the world from small scale subsistence farming towards 
commercial farming.  The Green Revolution, characterised by the dramatic increase in food 
production, was reliant upon specifically developed high-yield varieties and intensive 
technologies, including large-scale irrigation and heavy reliance upon fertilisers and 
pesticides.13 As a consequence, many local and regional crop varieties fell out of use. This 
lead to a rapid decline in agrobiodiversity: of the approximately 1021, crop species that 
have been cultivated in human history, approximately 7,000 are still in use.14  It is 
 
11 Gordon Conway, The Doubly Green Revolution: Food for all in the 21st century (London, Penguin Books, 
1997) at 1 
12  José Esquinas-Alcázar, ‘Protecting crop genetic diversity for food security: political, ethical and technical 
challenges’  (2005) 6 Nature Reviews Genetics 946 at 946-947 
13 Pamela A. Matson, Walter Falcon & Ashley Dean, Seeds of Sustainability: Lessons from the Birthplace of 
Green Revolution in Agriculture (Washington, Island Press, 2012) at 5 
14 Global Forum on Agricultural Research (GFAR), ‘The Role of Underutilised plant species in the 21st Century’ 




estimated that no fewer than 150 crop species are commonly cultivated, with estimates 
that most people survive on between 12 and 30 crop species.  Furthermore, humanity is 
reliant upon three main crops – rice, maize, and wheat- for up to half of humanities calorific 
and protein requirements.15 
 The consequence of this is that as a species, we are left vulnerable to food and 
nutritional insecurity, as widespread homogeneous crop yields are more susceptible to 
failure as a result of environmental hostility such as pests, drought and poor quality soil.  
Going forward, we are less able to adapt to climate change, as the loss of agricultural 
biodiversity equates to a loss of options.  What is more, this vulnerability is likely to affect 
people at the margins the most.  On the other hand, the advantages of engaging with the 
wider agrobiodiversity portfolio are numerous: in addition to their potential for 
adaptability, denser agrobiodiversity concentrations are better at nutrient cycling and tend 
to produce higher output per unit land area.16  It is necessary therefore, to consider 
alternative, sustainable means of food production, which support agrobiodiversity. 
 
1.1.3 Underutilised crops: An alternative? 
In the search for alternative means of food production, underutilised crops are not 
a new idea. Underutilised and niche crop varieties are essential for the food and nutritional 
security of up to half of the world’s population, and especially that of rural and indigenous 
communities.17 The term “underutilised crops” refers to crop species whose potential is 
not fully realised; this includes indigenous species, local and traditionally cultivated 
varieties that form part of the wider biodiversity portfolio18 and may have been neglected 
for various social or economic reasons.1920  These local and farmers’ varieties, also known 
 
15 ibid 
16 Michael Pimbert, Towards Food Security: Reclaiming Autonomous Food Systems (London, International 
Institute for Environment and Development, 2010) at 18 
17 Rosemary J. Coombe, ‘The recognition of indigenous peoples’ and community traditional knowledge in 
international law’ (2001) 14 St. Thomas Law Review 275 at 277 
18 Stefano Padulosi & Irmgard Hoeschle-Zeledon, ‘Underutilized plant species: what are they?’ (Liesa, March 
2004) at 5 
19 Sean Mayes, ‘The potential of underutilised crops to improve security of food production’ (2012) 63(3) 
Journal of Experimental Botany 1075 at 1075 
20 International Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI), ‘Neglected and Underutilised Crop Species: Strategic 




as landrace crops or primitive varieties are developed through the selective innovation of 
farmers over generations; thereby acquiring an equally valuable body of traditional 
knowledge relating to breeding and cultivation.21  Thus, it is an umbrella term 
incorporating a number of ideas. 
Underutilised crop species are often situated in diverse farming systems and are 
cultivated by small scale food producers.  The significance of this is enormous, as globally 
approximately 2.5 billion people live directly from agricultural systems, with smallholder 
farmers making up 85% of the world’s farming population.22  Many underutilised crop 
species are nutritionally rich and suited to low input agriculture.23  They are also often 
better adapted to local soil and climate conditions, including harsh environments, such as 
salinification and desertification.24 Furthermore, many underutilised species are nitrogen 
fixing in the soil and thus improving the agricultural environment in which they are 
cultivated and potentially provide opportunities for intercropping with other species.  As a 
result, they are of immense value to local food systems, as they offer a sustainable 
agricultural model, which in turn benefits long-term food security.  Diverse farming 
practices, including those that in part rely upon traditional agricultural knowledge, 
traditional farming practices and engage with local exchange practices are increasingly 
recognised as being essential to the food security of subsistence farmers and rural 
communities.25  Furthermore, the role of many underutilised crops is not simply limited to 
agriculture: many also possess social and cultural significance. 
Until recently, underutilised crop varieties and associated traditional knowledge 
have been largely ignored by commerce and science; however, they have the potential to 
be commodity crops and provide a valuable resource for the improvement of existing 
commercial plant varieties.26  The FAO suggests that the exploitation of these resources is 
not only necessary but should lead to significant commercial returns.  This may be 
 
21 Valeria Negri, ‘Ethical issues in Agrobiodiverity’ (2005) 18 Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 3 
at 5 
22 Plimbert, n16 above at 8 
23 GFAR, n14 above, at 2 
24 Plimbert, n16 above, at 18 
25 Coombe, n17 above at 277  




achieved through the mechanism of intellectual property (IP) protection for commercial 
varieties, which is intended to support further innovation.  In contrast to their underutilised 
counterparts, commercially available varieties have been selectively bred in order to 
possess desirable and uniform characteristics, thus making them eligible for IP protection 
and commercial exploitation.  
In contrast, many underutilised crops are heterogeneous and therefore genetically 
and morphologically less uniform, and therefore less likely to meet the requirements for 
IP protection.  However, the Global Forum on Agricultural Research (GFAR) suggests that 
it is not necessary for underutilised crops to be developed into a global commodity; rather 
the development and commercialisation of local, national and regional varieties is most 
likely to provide the best means of supplementing food and nutritional security.27  To that 
end, it envisages that adequate research and development into underutilised varieties 
should secure their position as both commodity and subsistence crops.  In the case of 
commodity crops, both public and private investment in research and development are 
justified in order to achieve market suitable crops; in the case of subsistence varieties, 
this is more likely to be limited to the public sector.  However, the development of 
underutilised crop varieties is not limited to institutional research and development: it may 
also take place as a result of on farm innovation and local seed exchange practices. 
 Due to the heterogeneity of crops falling within the scope of ‘underutilised’ and 
similarly, the disparity in the stakeholders in underutilised crops, it is highly impractical to 
continue to conceive of them in such broad terms.  For this reason, it is pertinent to 
consider a specific example in order to provide a lens through which we may consider the 
surrounding issues.   
1.1.3.1 Example: The Bambara Groundnut 
The Bambara groundnut (vigna subterranea) is a grain legume and a highly 
nutritious underutilised species.  It originates from West Africa and is widely cultivated in 
sub-Saharan Africa and some areas of South East Asia, including Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
 




Philippines, Thailand and Sri Lanka.  Due to its nature as a subsistence crop, virtually no 
research and development took place up to 2005.28  It is the third most important legume 
in Africa, behind the peanut and the cowpea.29  Although global production of the crop 
increased by two and a half times between 1961 and 2008, crop yield did not;30 thus, it is 
underutilised in the sense that its potential is not fully reached.   This section will briefly 
outline some of the key features of the crop and highlight some examples of its use. 
In terms of cultivation, the Bambara groundnut grows underground, and develops 
into small pods that contain the seeds, which grow to around 8-15mm in diameter.  It 
grows best in dry areas with sandy soil, although it can also be cultivated in humid 
conditions.  It is highly tolerant of low rainfall and poor quality soil and can often produce 
significant yields in drought conditions.  It is one of the crops targeted by the Millennium 
Seed Bank Global Crop Diversity Trust project ‘Adapting Agriculture to Climate Change’ 
which seeks to preserve the wild relatives of key crop foods in order to make them 
available to breeders for the development of new varieties with greater resistance to the 
effects of climate change.31  Due to the nitrogen fixing properties of its roots, it is suitable 
for intercropping with other species and therefore is capable of support increased food 
production. 
In terms of nutrition, the Bambara groundnut is what is known as a complete food, 
due to its very high carbohydrate content (approximately 65%), substantial protein 
content (approximately 20%) and fats (around 6%).32   The nuts can be eaten fresh or 
boiled after drying; salted boiled Bambara groundnuts are commonly eaten as a snack in 
West Africa.  Aside from direct consumption, it can be developed into various other food 
products; for example, it can be used as an alternative source of flour.  One traditional 
use of this type is in cooking dumplings, but it can also be used in cakes and biscuits.33 A 
 
28 F. J. Massawe, S. S. Mwale, S. N. Azam-Ali and J. A. Roberts, ‘Breeding in Bambara groundnut (vigna 
subterranea(L.) Verdc.): strategic considerations’ 2005 4(6) African Journal of Biotechnology 463 at 463 
29 Bioversity, n35 below 
30 ibid 
31 S. Cody, Gwilyn Lewis, ‘Vigna subterranea (Bambara Groundnut)’ available at: 
http://powo.science.kew.org/taxon/urn:lsid:ipni.org:names:525534-1 (accessed: 15th July 2020) 
32 FAO, ‘Traditional crops: Bambarra Groundnut’ available at http://www.fao.org/traditional-





recent project suggests that Bambara flour is an effective supplement to wheat flour in 
the production of commercial baked goods, with the added advantage of having a higher 
protein content than the wheat flour it replaces.34  Thus the advantages of substituting 
Bambara are twofold: supplementing a mainstream crop and increasing the nutritional 
content of the end product.    
Its uses are not limited to human consumption; however, the leafy offshoots of the 
crop are themselves nitrogen and potassium rich, which in turn makes them excellent 
animal feed.35  Furthermore, it is recognised as having various traditional medicinal uses.   
As is the case with many underutilised crops, there are social, cultural, and 
economic factors prohibitive to its uptake.  In the case of Bambara, in some areas it is 
viewed as a poor person’s crop, due to its role in subsistence agriculture.  Similarly, in 
other areas it is largely cultivated by women, which also impedes its cultural status and 
therefore its uptake.  These perception-related issues can be vastly more damaging when 
they are held by those with the power and influence to increase Bambara uptake (for 
example, government officials and crop and seed traders).36 
1.1.4 Development, Innovation, Reward, and the Role of Intellectual Property 
Protection 
 Regardless of the intended scale of their use, realising the potential of underutilised 
crop varieties to address food and nutritional security concerns requires development and 
innovation.  As the GFAR notes, innovations in underutilised crops should be incentivised 
by providing the innovators with the opportunity for significant returns.37  The traditional 
means of according such rewards is an intellectual property right.  Such a right should not 
only serve to reward the innovator for the ‘idea’ behind their innovation,38 but investment 
of time and effort in bringing it to fruition.  The solution to promoting the development of 
 
34 Ferial M. Abu-Salem and Azza A. Abou-Arab, ‘Effects of supplementation of Bambara groundnut (vigna 
subterranea) flour on the quality of biscuits’ (2011) 5(7) African Journal of Food Science 376 
35 Bioversity International, ‘Nutritious and Underutilized Species: Bambara Groundnut (vigna subterranea)’ 
available at http://www.bioversityinternational.org/uploads/tx_news/Nutritious_underutilized_species_-
_Bambara_groundnut_1683_01.pdf (accessed: 15th July 2020) 
36 ibid 
37 GFAR, n14 above, at 3  
38 P. Torremans, Holyoak and Torremans’ Intellectual Property Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 7th ed., 




underutilised crops then, should be the availability of an intellectual property right for the 
developer of a new variety. 
Since the entry into force of the 1994 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, (TRIPS) member states have been obliged to provide patent 
protection for inventions in all technological fields, provided that the invention is new, non-
obvious and useful. Member states may exclude plants and animals aside from 
microorganisms and essentially biological processes; however, they are required to 
provide protection for plant varieties through either patent protection or an alternative sui 
generis system of protection; or a combination of the two.  Alternative sui generis 
protection is generally interpreted as Plant Variety Protection or a Plant Breeder’s Right, 
usually those offered by the various enactments of the International Union for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV).  The recent UPOV Enactments have enjoyed 
considerable success in the West, where they were conceived as a result of plant breeders’ 
concerns over protecting their innovations.39   
The arrival of TRIPS obliged a considerable number of states to introduce 
appropriate legislation offering intellectual property protection for plant varieties where 
previously no such protection had been available.  Many of these states were lower- and 
middle-income states40 situated in Asia and Africa.  Some elected the option of simply 
adopting the most recent UPOV enactment as a model for their new Plant Variety 
Protection laws; others, however, chose to exercise the opportunity to develop alternative 
models of Plant Variety Protection, in line with national priorities.  As a result of this, it is 
unclear what opportunities exist for underutilised crops in terms of IP protection.  
 A separate but related issue that arises is that innovation in plant varieties cannot 
by their very nature be conceived as purely intellectual endeavours: they are dependent 
 
39 Sean C. Butler, A guide to UK and EU plant variety rights (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005) 3-
9 
40 A large volume of the academic discourse pertaining to global intellectual property norms, including the 
TRIPS Agreement itself, relies upon the nomenclature of ‘developed’, ‘developing’ and ‘least developed’ states.  
However, this terminology is problematic, as it is laden with imperialist and colonial connotations.  To that end, 
the terminology has been replaced with the terms ‘high-’, ‘middle-’ and ‘lower- income’ as these more directly 
reflect the economic status of the states being discussed. This is with the exception of where changing the 
terminology might serve to obfuscate the events being discussed; for example, in the discussion of the 




upon external inputs, both in the physical form of plant genetic material and in the form 
of associated agricultural knowledge.  The ownership of traditional germplasm and 
agricultural knowledge is often characterised as one aspect of the broader concept of 
farmers’ rights.  Too often however, the transposition of genetic resources and the 
associated traditional knowledge from the public to the private domain deprives small and 
local producers and rural communities of the benefits arising from their use.41  The 
question is how do we attribute just reward for the individuals and communities that have 
cultivated local varieties or those whose ownership is a recognised product of traditional 
resource rights?  This issue has been recognised primarily by two international 
instruments: the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and its associated Nagoya 
Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits 
Arising from their Utilization (Nagoya Protocol) and the International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGFRA). Both instruments establish 
mechanisms intend to facilitate access to germplasm and traditional agricultural 
knowledge and redistribute the benefits arising out of their use to the recognised 
originators of the resources.  Additionally, the ITPGRFA also explicitly acknowledges the 
contributions of local communities and farmers to the development of available genetic 
resources for agriculture.42  
The theory then, is that the existence of intellectual property rights for newly 
developed varieties should serve to stimulate innovation by offering a direct reward for 
innovators, while at the same time the existing access and benefit sharing provisions and 
the recognition of Farmers’ Rights should ensure that the originators of PGRFA and 
traditional agricultural knowledge are rewarded for their contribution.  The development 
of underutilised crops then, should be adequately supported by innovators engaging with 
this system. 
 
41 Mary E. Footer, ‘A tale of two commons: plant genetic resources and agricultural trade reform’ in Han 
Somsen (ed) The Regulatory Challenge of Biotechnology: Human Genetics, Food and Patents (Cheltnam, 
Edward Elgar, 2007) at 174-175 




However, the reality appears to be somewhat less clear-cut.   Whilst the collection 
of supranational legal frameworks outlined above might appear prima facie to be a 
cohesive framework, in actuality it represents a system of overlapping obligations; all of 
which is subject to national interpretation and therefore highly variable in substantive 
content.   Both IP protection and access and benefit sharing systems raise issues as to 
whether farmers and rural communities are able to engage with and benefit from them: a 
specific issue created by these frameworks is the transfer of access to germplasm from 
individuals to the state in question.  Of equal concern is the degree of technical and legal 
expertise required to access intellectual property protection.  Additionally, the unique 
circumstances and heterogeneous nature of many underutilised crops means that they 
may fall outside of the IP and benefit sharing regimes.  Thus, the existence of a concrete 
legal framework that supports innovations in underutilised crops is in doubt.   
1.2 Aim of Research and Research Questions 
The aim of this project is to analyse the interface between intellectual property 
protection and farmers, small scale agricultural producers and stakeholders in the 
agricultural industry, such as research and development organisations.  This in turn, will 
be used to reflect upon the nature and purpose of intellectual property protection in this 
novel field.  
This project is socio-legal in nature.  While there exists a vast body of literature 
addressing the legal framework for plant genetic resources for food and agriculture43 and 
the cultural role of underutilised crops and traditional knowledge in rural communities,44 
very little of that literature seeks to address either the relationship between IP and 
underutilised crops or the socio-legal interaction between the users of genetic resources 
and access and benefit sharing systems. 
 
43 For example, Patricia Lucia Cantuária Marin, Providing Protection for Plant Genetic Resources: Patents, Sui 
Generis Systems and Biopartnerships (London, Kluwer Law International, 2002) 




It is therefore intended to contribute to the field both theoretically and by adding 
an empirical dimension.  In reference to both germplasm and traditional knowledge, the 
research project will seek to address the following questions: 
 
1) How does intellectual property protection support innovations in underutilised 
crops? Moreover, concurrently, do IP and Benefit Sharing systems effectively 
reward those innovations? 
2) Is intellectual property protection an appropriate tool for addressing food security 
concerns? 
 
Within which, there are two central themes: firstly, what practical issues surround the 
actual usage of intellectual property protection for developments in underutilised crops?  
This necessarily includes identifying the extent to which intellectual property protection is 
compatible with innovations in underutilised crops in a particular set of circumstances.  
Concurrently, there is the issue as to how the mechanisms intended to facilitate access to 
germplasm and redistribute the benefits arising from its use interact with the intellectual 
property protection, and whether these mechanisms facilitate research and development.  
In sum, do intellectual property rights and associated benefit sharing serve to support and 
promote innovation in underutilised crops?    
The second is to consider, at the conceptual level, whether intellectual property 
protection is an appropriate mechanism for attempting to address food security concerns.  
As has already been noted, the TRIPS Agreement requires that protection be available for 
plant varieties, however TRIPS is a trade centred agreement, and as such is not directed 
at development concerns.  Nonetheless, there exists a reasonable consensus that IPRs 
should be support innovations in underutilised varieties and that this should be useful in 
addressing food and nutritional security issues.   
This then raises the issue as to how we assess the potential impact of intellectual 
property on food security.  The concept of food security in itself is relatively straightforward 




food security is ‘ensuring that all people at all times have both physical and economic 
access to the basic food that they need’.   A revised and more comprehensive definition 
was presented at the World Food Summit in 1996, which states that: ‘Food security exists 
when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and 
nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and 
healthy life’.   The FAO identifies four key dimensions of food security: availability of food; 
access to food; utilization of food; and a stable supply of food.   Clearly, the notion of food 
security is complex and multifaceted.   Assessing whether there has been an improvement 
in food security is simply too abstract and complex a task to attempt here.  There are too 
many social, political and economic factors which are difficult to impossible to distinguish 
and quantify.  Furthermore, asserting definitively and empirically the net impact that 
intellectual property protection has had in any given circumstance is reliant upon 
comparing the truth against numerous counterfactual situations.   It is simply beyond the 
scope of the present study.   
Thus, we need another form of indicator as to whether IP might serve to improve 
food security.  As the other key theme of this research is the relationship between 
intellectual property protection and underutilised crop species, the measure as to whether 
the availability of intellectual property protection and/or access and benefit sharing 
systems support addressing food security concerns will be based upon whether those 
mechanisms are accessible and useful for end users.  This is based upon the premise that 
the accessibility and usefulness of the mechanisms will be directly linked to whether 
developers chose to use them, and consequently, whether improved varieties are 
developed and made available. 
Accordingly, the outcome of the first line of inquiry will allow us to pinpoint the legal 
and extra-legal factors, which affect the level of engagement with IP and Access and 
Benefit sharing systems; whereas the second line of inquiry will allow us to consider any 
issues which are a consequence of more systemic concerns resulting from the application 




source of issues affecting the uptake and usage of IP and Access and Benefit sharing will 
in turn allow us to better propose alternatives/amendments to the current systems. 
1.3 Methodology 
The socio-legal nature of the research questions necessitates a mixed methods 
approach.  To that end, this study engages with a selection of doctrinal and qualitative 
methods.  This is supported by a Critical Realist epistemological standpoint.45  This 
approach has been selected as it allows the observation and critical evaluation of the 
external reality, both in terms of the legal background and to subsequently propose 
improvements based upon the outcomes of the research.46  This is supported by a Realist 
ontological position.47 
The selected methods fall broadly within two headings: doctrinal and qualitative.  
Within the heading of doctrinal methods, a black letter approach is used to synthesise a 
coherent understanding of the national and supranational legal frameworks pertinent to 
innovations in underutilised crops.  The critique of the normative framework forms the 
basis for all aspects of the investigation.    
A mixture of qualitative methods is used to develop the case study that builds upon 
and incorporates the doctrinal analysis.  The focus of the case study is to investigate 
aspects of the first research theme.  The case study is based around the IP and ABS 
framework in Malaysia, and primarily upon research and development projects 
surrounding the development of one crop species, the Bambara Groundnut.  The case 
 
45 As an epistemological approach, critical realism incorporates a spectrum of ideas.  The most coherent and 
systematically developed version of the approach is found in the work of Roy Bhaskar, in his Realist Theory of 
Science and subsequent publications.  The central component of realism is that an external world exists, 
independent of, and often defying our desires of it and attempts to understand and change it.  The external 
world is in principle knowable or discoverable.  Critical realism is fallibilist, and open to the possibility of being 
wrong.  From a methodological perspective, what this means is that we are able to use empirical methods to 
discern reality through observation.  We can then in turn build upon these observations to generate theory.  
Furthermore, critical realism supports the development of proposals for changing observed realities that are 
unsatisfactory, as a commitment to changing unsatisfactory realities is inherent to the approach. See, Ted 
Benton and Ian Craib, Philosophy of Social Science: The Philosophical Foundations of Social Thought 
(Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan; 2012) at 120-141 
46 ibid, at 121 
47 Realism, as an ontological position, is the belief that there are real existing entities behind universal or 
general ideas.   In the present context, this can be expressed as the standpoint that there is such a thing as 
intellectual property or intellectual property protection that goes beyond the mere idea.  See, Simon Blackburn, 
Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Online edition, 2nd revision, 2016), available at: 
https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199541430.001.0001/acref-9780199541430-e-




study based approach is necessary for purposes of scale and access.  Engaging with 
research and development projects not only facilitates access to participants and 
observation of the research and development process, but it is also useful in limiting the 
framing of the study, both in terms of the huge variety of underutilised crop species and 
local legal regimes.   
The selected qualitative method is an ethnographic approach, although it is not 
intended to be an ethnography in the traditional, anthropological sense.  Rather, the 
intention is to draw upon the ethnographic methodology of compiling various qualitative 
observations in order to produce a complete understanding of the crop development 
process, and how, this in turn reflects upon the legal reality. This is based on the premise 
that in order to best understand science, you should look at what practitioners do, rather 
than the results it produces. 48   This aspect of the qualitative inquiry is based on thick 
description, drawn from observational data and semi-structured interviews.  Thus, the 
purpose of this descriptive data is to document and characterise the crop development 
process which can then be used to critique the IP and access and benefit sharing 
framework.  Within the ethnographic approach, further qualitative research was 
undertaken through the medium of semi-structured interviews.  The objective of which 
was to access expert and local knowledge on the process of crop research and 
development, and opinions and understandings relevant to the IP and Benefit sharing 
framework.  The semi-structured method was based around open ended questions in order 
to allow participants to include any information that they believe to be relevant and to 
support the development of unexpected ideas and themes. The questions were open 
ended, designed to access participants’ knowledge, opinions, values and experiences 
relevant to both cultivating and developing underutilised crops and the pertinent legal 
framework.   
Ethical approval for this study was sought and received the University of 
Nottingham Ethics Committee in October 2016.  A small number of ad hoc scoping 
 




interviews took place between January 2017 and July 2018.   The main collection of data 
took place during January 2019; this was supplemented with written follow up questions 
until October 2019.  Participants were drawn from the following organizations: Bioversity 
International, Crops for the Future, the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture, the 
International Islamic University of Malaysia, the Plant Variety Protection Office of Malaysia, 
the Sabah Biodiversity Centre, and the Sarawak Biodiversity Centre. 
In total, there were 23 formal participants in the study, although ad hoc 
commentary was also provided by additional participants associated with the organizations 
given above.  Although this number does not appear particularly large, it not only 
represents a high percentage of the experts in the field, but also a substantial spread 
across the related heads of expertise.  It is highly unlikely given the necessary restrictions 
on the study (the focus on underutilised crop species, specifically the Bambara groundnut) 
that a considerably wider group of expert participants could have been achieved.  
Participants included: crop scientists;49 food product development and quality 
professionals;50 experts in the field of intellectual property protection and access and 
benefit sharing in Malaysia; and officials from the Malaysian Plant Variety Protection Office.   
The identities, occupations, and direct quotes of individual interview participants 
remain confidential.  The anonymization of participants’ comments was a requirement of 
access in certain cases.  Due to the fact that the participants were drawn from a relatively 
small pool, anonymity was maintained across the group so as not to affect or caused 
conflict in participants’ relationships with third parties or their employers.  The inclusion 
of the participants’ remarks was subject to the informed consent of the participants, on 
the basis that participants’ were free to withdraw at any point until the submission of this 
work and that any data pertaining to their participation would be destroyed.  The interview 
notes are stored in hard copy with the researcher.  Digital recordings of interview audio 
are stored on the University of Nottingham’s research drive, subject to its data retention 
 
49 The term ‘crop scientists’ is used as an umbrella term here to encompass various crop related roles, 
including agronomists, crop geneticists, agricultural management experts, and crop technicians, among others. 
50 The term ‘food development product development and quality professionals’ refers to individuals whose roles 




policy.   Separate copies of the interview audio are stored by the researcher, along with 
digital copies of interview notes on a purpose specific encrypted data storage device.   
1.4  Structure 
Chapters two through five will serve to outline the collection of international legal 
frameworks relating to underutilised crops and traditional knowledge.  Chapter two will 
focus on the TRIPS Agreement.  This will begin with an analysis of the substantive content 
of article 27.3(b) and will include the drafting history of the provision.  The implications of 
articles 7 & 8, concerning the objectives and principles of the TRIPS Agreement for the 
content of article 27.3(b) will be considered. It will then explore the idea of an ‘effective 
sui generis system’ and sui generis intellectual property rights. Furthermore, it will explore 
the role of bi and multilateral trade agreements (TRIPS plus) on states’ options for 
implementing article 27.3(b). 
Chapter three will consider the various enactments of the International Union for 
the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV).  It will explore the development of the 
Enactments to the Convention and the institutional structure of the UPOV regime.  It will 
then review the key concepts under the Convention, such as ‘plant varieties’ and ‘plant 
breeders’ rights’, before considering the substantive content and requirements for a plant 
breeders’ right.  This will be followed by an analysis of whether the UPOV system of plant 
variety protection can be considered a tool for addressing food security concerns. 
 Chapter four will consider the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture.  It will analyse the Multilateral System of Access and the Benefit 
Sharing, including the mechanism for accessing genetic resources, the Standard Material 
Transfer Agreement and the Benefit Sharing Fund.  It will explore the concept of Farmers’ 
Rights as presented by the Treaty, in the context of their difficult emergence in 
international law and their potential as an effective counterweight to private property 
rights.  It will also examine the compatibility between the ITPGRFA and TRIPS, and the 




Chapter five will then move on to discuss the Convention on Biological Diversity 
and the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits Arising out of Their Use.  The purpose of this section is to consider the 
implications of the provisions concerning the sustainable use of the components of 
biodiversity, access to genetic resources and distribution of the benefits of biotechnology 
in the context of intellectual property protection for underutilised crops.  This will be split 
into two parts.  The first part will consider the Convention on Biological Diversity.  It will 
analyse the framework nature of the Convention and the implications of this, before 
moving on to discuss the principles of access and benefit sharing it established, as well as 
the relationship between the principles of the CBD and intellectual property protection.   
The second part will focus on the Nagoya Protocol, including its elaborated regime for 
access to genetic resources and traditional knowledge and linked with this, the direct and 
indirect benefit sharing mechanisms created by the Protocol.  It will also examine the 
various compliance mechanisms established by the protocol.  Finally, it will explore the 
differences and the relationship between the access and benefit sharing regimes under the 
ITPGRFA and the Nagoya Protocol. 
 Chapters six and seven will form two halves of the case study, focused upon the 
development of underutilised crops in Malaysia.  The first part, chapter six, will consider 
the Malaysia and its food security concerns; before critiquing the current system of plant 
variety protection and the various tiers of the access and benefit sharing framework.  This 
will form the basis for the analysis in chapter seven.   
 Chapter seven will be based around the empirical aspect of the case study.  It will 
use the qualitative data to synthesise a narrative of the development of the Bambara 
groundnut in Malaysia and consider how it might be useful in meeting the country’s food 
security objectives, highlighting IP and ABS concerns along the way.  It will outline the 
benefit sharing projects that have been funded in Malaysia.  It will then engage in an 
analysis of the access, IP and benefit sharing concerns that arise out of the development 




question as to whether the current IP framework in Malaysia serves to support 
developments in underutilised crop species. 
 Chapter eight will serve to review the outcomes of the previous chapters and as a 
conclusion. 
1.5 Terminology 
As has been discussed above, the purpose of this research is to examine whether 
the certain legal constructs – in this case, intellectual property rights – are a useful and 
accessible tool for stimulating development and rewarding innovation in the case of 
underutilised crops; specifically, the Bambara groundnut.  Thus, this socio-legal approach 
necessitates testing the selected legal constructs against the corresponding reality.  
However, the two legal constructs central to the analysis, plant variety protection and sui 
generis intellectual property protection, do not have a universally held meaning.  For this 
reason, it is necessary to have working definitions of these constructs to provide a point 
of reference when undertaking the theoretical analysis of IP in chapter two and more 
importantly, as a guide during both the data collection and analysis phases of the case 
studies. 
1.5.1 Plant Variety Protection, Plant Breeders’ Rights and Alternative Plant 
Variety Protection  
 Plant variety protection (PVP) and plant breeders’ rights (PBR) are the traditional 
mechanism for according an intellectual property right to the creator of an eligible plant 
variety.  This form of IP protection was the product of negotiations that took place in the 
1950s between plant breeders from various states including the USA, Germany, France, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom with the intention of developing a new method 
of protecting plant varieties from the various methods that had previously been employed 
as a result of plant innovations not conforming to the technical requirements of patent 
protection.51  The result of the negotiations was the 1961 Enactment of the International 
 




Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants,52 which introduced plant variety 
protection.  Whilst the ideas underpinning this new right broadly reflect those underpinning 
patent protection, its technical requirements have been engineered to suit the specific 
nature of innovations in plant varieties.  UPOV is therefore the bench mark for Plant Variety 
Protection.  
Under the most recent 1991 UPOV enactment, plant variety protection is available to 
all botanical genera and species that fulfil the criteria of being New, Distinct, Uniform and 
Stable. These criteria will be considered briefly in turn: 
(i) New: A variety is considered new if it has not been offered for sale in the 
territory of the state of application in the last year, or in another state in the 
last four years.53 
(ii) Distinct: a new plant variety is considered distinct if it is clearly identifiable by 
one or more important characteristics from any other variety in common 
knowledge (for example, having been entered in an official register of varieties) 
at the time of application.54  “Characteristics” may be defined as morphological 
or physiological characteristics, and must be capable of precise description and 
recognition.   Of special note is the qualification “important”: this permits states 
parties to implement regulation that may prevent the frivolous grant of rights 
over a new variety with only minimal differences from existing protected 
varieties; or alternately to determine what characteristics are relevant to 
distinguishing a new variety dependent upon species.  
(iii) Uniform: a new variety should be “sufficiently homogenous”, in particular 
relating to its reproductive or propagative characteristics. 55 
(iv) Stable: a new variety should be stable in its essential characteristics, and 
remain so after repeated reproduction or propagation.  Due to their technical 
 
52 ‘UPOV’ is the acronym of the French name of the organisation: Union Internationale por la protection des 
obtentions végétales 
53 UPOV, art. 6 
54 UPOV, art.7 




nature, complete expansion of the requirements of Uniformity and Stability are 
addressed on a species basis in the UPOV DUS Test Guidelines.56 
Thus, a Plant Breeders’ Right under the 1991 Act applies in regard to a single plant 
variety, which is defined as a plant grouping with a single botanical taxon of the lowest 
known rank which can be defined by the expression of characteristics which result from a 
genotype or combination thereof and can be distinguished from other varieties on the 
basis of that expression and can be considered as a unit with regard to its suitability for 
being propagated and unchanged.    
A breeder may be an individual, their employer or legal person.  Under the 1991 Act, 
a successful applicant for plant variety protection will have monopoly over the production 
and reproduction,57 conditioning for the purpose of propagation,58 offering for sale,59 
selling or marketing,60 import,61 export62 and stocking for any of these purposes.63  This 
monopoly applies to the vegetative and propagating material of the registered variety, 
including whole plants64 and extends to harvested material or products derived thereof 
obtained through unauthorised use of propagating material from protected varieties, 
unless the breeder has had sufficient opportunity to exercise their rights.65  
The concept of Alternative Plant Variety Protection is more difficult to address.  If UPOV 
style plant variety protection is generally taken to be the standard form of plant variety 
protection, then Alternative PVP is necessarily what falls outside of the UPOV paradigm.  
Aside from this somewhat obvious observation, it is not strictly possible to define the 
characteristics of Alternative PVP, as there exists a broad spectrum of approaches.  Some 
examples include: the adoption of alternative criteria to the DUS requirement;66 protection 
 
56 UPOV, art. 9 
57 UPOV, art. 14(1)(a)(i) 
58 UPOV, art. 14(1)(a)(ii) 
59 UPOV, art. 14(1)(a)(iii) 
60 UPOV, art. 14(1)(a)(iv) 
61 UPOV, art. 14(1)(a)(v) 
62 UPOV, art. 14(1)(a)(vi) 
63 UPOV, art. 14(1)(a)(vii) 
64 UPOV, art. 14(2) 
65 UPOV, art. 14(3) 




for extant and farmers’ varieties;67  protection for local and domestic varieties;68 protection 
of general domestic plant varieties and wild plant varieties.69  Some alternative approaches 
better reflect a registration and licensing regime rather than an intellectual property right 
in the traditional sense.  A number of these examples will be considered it greater depth.  
Thus, the term escapes precise definition. 
 For the purpose of this work: 
• Plant Variety Protection and Plant Breeders’ Rights are taken to mean an intellectual 
property right for an eligible plant variety that conforms with UPOV standards.  It 
is not necessary for a given state to be a contracting party to any UPOV enactment, 
as a number of states have adopted UPOV style protection without acceding to the 
convention.  These may be referred to as ‘traditional Plant Variety Protection’ or 
‘traditional Plant Breeders’ Rights’ for purposes of clarity.  
• Alternative Plant Variety protection refers to a unique, sui generis intellectual 
property right or one that is distinctly different from traditional Plant Variety 
Protection that arises out of national legislation   
 
1.5.2 sui generis, sui generis rights, sui generis systems 
In the discourse on intellectual property protection for innovations in plant 
varieties, the term ‘sui generis’ is frequently encountered.  The TRIPS Agreement 
introduces the idea of an effective sui generis system of protection for inventions 
concerning plant varieties.  The term ‘sui generis’ is Latin for ‘of its own kind’.70 In other 
words, ‘sui generis’ refers to a unique form of intellectual property protection.  There is no 
reference in the text nor the drafting history71 of the TRIPS Agreement as to what should 
constitute an effective sui generis system.  It is the view of a number of states parties that 
‘sui generis’ should be taken that the protection provided by the UPOV system, and in 
 
67 India: Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers Rights Act 2001, s.15(2), s. 41 
68 Thailand: Plant Varieties Protection Act 1999, s.11(3) 
69  ibid, s.43, s.11 
70 ‘sui generis’  OED Online, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, June 2016) available at 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/193700?redirectedFrom=sui+generis#eid (accessed: 15th July 2020) 
71 Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis (4th ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 




particular its 1991 enactment, is the effective system to which the provision is referring.72  
This view is particularly prominent among the industrialised nations that promoted the 
creation and expansion of the UPOV system.  Many have adopted this approach in order 
to comply with the TRIPS Agreement or have introduced similar legislation into national 
law without acceding to the Union.  However, there is no requirement for states to accede 
to the Convention or adopt a similar approach.   
The alternative view is that the UPOV system is but one example of an effective sui 
generis system, and that art. 27.3(b) leaves member states the freedom to select or 
develop a system that meets their national needs and priorities.73  This view is consistent 
with the Objectives and Principles outlined in arts. 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement, which 
asserts that member states should adopt measures ‘in a manner conductive to social and 
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations’.  Furthermore, member states 
are permitted to ‘adopt measures necessary to promote public health and nutrition, and 
to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their social and economic 
development’ in the formulation of their national laws. 
Thus, there is some disagreement as to the scope and substance of a sui generis 
system for protecting innovations in plant varieties.  What is more, it is clear that there 
are two distinct concepts referred to by the term sui generis: an intellectual property right 
and a broader system, which includes the interests of various stakeholders.  By process of 
reduction, the only characteristics that can be attributed to a sui generis IPR are the same 
as other rights mandated by the TRIPS Agreement: that they are private rights and in 
relation to certain acts covered by an IPR, confer no further exclusive right other than 
equitable remuneration for the rights holder.      
However, as a result of the diverse range of interests in developments in plant 
varieties, particularly in developing and biodiversity rich parts of the world, sui generis 
intellectual property protection for crop varieties sits on the nexus between intellectual 
property protection, conservation regimes and traditional rights (including farmers’ 
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rights).  Consequently, it is arguable that a sui generis system is composed not only of a 
sui generis IPR but a collection of overlapping voluntary and non-voluntary obligations.74  
In fact, some states have modelled their approach to protection for plant varieties around 
this idea, by building IP protection for plant varieties, benefits for resource holders and 
biodiversity into the same legislative framework.75    Even where this is not the case, for 
analytical purposes it is possible to theoretically construct such a system by identifying 
the various components. 
A further point to clarify is the confusion that surrounds the term ‘sui generis 
system’.  Whilst the lack of a concrete definition has already been established, the precise 
meaning of the term is further clouded by the broad range of subject matter to which 
various authors have applied it.  For example, the term is often used to refer to farmers’ 
rights. 
Thus, for the purposes of this research: 
• the term ‘sui generis right’ will be taken to mean an intellectual property right in 
a plant variety, other than those explicitly referred to in the text of the TRIPS 
Agreement.  This will include both traditional UPOV style plant variety protection 
and alternative forms of plant variety protection.  
• the term ‘sui generis system’ will be used more broadly to refer to frameworks 
containing inter alia, sui generis intellectual property rights, farmers’ rights and 
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Chapter 2: The 1994 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property 
2.1 Introduction  
At the very centre of the present analysis, is the fact that states parties are required 
to make available intellectual property protection for plant-based innovations.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, this near universal76 obligation stems from the 1994 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS, TRIPS Agreement).  
It is therefore the objective of the chapter to develop an understanding of that obligation 
in context, and how it intersects with food security concerns and the consequences of this 
obligation for the development of underutilised crop varieties. 
To recall from the previous chapter, we are considering whether intellectual 
property protection is useful device in the development of underutilised crops and whether 
it might aid in addressing food security concerns.  As a trade focused agreement, with a 
subject matter of IP protection, TRIPS does not directly address developmental concerns 
such as food security per se.  However, as a result of requiring states to make IP protection 
available for plant-based innovations, it inevitably intersects with food security concerns.  
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the content of the TRIPS Agreement in the 
context of those concerns.   
This chapter will first briefly consider the history of the TRIPS Agreement, both 
prior to and during its negotiation; it will examine the linkage between IP and trade and 
how has this shaped the outcome of the TRIPS Agreement.  It will then include an 
examination of the notion of sui generis IP protection, in order to answer the question: 
what is sui generis intellectual property protection as envisaged by the TRIPS Agreement?  
This will form the basis for the case study analysis in chapters six and seven.  It will then 
consider the relevance of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, or so called ‘TRIPS 
Plus’ agreements, on member states ability to develop and implement suitable IP rights 
for plant-based innovations.  Finally, it will consider the dispute settlement and compliance 
 




mechanisms incorporated into TRIPS, and their relevance for member states in 
implementing article 27.3(b). 
2.2 Background 
The relationship between international trade and intellectual property rights began 
to develop in the 1970s.  During this period, there was a gradual realisation among high 
and middle income states that counterfeit goods were negatively affecting trade 
revenues.77   This lead to a draft anti-counterfeiting agreement between the US and the 
European Economic Community in 1979.78  Its sole focus was to address trade in falsely 
trademarked goods. 79  While the draft agreement between the US and the EEC was not 
adopted, it stimulated discussion on the position of IP protection within the arena of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  
During the early to mid-1980s, the US government experienced persistent lobbying 
from industry concerns about the impact of counterfeit products and copyright piracy 
prompted significant upon trade returns and investment, estimated to be causing losses 
of tens of billions of dollars;80 who consequently argued that there existed a need for global 
minimum standards for IP protection.81  At the same time, the International Intellectual 
Property Alliance (IIPA)82 produced a study indicating that ineffective copyright laws in 
larger and more advanced developing economies was directly responsible for large scale 
losses by US industries.83   
 
77 Michael Blakeney, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Concise Guide to the TRIPS 
Agreement, (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1996) at 1 
78 ‘Agreement on Measures to discourage the Importation of Counterfeit Goods’ (L/4817, 31 July 1979)  
79 Charles Clift, ‘Why IPR issues were brought to GATT: a historical perspective on the origins of TRIPS’ in 
Carlos M. Correa (ed), Research Handbook on the Protection of Intellectual Property under the WTO Rules: 
Intellectual Property in the WTO Volume I (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2010) at 5 
80 Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis (4th ed; London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
2008) at 12 
81 Clift, n79 above, at 6-7 
82 Formed in 1984, the IIPA is a coalition of seven trade associations representing US copyright based 
industries.  See, https://www.iipa.org/about/ (accessed; 15th July 2020) 
83 IIPA, Piracy of US Counterfeited Works in Ten Selected Countries (1985) at 7; cited in Michael Blakeney, 
Intellectual Property Law and Enforcement: A Commentary on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 




The revisions of the Paris84 and the Berne Conventions85 taking place in the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) during this period failed to manifest the stronger 
IP standards desired by developed states.8687  The US proposed that the Uruguay round of 
the GATT consider all aspects of intellectual property rights, asserting its belief that the 
GATT was an appropriate forum for the enforcement of IPRs.88  This was met with mixed 
responses; the EEC remained ambivalent as to the appropriateness of GATT as a forum, 
however many lower and middle income states, including Brazil and India, were hostile to 
the development.89  Ultimately, a mandate for the negotiation of an agreement concerning 
the ‘trade-related’ aspects of intellectual property rights was included in the Punta del Este 
Declaration during the Uruguay round of the GATT.90   
The rationale for its inclusion was to reduce distortions or impediments to trade 
and to prevent the enforcement of IPRs becoming a barrier to trade.  The declaration also 
gave the scope to ‘elaborate as appropriate new rules and disciplines’; thus opening the 
door to the obligatory provision of IPRs in the field of biotechnology.  The link between IP 
protection and trade was therefore firmly cemented before the negotiation of the 
Agreement began. 
Negotiation of the Agreement began in 1987.  The first challenge was defining the 
scope of the Agreement, as the mandate had not established what exactly the ‘trade-
related’ aspects of intellectual property were.  Initially, there was little progress as a 
number of lower and middle income states, most prominently Brazil and India, continued 
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to question the relevance of GATT as a forum for an agreement on intellectual property 
and maintained that the scope of the agreement should be interpreted restrictively.91  One 
of the main reasons for the resistance of many lower and middle income states in Asia, 
Africa and the Pacific against a comprehensive agreement on IP was that many had only 
recently liberated themselves from colonially imposed IP regimes and in some cases, had 
deliberately scaled back the available IP protection in order to support their development 
aims.92 
During the Mid-Term Review from 1988-1989, a framework for the agreement 
emerged.  This included, inter alia, the provision of adequate standards and principles 
concerning the availability, scope and use of trade-related intellectual property rights; the 
provision of effective means of enforcement of IPRs; and an effective means of dispute 
settlement between governments.93  Thus, the content of domestic IP regimes was now 
firmly established as an arm of the international trading regime. 
The drafting process came to a head in March 1990 when the European Community 
proposed a text entitled ‘Draft Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights’ which concerned all aspects of IP protection, its enforcement and relevant 
principles.94  This was followed by proposed texts from the United States,95 Switzerland96 
and Japan.97  This was met by increased participation from a number of lower and middle 
income states, including submissions of a detailed proposal on measures the availability, 
scope and use of IPRs in addition to draft rules on counterfeit goods98 by a group of 14 
developing countries.99   
The developed states’ texts were compiled into a ‘composite draft text’ which is 
often referred to as the ‘A’ text; and the developing countries’ counterproposals were 
 
91 Blakeney, n77 above, at 4 
92 Carolyn Deere-Birkbeck, ‘Developing countries in the global IP system before TRIPS: the political context for 
the TRIPS negotiations’ in Correa (ed) 2010, n79 above, at 22-28 
93 MTN.TNC/11 (April 21, 1989) at 21 
94 MTN.GNG/NG11/W/68 (March 29, 1990) 
95 MTN.GNG/NG11/W/70 (May 11, 1990) 
96 ‘Draft Amendment to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade on the Protection of Trade Related 
Intellectual Property Rights’ MTN/GNG/NG11/W/73 (May 14, 1990)  
97 ‘Main Elements of a Legal Text for TRIPS’ MTN.GNG/NG11/w/74 (May 14, 1990) 
98 Yusuf, n87 above, at 13 
99 The initial proposal was tabled by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Columbia, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria, 





branded as the ‘B’ text.  The two approaches differed in both substance and structure.  
The B text was eventually abandoned by developing countries who instead pursued 
flexibilities in the A text.100  Elements of the B text were incorporated into the A text; most 
notably articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement, concerning its objectives and principles, 
although its influence can also be found elsewhere.101  Negotiations over the details of the 
text continued until December 1991, when the so-called ‘Dunkel draft’ of the Agreement 
was produced, which broadly mirrors the final draft.102 
The TRIPS Agreement was adopted at Marrakesh on April 15 1994 as Annex 1C of 
the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations and entered into force for developed members on January 1st 1996; for 
developing country members on January 1st 2000, with the option to delay protection in 
certain areas for five years; and for least developed states on January 1st 2006.103    
As is clear from the text of the TRIPS, most, if not all aspects of IP are considered 
to be trade-related and are thus within the scope of the Agreement.  In the sphere of 
biotechnology and plant-based innovations, it has been necessary for many lower- and 
middle- income states to implement measures in order to meet their obligations under art. 
27.3(b) TRIPS.  The Agreement provides for minimum universal standards in all fields of 
intellectual property protection104 and as such, leaves the implementation of the substance 
of the Agreement to individual member states.  This in theory, should allow sufficient 
flexibility for states to introduce solutions which support their development and food 
security aims.  However, this flexibility is still relative to the stronger IP standards desired 
by high income states and is subject to implementation and enforcement mechanisms 
which are considered below.   
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2.3 TRIPS and plant-based innovations 
Plant-based innovations are addressed by article 27 of TRIPS, which concerns 
patentable subject matter.  It provides that: 
 ‘patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of 
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial 
application’.105   
However, states are permitted to exclude plant and animals (other than micro-organisms) 
from patentability provided that IP protection is available for plant varieties either in the 
form of plant specific patents, an alternative ‘effective sui generis’ form of IP protection, 
or a combination thereof.106  Thus, the provision for protecting innovations in plant 
varieties exists as an exception to patentability. 
 Prima facie, article 27.3(b) appears to be flexible in its applicability.  This apparent 
flexibility is a product of the particularly contentious provision in the drafting of the 
Agreement which was the subject of a number of north-north and north-south divides.107  
Among high income states, debate was centred upon the extent of application of IP 
protection to the field of biotechnology.108   Lower and middle income states raised 
numerous concerns, including the moral issues surrounding the ‘patenting of life’, and in 
particular, concerns of bio piracy and the exploitation of the resources of the genetically 
wealthy south by the technologically advanced north.109  These concerns are not explicitly 
reflected in the text of article 27.3(b).  However, they can be viewed more broadly as an 
aspect of member states option to develop their own solution for implementing article 
27.3(b), appropriate to their needs and concerns, which may include the conservation of 
biological diversity and safeguarding food security concerns.    
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In common with its other substantial provisions, the interpretation of the extent of 
obligations arising out of article 27.3(b) TRIPS can be supplemented by other relevant 
components of the TRIPS Agreement.  The preamble recognises both ‘the underlying public 
policy objectives of national systems for the protection of intellectual property, including 
developmental and technological objectives;’ and ‘the special needs of the least-developed 
country Members in respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic implementation of laws 
and regulations’.  Equally, article 7 on the objectives of the Agreement states that: ‘The 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation ... in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations’.  In the same vein, article 8.1 permits 
member states to adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition.  
This then raises the question as to whether these provisions permit member states 
additional flexibility in their implementation of article 27.3(b)?  According to article 31.1 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,110 the term of a treaty are to be 
interpreted in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning to the terms of the 
treaty in the light of its objective and purpose. Thus, the designation of articles 7 and 8 as 
the objectives and principles is a strong indication that they are relevant for assessing the 
objective and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement, as they are structural provisions which 
overarch the substantive provisions of the Agreement.111  To that end, the values 
expressed in articles 7 and 8.1 should be factored into any implementation of TRIPS 
obligations.  This reflects the basic mission of the WTO, to promote trade and economic 
development; it might therefore be suggested that the function of the objectives and 
principles of TRIPS is to provide a balance between the holders and users of knowledge.112 
However, assigning any concrete significance to these provisions in its 
interpretation of TRIPS obligations has been largely avoided by the Dispute Settlement 
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Body (DSB).113  It is therefore difficult to attribute any particular relevance to the 
provisions.  The best possible argument that might be made is that they provide a degree 
of flexibility for balancing the implementation of IPRs against other obligations, but it is 
questionable whether this provides any more flexibility than already exists in the wording 
of article 27.3(b).  Thus, on paper at least, it appears that there is sufficient elasticity built 
into TRIPS obligation to allow member states to implement article 27.3(b) in line with their 
needs and priorities obligations, provided that it is still consistent with their other 
obligations arising out of the TRIPS Agreement. 
2.3.1 The review of art. 27.3(b) 
Art. 27.3(b) contained a built-in provision for review after five years, which was 
scheduled to take place in 1999.  This was before many lower and middle income states 
were required to have implemented the substantive provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.  
At the time, many lower and middle income states hoped that the review might serve to 
clarify the scope of their obligations and that it might present the opportunity to revise the 
substance of the article to better accommodate their development needs.114  The process 
of the review began in December 1998, but did not reach a conclusive outcome, nor did it 
provide developing states with answers in the time frame they had anticipated. 
The review process began on uneven ground when the agenda was defined by 
developed countries as being restricted to the implementation of the provision, rather than 
its substance as was argued for by many developing states.115  The scope of the review 
was further limited by the fact that only developed countries were obliged to have 
implemented the provision by this point.  The initial review on implementation took the 
format of a relatively short questionnaire to which some 30 states responded.116 
 
113 For example Canada: Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products – Report of the Panel (17 March 2000) 
WT/DS114/R; European Communities: Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural 
Products and Foodstuffs (15 March 2005) WT/DS174 & 290/R (EC – TMs & GIs). 
114 GRAIN, ‘For a Full Review of TRIPS 27.3(b): An update on where developing countries stand with the push 
to patent life at WTO’ (March 2000) available at https://www.grain.org/article/entries/39-for-a-full-review-of-
trips-27-3-b (accessed: 15th July 2020) at 2 
115 Ibid, at 3 





Discussion of the substance of the provision did take place in the latter half of 1999, 
when India presented its analysis of the issues faced by developing states regarding art. 
27.3(b).  Its submission raised questions on the ethics of patenting life; the incompatibility 
of industrial property with traditional knowledge sharing systems and the need to reconcile 
the provision with the Convention on Biological Diversity.117  With particular regard to sui 
generis systems of IP protection, it is interesting to note that India considered the 
provision to contain sufficient latitude for member states to develop an effective means 
for providing protection for plant varieties which was flexible enough to incorporate 
development and policy objectives, as well as meeting obligations from other international 
agreements.118  It concluded that assessing the scope of an effective sui generis system 
was perhaps best left to individual member states. 
In the debate that took place in the following months, nearly 100 lower and middle 
income states submitted nine distinct proposals concerning the reform of art. 27.3(b).119  
These positions were rejected by high income states, although there was a spread of 
opinion among high income states as to the strictness of the provision. 
Thus, at the end of the review the TRIPS Council decided to leave the matter for 
future meetings and noted the “non-outcome” of the review process.120  Issues raised that 
remained unaddressed included the scope of the exceptions to patentability; ethical 
exceptions to patentability; applicability of patent protection to plant varieties; the 
applicability of patent protection to plant varieties; the availability of plant variety 
protection; the elements of ‘effective sui generis’ protection; the relationship between 
TRIPS and UPOV; provisions concerning transfer of technology; and the relationship 
between TRIPS and traditional knowledge and farmers’ rights.121  Essentially, the review 
produced little by way of results and failed to meet expectations. 
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The issue of art. 27.3(b) arose again in the context of the Doha Development Round 
of the WTO, beginning in 2001.  Paragraph 19 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration instructs 
the TRIPS Council to continue its review of art. 27.3(b) and the relationship between TRIPS 
and the Convention on Biological Diversity, with particular emphasis on the interests of 
developing countries in this regard.122  Despite the fact that numerous rounds of 
discussions have taken place since then, no significant progress has been made.  Thus, 
while the review cannot be considered a total failure, because at the very least it has 
managed to keep the discussion concerning the uncertainties of art. 27.3(b) alive; it does 
not appear to have achieved any notable success.  From the perspective of developing 
states seeking to balance supporting agricultural innovation and safeguarding local 
biodiversity and traditional knowledge, this lends a regrettable uncertainty to their 
development of any sui generis regime.  It is suggested that resolution of these issues 
would be valuable as it would allow developing states to address their local food and 
nutritional security concerns with certainty that they are not in breach of their TRIPS 
obligations.  
 
2.4 Options for plant-based innovations under TRIPS 
As has been noted, at the time of entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement a large 
number of lower- and middle-income states had rejected many forms of intellectual and 
industrial property protection.  This included IP protection for to plant-based 
innovations.123  As a result, TRIPS was the direct motivation for the introduction of 
intellectual property protection for plant-based innovations in many states.  Thus, TRIPS 
left a considerable number of lower- and middle- income states with the options of either 
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adapting its patent law to accommodate plant-based innovations, adopting sui generis 
protection, or both.124  
Plant specific patent protection is an option that has been adopted in a number of 
countries. Under art. 27.3(b) it is possible for innovations based upon other aspects of 
plant material to be protected by ordinary patent protection where it meets the normal 
requirements; for example, inventions concerning plant genetic material.125  Similarly, it 
is also within the scope of the article for plant varieties themselves to be protected under 
ordinary patent law where it has been drafted in a manner that accommodates plant 
varieties.126 
One possible option for implementing sui generis intellectual property protection 
for plant-based innovations is for states to adopt one of the Enactments of the 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV).  UPOV was the 
internationally established model of sui generis PVP during the negotiation of the TRIPS 
Agreement.  To a certain extent, UPOV may be considered a default sui generis option for 
PVP.  However, TRIPS does not require member states to implement UPOV.  There are a 
number of reasons for this.  First, article 1.1 TRIPS gives member states the freedom to 
determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of the Agreement within 
their own legal system and practice.  To require member states to subscribe to a specific 
sui generis system of PVP would fundamentally undercut this freedom.  The fact that TRIPS 
does not stipulate UPOV is in itself significant, as where the drafters of the Agreement 
intended member states to follow the principles set out in an existing international IP 
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treaty, they are explicitly referred to in the text of the TRIPS Agreement.127  Of particular 
relevance to this point is article 2.1 TRIPS, which stipulates that ‘In respect of Parts II, III 
and IV of this Agreement, Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 12, and Article 
19 of the Paris Convention (1967)’.  Thus, if the drafters had intended compliance with 
UPOV in the meaning of article 27.3(b), it would state as much. 
As has been previously noted, TRIPS was the impetus for many states, and in 
particular, lower- and middle- income states, to implement any type of IP protection for 
plant varieties.  There was a strong preference among many lower- and middle- income 
states for the previous 1978 UPOV Enactment which offered more flexibility than the 
version of sui generis PVP contained in the 1991 Enactment, which favours the breeders’ 
rights over other competing interests.  Therefore, many lower- and middle- income states 
were resistant to the notion of adopting the later enactment.   
Linked with this, was the fact that at the same time that the TRIPS Agreement was 
being negotiated, the UPOV Council was in the process of producing the (then) new 1991 
UPOV Enactment.  A pragmatic reason for the lack of reference to the UPOV Convention 
was timing: it was considered premature to refer to the 1991 Enactment, which was not 
yet in force; and outdated to refer to the 1978 Enactment that was being replaced.128 
A further reason why TRIPS does not prescribe UPOV as an effective sui generis 
system of PVP is that TRIPS requires states parties to structure their laws in ways that the 
UPOV Enactments do not.  For example, article 3 TRIPS requires member states to adopt 
the principle of national treatment.  This principle is also expressed in the 1978 and 1991 
UPOV Enactments.129  However, the principle as espoused under UPOV only applies to 
other states parties to the UPOV members, whereas TRIPS requires the principle be 
extended to all WTO members.  Therefore, compelling member states to merely subscribe 
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to either of the UPOV Enactments would leave them in violation of their wider TRIPS 
obligations.130 
If states chose to reject both patent protection for plant varieties and the model of 
plant variety protection provided for by the UPOV Enactments, then the alternative is that 
states are able to develop their own sui generis system for the protection of plant-based 
innovations, in line with their national needs and priorities.  This approach has successfully 
been adopted in a number of states, such as India, Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia, 
among others.131  The issue as to what constitutes effective sui generis protection is 
considered in section 2.5 below. 
However, the ability of member states to develop an appropriate sui generis 
solution for their implementation of article 27.3(b) may be limited by so called ‘TRIPS Plus’ 
Agreements.  These are bi- and multilateral trade agreements between states parties 
which form part of the wider body of WTO and TRIPS law and require states to implement 
more extensive levels and standards of IP protection than are required by the TRIPS 
Agreement.  They may also require signatories interpret the TRIPS Agreement in a 
narrower manner, in order to ensure greater compliance with the Agreement.132  These 
higher standards of IP protection are often promoted by industrialised nations, such as the 
United States or the European Union in their trade agreements. 
In the case of plant-based innovations, they may restrict the freedom available to 
member states under article 27.3(b) by requiring states parties to accede to the UPOV 
Enactments.  This effectively denies states the flexibility to adopt a solution that might be 
better suited to their national needs and priorities. For example, the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) requires that signatories ‘give effect to’ either UPOV 1978 or 
UPOV 1991.133  This at least, gave some scope for signatories to pursue the most 
appropriate PVP solution.  As a developing state with considerable rural population and 
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agricultural economy, Mexico opted to accede to UPOV 1978 when it became a member of 
NAFTA and retained some of the flexibilities present the 1978 Enactment.  Since it is no 
longer possible to accede to UPOV 1978, this small flexibility is no longer available.   The 
recently failed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) would have required several states, 
including Malaysia, to accede to UPOV 1991 which had implemented their own sui generis 
PVP solutions.134  Continuing the previous example, the TPP would have required Mexico 
to update its UPOV membership to the 1991 Enactment, and thus further limited its 
flexibility.  Its successor, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (CPTPP), also mandates membership to the 1991 Enactment.135  However, at 
the time of writing, several of the states that would be required to join UPOV 1991, 
including Malaysia, are undergoing a period of consultation as to whether the agreement 
should be ratified.136 
 
2.5 The issue of effective sui generis protection 
Since the scope of patentability is evident in the text of the Agreement, the question 
to be considered is the scope of ‘an effective sui generis’ form or system of IP protection.  
Neither TRIPS nor its travaux préparatoires provides guidance upon what the components 
of an effective sui generis system ought to be.137  Furthermore, the TRIPS Agreement 
makes no mention of the UPOV system of protection and as such, there is no requirement 
to accede to the UPOV Conventions.  Nonetheless, there is a near universal consensus that 
UPOV is an example of an effective sui generis system. Interestingly, in its latest iteration, 
UPOV appears to have ‘rebranded’ itself in the light of the TRIPS Agreement; having taken 
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to describing its mission as being ‘to provide and promote an effective system of plant 
variety protection’.138   
Logically then, the only characteristics that can concretely be attributed to a sui 
generis IPR are the same as other rights mandated by the TRIPS Agreement: that they 
are private rights and in relation to certain acts covered by an IPR, and confer no further 
exclusive right other than equitable remuneration for the rights holder.139  This fits with 
the view offered by Leskien and Flitner, who suggest that effectiveness refers to a level of 
protection in the system, and thus a sui generis right requires certain minimum substantial 
rights which allow for effective action against any infringement as required by Articles 42-
49 TRIPS (Civil and Administrative Procedures and Remedies).140  Therefore the onus upon 
member states is only to provide judicial procedures; TRIPS minimum standards require 
rights holders themselves to be responsible for discovering any breach of their rights and 
bringing action should they so wish.  
However, prominent plant breeding associations such as ASSINSEL141 have 
asserted that for a sui generis system to be considered effective it must incorporate the 
standards of uniformity, distinctiveness and stability (i.e. the criteria utilised by the UPOV 
system for assessing suitability for plant variety protection) otherwise a variety is 
unsuitable to be the subject of a legal right, in its view.142  Nevertheless when considering 
the weight of such an opinion, it must be borne in mind that the membership and nature 
of such organisations possesses a vested interest in the availability of traditional plant 
variety protection.  Therefore, its view cannot be considered authoritative.   
The most compelling argument is put forward by Biswajit Dhar, who purports that 
it is the availability of protection that decides its effectiveness.  Dhar suggests that the 
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measure of an effective regime is one that offers protection for the largest number of new 
varieties.  This is only possible if the system engages with the largest possible number of 
stakeholders in plant breeding, which should include formal plant breeders and traditional 
and small scale farmers. 143  This proposal holds weight when considered in the light of the 
much cited justification for the availability of IP protection in the sphere of plant breeding 
and indeed in general: that the availability of IPRs should stimulate innovation and lead to 
an increased number of available plant varieties.  This in turn, should lead to a greater 
number of options available to address food security concerns.  Furthermore, when 
combined with the minimal standards required of an intellectual property right, this 
definition of effectiveness is a useful tool for determining the most suitable implementation 
of art. 27.3(b) in a manner that is relative to the agricultural landscape of a given state.  
Using this effectiveness criterion, it appears obvious that states with predominantly 
industrial agricultural practices would adopt UPOV, whereas states with diverse or 
principally subsistence agricultural practices would have the freedom to engineer a unique 
solution.  
When viewed in this light, the content of article 27.3(b) appears to be something 
of an achievement.  Even though the wording of the provision originated from the 
developed economies of the European Community, per se the provision is sufficiently 
flexible to be adapted to developing states national needs and priorities.  However, the 
regime has been criticised, primarily by developing states, for failing to address the wider 
issues associated with IP protection for biotechnology and plant breeding activities.  Plant 
breeding based developments do not exist in isolation; but rather are intrinsically linked 
with biodiversity conservation and traditional resource rights especially for many 
genetically rich developing states.  Accordingly, it has been argued that an ‘effective sui 
generis system’ is not only composed of a sui generis IPR but a collection of overlapping 
voluntary and non-voluntary obligations.144  However valid this criticism may be, and given 
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the existence of binding international agreements concerning access to and use of genetic 
resources145 and the continued discourse on the protection of traditional knowledge,146 its 
validity appears obvious, in its current format, it simply remains beyond the scope of the 
TRIPS Agreement.  Nonetheless this does not excuse the lack of clarity on the relationship 
between these matters, which was raised during the review of art. 27.3(b). 
 
2.6 Implementation and enforcement of TRIPS 
As has been noted above, the TRIPS Agreement provides minimum standards for 
available IP protection and as such, relies upon individual member states implementation 
of the provisions.  To that end, the Agreement contains several mechanisms intended to 
promote implementation and compliance.  They are: transparency and compliance 
monitoring, dispute prevention and the dispute settlement mechanism.  
Concerning transparency, art. 63.1 requires member states to publish all laws, 
regulations, final judicial decisions, and administrative rulings relevant to the subject 
matter of the Agreement, including bilateral agreements and other agreements.  This 
primarily serves to facilitate the enforcement provisions of the Agreement (arts. 41-60).147   
Alongside which, art. 63.2 requires that member states notify the TRIPS Council of the 
laws and regulations outlined in art. 63.1, in order to facilitate its review of the operation 
of the Agreement.  In addition, members have taken to providing a Checklist of Issues on 
Enforcement148 to provide further information on how they are currently meeting 
obligations, given that much of the pertinent information is found outside IP law.149  This 
information then provides the basis for review by the TRIPS Council, by means of question 
and response, and allows the development of a comprehensive picture about the 
implementation of IP laws at the national level.150  It also allows examination by other 
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members via the same medium.151  This provides member states with the opportunity to 
seek advice on their implementation of TRIPS provisions, but the continued review of 
national law also gives member states the opportunity to address identified issues and to 
avoid potential formal action at a later stage. 
Art.64 provides the so called ‘teeth of TRIPS’;152 as it applies Articles XXII and XXIII 
of the GATT 94 as applied and elaborated upon by the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU) to disputes arising under the TRIPS Agreement.  Non-compliance with TRIPS does 
not produce an automatic response; rather it is necessary for another member state to be 
sufficiently concerned by a states IP laws and practice to raise a dispute with the Dispute 
Settlement Body.  A finding of non-compliance exposes states parties to trade sanctions, 
even though in practice the threat is rarely felt, as thus far the WTO has not authorised 
sanctions for non-compliance with TRIPS.  During the negotiation of the Agreement, there 
existed widespread concern among developing states about the use of the DSU as a 
mechanism by developed states to leverage stronger IP protection and to legitimize trade 
retaliation.153  However, its impact has not been as severe as anticipated. 
The primary reason for this is that in combination with the review mechanism, the 
TRIPS Council advocates a dispute prevention rather than settlement approach.154  The 
dispute settlement procedures begin with a mandatory consultation period of at least sixty 
days before the dispute proceeds to a dispute settlement panel.  During which, member 
states are encouraged to find a resolution to their dispute.  Thus, the dispute settlement 
procedure aims to avoid formal disputes where possible.  Secondly, in practice, developing 
states have not been targeted for dispute settlement in the way in which it was originally 
imagined; the majority of disputes that have reached a dispute settlement panel have in 
fact been complaints between developed economies.155  Third, in the evaluation of 
developing states intellectual property regimes, it is necessary to take in to consideration 
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arts. 7 and 8 of the Agreement, concerning its objectives and principles.  These provisions 
provide an overall framework for judging the adequacy and effectiveness of intellectual 
property regime; serving to balance available protection for rights holders against 
measures undertaken for social and economic welfare.156  Accordingly they may provide 
‘a shield’ for defending choices made in the implementation of art. 27.3(b) 
Taubman notes that while emphasis is often placed on the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, in practice it is rarely used.  Conversely, while the transparency provisions 
are largely overlooked, they are in fact extensively used.157  Nonetheless, given the past 
willingness of member states such as the US to utilize trade sanctions to enforce IP 
compliance and the ambiguity of surrounding the wording of art. 27.3(b), the threat of 
formal action under TRIPS undoubtedly feels very real and as such, is likely to impact the 
choices made by developing states in implementing the provision. 
2.7 Summary 
It is clear from the early sections of this chapter that the standards set by the 
TRIPS Agreement largely reflect the IP standards of western states, such as the United 
States and the member states of the European Union.   The wording of article 27.3(b) has 
left the scope of the article and its obligations open to considerable debate.  These 
questions, which include the relevance of articles 7 and 8 TRIPS in the interpretation of 
article 27.3(b), have not been adequately addressed either through the formal review 
process for the article or by the Dispute Settlement Body.   Therefore, we must deduce 
that article 27.3(b) grants states considerable freedom in how they interpret and 
implement the provision.   States are given the choice between patent protection for plant-
based innovations and an effective sui generis system of intellectual property protection, 
or both.  Yet there exist different interpretations as to what constitutes an ‘effective sui 
generis system’ of IP protection.  On examining the arguments, it is obvious that the only 
qualities that can be attributed to an effective system of sui generis IP protection under 
TRIPS is the availability of an intellectual property right that satisfies the minimum 
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substantial rights required under TRIPS and allows for effective action against 
infringement.   
Thus, states which opt for sui generis protection for plant-based innovations are 
left with the option to choose between adopting UPOV standards for plant variety 
protection, or to develop their own regime in line with their needs and priorities.   However, 
in recent years, bi- and multilateral trade agreements have been used to force states into 
acceding to the UPOV system, even where it may not be the best option for a given state.  
Therefore, while the minimum standards approach of TRIPS provides considerable 
freedom, the reality is that states option in implementing article 27.3(b) may be limited 

































Chapter 3 - The Conventions of the International Union for the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants 
3.1 - Introduction 
The various conventions of the International Union for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants158 (UPOV) are to date, the only international instruments that pertain 
to the protection of plant-based innovations.  As a result, acceding to the UPOV regime is 
the de facto default option for compliance with article 27.3(b) TRIPS.  In the context of 
this investigation into the role of intellectual property (IP) protection in developing 
underutilised crop varieties, this creates several fundamental questions that must be 
addressed.   First, what is plant variety protection (PVP), the intellectual property right for 
plant-based innovations available under the UPOV regime, and what types of plant-based 
innovations does it support? Second, does the UPOV system constitute an effective sui 
generis system of protection for plant-based innovations, as required by article 27.3(b)?  
In considering this, it is essential to recall from the previous chapter that the only qualities 
that it is possible to ascribe to an ‘effective sui generis system of intellectual property 
protection’ is the availability of minimum substantial rights which allow for effective action 
against infringement.  Third, is there a relationship between UPOV plant variety protection 
and addressing food security concerns?  
In order to begin to answer these questions, it is necessary to explore the origins 
and development of this unique IP right.  The first part of this chapter will broadly consider 
the history and the development of the UPOV regime, including its membership and 
institutions.  It will then examine the construct of a ‘plant variety’ and ‘plant variety 
protection’.  The second part of the chapter will explore the content and scope of UPOV 
plant variety protection and will also serve to lay the groundwork for the discussion in 
chapter six.  Finally, the third part of the chapter will then return to discuss the possible 
links between UPOV and addressing food insecurity. 
 
 




3.2.1 Background to the UPOV Conventions 
Modern plant variety protection is essentially European in origin.  The idea of 
protecting plant varieties through a specialist intellectual or industrial property right 
emerged around the late 19th and early 20th century, at the same time that plant breeding 
was emerging as a scientific discipline.159  Initially, there were several unsuccessful 
attempts to introduce specialist protection for plant varieties in France and Germany.160  
This began to change around the 1920s with some countries, such as Germany161 and the 
US,162 adapting their patent laws to accommodate plants.163  At the same time, a number 
of countries164 began to offer patent protection for plant varieties through ordinary patent 
law, although evidence suggests that the number of applications and grants was quite 
limited.165 
Other countries began to offer different formats of legal protection for varieties.  
For example, in France protection was made available through a licensing regime based 
upon a combination of trademarking and official seed certification.166  However, this did 
not amount to a state-granted property right.167  It also became common for breeders in 
a number of European states to seek trademark protection as a means of achieving 
exclusivity over their variety.   
 Towards the middle of the 20th century, new forms of intellectual property 
protection for plant varieties began to emerge that would lay the foundation for the modern 
plant variety protection.  In 1941, the Netherlands adopted the Plant Breeders’ Decree 
which offered protection to varieties which were new and sufficiently homogenous.168  
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Similarly, Germany introduced the Seed Law of 1953169 which created protection for plant 
varieties that were distinct, stable and of agricultural value.170 As such, these were limited 
forms of plant variety protection.171   
The concerns over food security that emerged all over Europe in the aftermath of 
the Second World War were the impetus for the development of a coordinated approach 
to IP protection for plant varieties.  It was generally held that the development of new, 
more productive crop varieties would secure food production, and that IP protection for 
plant varieties would encourage this.  Thus, the correlation between the availability of IP 
protection for plant varieties and addressing food security concerns has existed for a 
considerable period of time; and was a catalyst for the UPOV regime.  
The actual process that would lead to the original UPOV Convention began in 1956 
when the International Association of Professional Plant Breeders (ASSINEL)172 raised its 
concerns about the lack of opportunities for the reward of plant breeders' efforts with the 
French government.173  This led to the First Diplomatic Conference in 1957 on the 
protection of new plant varieties. This was attended by twelve European states,174 
alongside United International Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI)175, 
the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the Organisation for European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC). The first Conference did not yield an agreement but laid 
the foundation for further preparatory work.176  Most notably, it was agreed that plant 
varieties should be protected by a new, sui generis intellectual property right rather than 
attempt to accommodate plant-based innovations through the revision of existing patent 
laws.  The Conference parties recognized of the difficulty of applying the traditional criteria 
for patentability to plant-based developments. 
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During the interim period between the Conferences, a series of expert meetings 
took place.  The subject of these meeting was discerning the substance of the new IP right, 
and the criteria for its grant.  Attention was also given to the question as to whether the 
subject matter of plant varieties should fall within the scope of the Paris Convention.177  It 
was felt among participants that the products of agricultural plant breeding should not be 
the subject of an industrial property right.  Therefore, plant varieties would become the 
subject of a new convention.178 
A second Diplomatic Conference took place in 1961.  This Conference was attended 
by representatives from the European Community (EC), the International Association for 
the Protection of Intellectual Property (AIPPI),179 the International Community of Breeders 
of Asexually Produced Ornamental and Fruit Varieties (CIOPORA),180 and Federation of the 
International Seed Trade (FIS).181  Thus, the draft Convention under consideration at the 
Conference reflected the view of all of the major stakeholders in European plant breeding.  
Its draft was adopted subject to non-substantive amendments.182 
The first UPOV Convention eventually came into force on 26th November 1968 upon 
its ratification by the Federal Republic of Germany.  It is important to note that it was not 
the purpose of the UPOV Convention to create plant variety rights per se, but rather to 
establish a set of common principles for national PVP regimes that could be harmoniously 
implemented.183  Indeed, this continues to be the case: the UPOV Enactments set the 
standard for plant variety protection in its member states.  This point will be returned to 
in section 3.4. 
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3.2.2 Historical development of the UPOV Enactments 
Similar to other international instruments in the sphere of IP protection, such as 
the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention,184 the UPOV Convention has been subject 
to three revisions.  These took place in 1972, 1978 and 1991.  The adjustments made by 
the 1972 Enactment were limited to the administrative aspect of the treaty and therefore, 
do not merit discussion here.185  The 1978 Enactment introduced substantive changes to 
the Convention.  These included the expansion of plant breeders’ rights.186 The 
amendments were also intended to facilitate the accession of certain states, most notably 
the US, to the Convention.187 In particular, the introduction of a provision allowing plant 
varieties to be protected under both PVP and patent regimes.188  Broadly speaking, the 
changes introduced in the 1991 Enactment serves to strengthen plant breeders’ rights and 
widen the scope of the Convention.  These changes were made necessary by the 
considerable advances in the plant bioscience industry and the field of genetic engineering 
in the time between the two Enactments. It is worth noting at this stage that in the drafting 
of the 1991 Enactment, that the drafters opted to describe it as ‘effective189 system of 
plant variety protection’.190  The choice of this particular descriptor is not surprising given 
that the 1991 Enactment was being drafted during the same period of the TRIPS 
Agreement; it appears to be a deliberate choice to brand itself as a solution to 
implementing article 27.3(b).     
States parties continue to be bound to the Enactment to which they acceded, unless 
they chose to ratify a later Enactment.  Thus, there exist discrepancies between the 
standard of plant variety protection adopted by UPOV members across the UPOV system.  
A few states remain party to the 1961/1972 Enactment.  The option to accede to the 1978 
Enactment remained available until the 1991 Enactment came into force.191   Thus both 
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texts continue to be relevant.  Therefore, the substance of both the 1978 and 1991 
Enactments is discussed in this chapter.  
 
3.2.3 Membership of the UPOV Convention 
After the entry into force of the original convention, membership was more or less 
confined to the initial European states parties.  This continued, with only ten members of 
the Union by the time that the second set of revisions to the Convention was beginning to 
be discussed in 1978.192  The modifications made by the 1978 Enactment served to entice 
an increase in uptake of the UPOV system.193   However, membership remained limited 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, during which time the Convention came under 
considerable criticism for being an ‘outmoded impediment’.194  The more substantial 
amendments made by the 1991 Enactment were in part, effected in order to address these 
criticisms.  Additionally, the period in which it was possible to choose to accede to either 
the 1978 or 1991 Enactments was intended to entice further membership.   
At present, there are 76 states and organisations that are party to the 
Conventions;195 and 20 states and one organisation in the process of acceding to the 
Convention.196  A further 24 states and one organisation have requested assistance from 
the Office of the Union in developing law based on the UPOV system.197198  Thus, while 
considerable, membership is far from universal.   
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Unsurprisingly, there has also been gradual uptake in membership since the entry 
into force of the TRIPS Agreement.  Some of this has been voluntary accession undertaken 
by states as a solution to fulfilling their obligations under article 27.3(b) TRIPS.  However, 
as noted previously in chapter two,199 a considerable percentage of the uptake is the 
product of bilateral or regional trade or investment agreements,200 or TRIPS plus 
agreements.  The effect of this is that states and organisations that had previously been 
resistant to the UPOV regime due to its substantive content have been obliged to join the 
regime.201  Thus, although the Convention’s membership has moved away from its 
Eurocentric roots, this is not necessarily an indication of a shift in values.  Rather, it signals 
the global export of the UPOV system.  The result of this is that states that have adopted 
UPOV as a result of external obligations may find themselves with a protection system for 
plant varieties that does not necessarily reflect their needs. 
It is important to note, that just because states are not parties to the UPOV regime, 
does not necessarily mean that UPOV style plant variety protection is not available in that 
state.  This may be because the state in question has not elected to join the UPOV system.  
This is the case in India: protection for new varieties202 tracks the UPOV requirement for 
PVP.203  Alternatively, it may be that the state is in conflict with the UPOV over other 
aspects of its PVP regime.  This is the case in Malaysia and will be returned to in chapter 
six.  
3.2.4 UPOV Institutions 
The permanent organs of the Convention are the UPOV Council and the UPOV 
Office.204  The Council consists of a representative of each member of the Union205 and is 
responsible for, inter alia, encouraging the development of the Union,206 and other tasks 
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as necessary for the functioning of the Union.207  Prima facie, the role of the Office is simply 
to carry out the tasks assigned to it by the Council.208  Despite this vague mandate, the 
Office is an organ of considerable importance within the UPOV system.   
It is responsible for producing and implementing numerous substantive aspects of 
the UPOV system that are not contained within the enactments.   This includes the 
production of the DUS Test Guidelines;209 thus the UPOV office effectively sets the 
standards for plant variety protection.  The UPOV Office issues Explanatory Notes which 
present an official interpretation of many important issues.210 It also reviews the PVP 
regimes of member states and potential member states and assesses their compatibility 
with the UPOV enactments.  It provides guidance how to integrate UPOV standards into 
state parties’ national PVP regimes prior to approval for the grant of membership.  Thus, 
the Office wields considerable power within the UPOV system, as it sets the standard for 
PVP for its members.  It is important to bear in mind that the standards set by the Office 
are not strictly derived from the text of the Convention itself, but upon how it has been 
interpreted by the Council and the Office.   Accordingly, the Office has the opportunity to 
determine how plant variety protection is developed across the UPOV system.  This point 
will be returned to in section 3.3.5 below.  
 3.2.5 ‘Plant varieties’ 
As is outlined above, the concept of plant variety protection is a product of the 
UPOV regime. Under the original enactment ‘plant variety’ was defined as ‘any cultivar, 
clone, line, stock or hybrid which is capable of cultivation and which satisfies’ the provisions 
of art. 6(1)(c) and art. 6(1)(d): namely, homogeneity and stability.  The focus on plant 
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varieties is unique to the UPOV system, as opposed to traits genes or breeding techniques 
which may be the subject of other forms of intellectual property right.211   
A definition of the term is not present in the 1978 Act. The reason for this is that 
there existed sufficient consensus among plant breeders as to what constituted a plant 
variety.212  Interestingly, AIPPI noted that the absence of a definition had not caused any 
difficulties.213  A definition returned in the 1991 Act.  The motivation for its reintroduction 
was the increased need to demarcate UPOV based plant variety laws from patent law.  
Changes in science and technology, along with the increased use of patent protection for 
plant-based innovations had caused the boundary between the two to blur in the time 
period between the Enactments.214 Art. 1(iv) of the 1991 Enactment defines a plant variety 
as: 
 
 ‘a plant grouping within a single botanical taxon of the lowest rank, which irrespective of 
whether the conditions for the grant of a breeder’s right are fully met, can be: 
  defined by the characteristics resulting from a given genotype or combination of 
genotypes, 
 distinguished from any other plant grouping by the expression of at least one of the 
said characteristics and 
 considered as a unit with regard to its suitability for being propagated unchanged’ 
 
A variation in the lowest botanical taxon is, in scientific terms, known as a cultivar.  
Thus, the concept of a ‘plant variety’ is a legal rather than scientific.  This is an essential 
point to note: the drafters of the UPOV Conventions invented the notion of the plant 
variety.  Thus, not only has UPOV invented both the constructs of plant varieties and plant 
variety protection, but it also sets the criteria against which they are judged.  It is 
particularly important not to lose sight of this point when considering the alternatives to 
UPOV. 
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It is also necessary to observe the inclusion of the phrase ‘irrespective of whether 
the conditions for the grant of a breeder’s right can be fully met’.  Thus, the regime 
foresees the existence of varieties that do not meet the thresholds for plant variety 
protection, or alternatively, the existence of unregistered varieties.  This is a deliberate 
feature of the drafting of the provision.215  The existence of varieties that are not suitable 
for registration is necessary to accommodate the newly included concept of essentially 
derived varieties. Varieties that are unsuitable for registration may also be useful in 
assessing the novelty and distinctiveness of applicant varieties.216  Therefore, the 
recognition of varieties that are unsuitable for registration serves a functional role in the 
UPOV system.  However, it does raise the issue as to whether these varieties are capable 
of being the subject of other types of IPR.  This issue will be returned to section 3.3.5 
below, and in chapter six. 
3.2.6 Plant variety protection vs. plant breeders’ rights  
Generally speaking, the terms ‘plant variety protection’ and ‘plant breeders’ right’ 
are considered to be interchangeable.  However, an interesting point noted by Margaret 
Llewelyn is that there has been a gradual shift in use of terminology from plant breeders’ 
rights towards plant variety protection.  She observes that this is likely a result of 
developments in breeding technology and in a shift in the perceived value of plant 
breeders’ work being the subject of importance towards plant varieties as material.217  
Alongside which, there has been a transformation, although not universal, of the 
commercial plant breeder from a small scale enterprise to multi-national companies.218  
Thus, she argues that a reversal of emphasis has taken place, and rather than the UPOV 
system favouring a specific interest group, it now protects a specific type of valuable 
material regardless of its origin.219   
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This is interesting, because it provides clear evidence that the UPOV system treats 
plant breeding as a commercial industry, rather than as a practice undertaken by 
individual, farm-based innovators. It reflects the scientific and technical developments that 
have taken place in the sphere of agricultural innovation. 
The point of these comments is not to suggest that one term is more appropriate 
than the other; it is simply to highlight that the shift in emphasis towards the value of the 
product rather than the owner of the IPR is reflective of the direction taken by UPOV since 
its inception. 
3.3 Plant variety protection available under UPOV 1978 and UPOV 1991 
3.3.1 Protectable subject matter 
Under the 1978 Enactment, all botanical genera and species may be the subject of 
PVP as defined by the Convention.220  States parties were required to apply the Convention 
to at least five genera or species at the time the Convention entered into force;221 with a 
view to eventually applying the provisions of the Convention to as many genera or species 
as possible.222  To that end, the 1978 Enactment sets out a timescale for the gradual 
inclusion of further genera or species.223  There is no requirement to introduce protection 
for any specific genera or species; this can be determined in line with national needs and 
priorities. Thus, the 1978 regime proposes a fairly gentle submersion into the waters of 
plant variety protection. 
On the other hand, the 1991 Enactment requires 15 genera or species to be eligible 
for protection at the time of entry into force of the Convention;224 and the provisions of 
the Convention to apply to all genera or species within 10 years.225  The all-encompassing 
approach taken in the 1991 Convention can be considered problematic for lower and 
middle income states parties.226  This is because is likely to be onerous on the state organs 
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responsible for the implementation of UPOV and the grant of PVP as they may not have 
sufficient technical expertise in many genera or species.  This includes both the 
development of appropriate testing guidelines and the availability of examiners with the 
expertise necessary to evaluate applicant varieties.  Indeed, it can delay the entry into 
force of a PVP regime considerably.227   
This is somewhat mitigated by the support of the UPOV office in compiling and 
disseminating technical guidelines for many genera and species which are regularly 
updated.228   It is also anticipated that there will be a level of technical cooperation and 
information sharing between the rights granting offices of states parties.  This includes the 
option to purchase Reports on Examination conducted by other members.229  This should 
be of some benefits to states which do not have the capacity or expertise for field testing 
certain species.  It may offer a shortcut to member states to give effect to their PVP regime 
by providing them with the means to offer PVP for a sufficient number of species for the 
state to meet its obligations under UPOV.  However, the effect of this will be limited, as 
this will ultimately need to be supported by adequate scientific and technical expertise as 
well as testing capacity. 
Whether or not the approach adopted by UPOV 1991 is considered to be 
burdensome, it is necessary to emphasise that the listing of genera and species for 
protection is a crucial feature of the UPOV regime.  In chapter two it was concluded that 
the only features that can definitively be attributed to sui generis IP protection for plant 
varieties are the availability of a minimum substantial right and the effective means for 
enforcing that right.  Thus, making protection available for at least a minimum number of 
plant species or genera is necessary for PVP to meet the criterion of effective under 
TRIPS.230  Without it, the principles of plant variety protection are meaningless.  It is 
arguable that without the inclusion of the minimum number of varieties, that a state party 
 
227 For example, the Malaysian Protection of New Varieties of Plants Act 2004 did not enter into force for four 
years 
228 Llewelyn & Adcock, n160 above, at 169 
229 Sanderson, n213 above, at 176 





would fail to meet its obligations under article 27.3(b) TRIPS, even if it had otherwise 
implemented appropriate plant variety protection legislation. 
 It is not possible to predict how many species would need to be included in a PVP 
regime in order for it to be considered to be truly effective.   When viewed in the light of 
the efficacy requirement, the push towards including as many varieties as possible makes 
a greater degree of sense.  Even so, the push towards including all genera and species 
within a 10-year period in the 1991 Enactment still appears to be unnecessarily taxing as 
opposed to the aim to include as many varieties as possible, espoused in its predecessor. 
3.3.2 Content of a plant breeders’ right 
Generally speaking, the focus of plant variety protection is the control over 
commercial dealings with reproductive material.231   Under the 1978 Enactment, PVP 
offered the breeder of a plant variety an exclusive right over the production for the 
purposes of commercial marketing; offering for sale; or marketing of the propagating 
material of the protected variety.232   The breeder may authorise third party use subject 
to whatever conditions they deem appropriate.233  States parties are given the option to 
allow more extensive protection over certain varieties, such as the marketing of specific 
products derived from plant varieties.234 
The 1991 Enactment extends plant variety protection to include, in addition to the 
above, the production or reproduction; conditioning for purposes of propagation; 
exporting; importing; or stocking of a protected variety.235  It also broadens protection to 
include harvested material acquired through propagation;236 and products made directly 
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3.3.3 Limitations of plant variety protection 
i) Public interest: Both the 1978 and the 1991 Acts allow states parties to restrict a 
breeders’ right for the purposes of public interest; provided that where the 
restriction is made to ensure widespread distribution of the variety all possible 
measures are taken to remunerate the breeder.238   
 
ii) Research exemption: The 1978 Act permitted the use of a protected variety for the 
purposes of the initial development of a new variety but restricted its use for 
commercial production without the breeders’ authorisation.239   The 1991 
Enactment better explicates the ‘acts for research purposes’ as being acts done 
privately and for non-commercial purposes; acts for experimental purposes; and 
acts for the purpose of breeding other varieties.240   
 
iii) Essentially derived varieties: The 1991 Enactment introduces the concept of an 
essentially derived variety (EDV). An essentially derived variety is defined as being 
clearly distinguishable from the original variety, while being predominantly derived 
from the initial variety241 and displaying the essential characteristics of the first 
variety, aside from the differences which mark the derivation.  It has a number of 
purposes.  Firstly, it serves to counter balance the exemption allowing the use of a 
registered variety for the purpose of breeding other varieties, as it prevents 
breeders from utilising a registered variety for the repeated production of another 
variety and thus exploiting the research exemption.242   
Secondly, it serves to prevent the registration of varieties that are insufficiently 
distinct from the original variety.243  It is pertinent to note that central to the idea 
of an essentially derived variety is that it is derived from a single registered 
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variety.244  Thus, it does not include cross breeding the initial variety with another 
variety.245  Third, it is intended to circumvent breeders’ capitalising on registered 
varieties by altering them in such a manner as to make them distinct whilst the 
essential characteristic and thus their commercial appeal remains that of the 
original registered variety.246   
Art 14(5) provides a list of possibilities as to how an EDV may come about.  
Examples of this include selection of a colour mutation from an ornamental variety 
or the insertion of a single gene via laboratory-based methods.247  Beyond this, the 
Convention does not address what might constitute an EDV.  UPOV has issued 
explanatory notes on essentially derived varieties248 however this only makes a 
limited contribution to the discussion.249  A number of different approaches to 
assessing EDV have been suggested by key organisations in the international plant 
breeding sphere.  For example, the ISF has produced a ‘Code of Conduct’ for 
establishing genetic variation and the ‘Regulation for the Arbitration of Disputes 
concerning Essential Derivation (RED)’.250  Interestingly, while PVP itself remains 
strictly assessed on morphology, there are numerous suggestions that genotype 
should be a factor in assessing whether a variety constitutes an EDV.  This, 
however, raises a number of technical concerns.  The most prominent of which is: 
what percentage of genetic similarity is considered acceptable? Equally difficult to 
address is the practical aspect of establishing a database of extant varieties for 
comparison.  As such, ‘essentially derived varieties’ is a hybrid legal/scientific 
concept, many of the details of which remain unresolved.   
Thus, the key idea is that essentially derived varieties serve to prevent the 
narrowing of PVP.  This should benefit to PVP holders.  It is important to note 
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however, that whether a variety can be considered to be an EDV is not to be 
determined by the examining office at the point of application.  Rather it is for 
breeders themselves to regulate and resolve, either through negotiation or legal 
proceedings.251  This is where the additional protection offered by the prohibition 
of EDVs may vary dependent upon the resources of the PVP holder, as the ability 
to enforce their right requires the PVP holder to have the resources to do so.  To 
that end, it may even prove an issue for commercial plant breeders, as many are 
small and medium enterprises.   
 
iv) Farmers’ rights/seed saving exemption:  The 1978 Enactment does not explicitly 
touch upon the idea of seed saving exemptions.  However, this is largely because 
the idea of farmers’ privilege was largely accepted at the time of drafting and is 
therefore generally considered to be implied into the text.252  Thus, farmers 
remained at liberty to save and re-sow commercially acquired seed year on year.  
The 1991 Act adopted a more restrictive approach by explicitly addressed the issue.   
Art. 15(2) permits contracting parties to restrict breeders’ rights in order to permit 
farmers to use protected material they have obtained from harvesting for 
propagating purposes on their own holdings within reasonable limits and 
safeguarding the legitimate interests of the breeder.  This provision does not 
remove the possibility of farmers reusing seed year upon year; however, it does 
considerably restrict it.  It leaves it open to contracting parties to determine what 
is a reasonable amount of seed reuse without remunerating the breeder.  The fact 
that it is restricted to farmers’ own lands indicates that saved seed must be for a 
non-commercial use.253 The construction of the provision has the potential to 
impede on farm breeding activity, as it is impossible to separate breeding and seed 
production.254 If restrictively interpreted, the provision has the potential to render 
 
251 Greengrass, n247 above, at 471 
252 Sanderson, n213 above, at 235 
253 Llewelyn & Adcock, n160 above, at 191 




some traditional farming practices illegal.255  A common critique of art. 15(2) is that 
saving farm produced seed is an essential practice for small scale farmers and that 
the limitation placed on the seed saving exemption is likely to be to the detriment 
of the less affluent.  Nonetheless, art. 15(2) does provide a potential safeguard for 
farmers’ individual food production needs.  Thus, the success of this balance is 
likely to be dependent upon the judgment of states parties in implementing the 
provision. 
 
3.3.4 - Criteria for plant variety protection  
There are four criteria for the grant of plant variety protection within the UPOV system; 
to be eligible a plant variety must be new, distinct, uniform and stable (DUS).256 These 
are assessed on the basis of a technical examination executed by the national granting 
office.257  In addition, there is the implicit criterion that varieties will be given a name on 
registration.258  The DUS criteria will be considered in turn. 
 
• New: The 1978 Enactment does not explicitly refer to novelty as a requirement but 
does prevent varieties that have previously been available for sale from being granted 
PVP.  Under the 1991 Enactment, a variety is considered new if it has not been offered 
for sale in the territory of the state of application in the last year, or in another state 
in the last four years.259  It is important to note that novelty here is not the same 
requirement as in patent law; rather it is an issue of commercial novelty.260  This is 
made explicit by the clarification provided by art. 6 of the 1991 Act.261  An issue that 
arises as a result of novelty being conceived in a strictly commercial sense is that unlike 
patent protection, it does not require the origin of the material used to develop the 
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variety.262  This leaves the potential for the appropriation of crop varieties which have 
not been commercialised, such as farmers’ varieties.263 
 
• Distinct: under both the 1978 and the 1991 Acts, a new plant variety is considered 
distinct if it is clearly identifiable by one or more important characteristics from any 
other variety in common knowledge (for example, having been entered in an official 
register of varieties) at the time of application.264  “Characteristics” may be defined as 
morphological or physiological characteristics, and must be capable of precise 
description and recognition.   Of special note is the qualification “important”.  This 
permits states parties to implement regulation that may prevent the frivolous grant of 
rights over a new variety with only minimal differences from existing protected 
varieties.  It also serves to allow PVP offices to determine what characteristics are 
relevant to distinguishing a new variety on a species by species basis.  As Butler points 
out, the distinctive characteristics of a rose are very different from that of a potato.265  
Broadly speaking, the issue of distinctiveness is a technical matter and therefore is 
generally based upon expert knowledge of a given crop variety.266  Distinctiveness 
therefore, is largely a matter of science. 
The difficulty with the distinctiveness criterion is that while there may be a general 
understanding as to what constitutes ‘common knowledge’ for the purpose of assessing 
distinctiveness, there is no comprehensive frame of reference to ensure that this 
assessment is accurate.  Possible solutions include collections of germplasm or 
cultivated varieties that would serve to aid the assessment as to whether a variety is 
common knowledge or not.267  Indeed, the ISF has suggested one potential solution to 
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this issue might be the establishment of a worldwide database of phenotypical 
descriptions of varieties in common.268  
 
• Uniform: under the 1978 Act, a new variety should be “sufficiently homogenous”, in 
particular relating to its reproductive or propagative characteristics.269  The only 
modification made by the 1991 Act is that the requirement is that a variety is 
‘sufficiently uniform in its relevant characteristics’.270  The difference appears to be 
minimal, although it is arguable that the 1991 version may in fact allow for a slightly 
looser interpretation of the criterion albeit subject to the requirements of the Test 
Guidelines.  Alternatively, Llewelyn and Adcock suggest that the difference between 
the two enactments is actually representative of a shift towards a presumption of grant 
of PVP.271 
The uniformity criterion is clear cut, as it is essentially a technical issue to be assessed 
during the official examination.  Nonetheless, it has the potential to be problematic for 
varieties developed for difficult cultivation environments; or for low input varieties 
which are prone to diversification based on environmental conditions and therefore 
risks hindering progress in this arena.272 
 
• Stable: a new variety should be stable in its essential characteristics, and remain so 
through subsequent generations after repeated reproduction or propagation.273  It is 
perhaps the most straightforward criterion.  The assessment of stability of the essential 
characteristics is relative to the plant species in question.  Therefore the provisions in 
the Conventions are deliberately vague as stability is a technical matter largely dealt 
within the Test Guidelines.  In the same vein as uniformity, stability has the potential 
to prove problematic for varieties cultivated in difficult environments.  
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3.3.5 - Further limitation of criteria for plant variety protection 
Aside from the criteria discussed above, UPOV explicitly mandates that protection 
can be subject to no further conditions provided the applicant complies with the formal 
requirements of the convention and pays the necessary fees.274  This appears to be a 
reasonable restriction in order to ensure the predictability and consistency of plant 
breeders’ rights across all parties to the UPOV system.  However, the effect of this is to 
restrict contracting parties from offering other types of plant variety protection in their 
national frameworks.   
Effectively, state parties are left with a choice.  Either allow only plant variety 
protection for varieties that are able to meet the DUS criteria or be excluded from the 
UPOV system.  This makes it very difficult for states parties to adapt their national regimes 
to meet their needs and priorities,275 as it removes the possibility of protection for 
traditional or local varieties, or varieties not meeting the DUS criteria.  This is even more 
problematic where a state party is obliged to implement UPOV as a result of TRIPS plus 
obligations.276 
Malaysia provides a good example of this issue.  The Protection of New Plant Variety 
Act 2004277 contains two options for the protection of new varieties of plants.  The first 
relies on DUS criteria and mimics UPOV style PVP.278  The second is based on the separate 
criteria of Distinctiveness and Identifiability.279  The criterion of identifiability is a lower 
threshold than that of uniformity and stability, as it only requires that an applicant variety 
possess one identifiable characteristic across a grouping.280  The second type is only 
available to certain group, such as farmers, local communities or indigenous peoples;281 
and has a shorter duration of protection.282  It is clear that this form of protection is aimed 
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at plant varieties incapable of fulfilling the DUS criteria, and that it is not intended to serve 
commercial plant breeders in the same way as traditional plant variety protection.  
However, the availability of the alternative PVP is a significant hurdle to Malaysia’s 
membership to UPOV as it contravenes the prohibition of further criteria for PVP.  Indeed, 
in its assessment, the UPOV Council suggested that it would be more appropriate for the 
alternative DI protection to be the subject an entirely separate regime.283  Yet this is not 
easily reconciled with UPOV’s recognition of plant varieties that do not meet the DUS 
criteria.   This issue is returned to in chapter seven. 
This strict approach to what is allowed to be protected by members of the UPOV system 
emphasises again the commercial focus of UPOV style PVP.  It raises doubts about UPOV’s 
role in supporting innovation and potentially addressing food security concerns: if the only 
acceptable forms of plant-based innovations are those capable of meeting the DUS criteria, 
then the only way that it can be useful in addressing food insecurity is where the need can 
be met by commercial varieties 
It is also arguable that this is to the detriment of the very people UPOV is intended to 
benefit, i.e. plant breeders.  Once a variety is registered, the breeders’ exemption serves 
to make it available for research purposes.  Thus, by narrowing the scope of acceptable 
intellectual property protection for plant-based innovations, it can be asserted that UPOV 
is actually restricting the material available to breeders. 
A related issue resulting from the prohibition of further criteria is that it prevents states 
parties from incorporating disclosure of origin or similar provisions into their plant variety 
protection regimes.  This prevents UPOV based PVP systems from effectively controlling 
whether the material used in developing an applicant variety was legally obtained by the 
breeder. 284   This is not a necessary feature of an intellectual property regime, nor is it a 
strict requirement of an effective system of sui generis IP protection as discussed in 
chapter two.  However, there have been repeated calls for increased cooperation and re-
 
283 UPOV Council, ‘Twenty-Second Extraordinary Session, Geneva, April 8, 2005.  Examination of the Protection 
of New Varieties of Plants Act 2004 of Malaysia with the 1991 Act of the UPOV Convention’ available at: 
http://www.upov.int/edocs/mdocs/upov/en/c_extr/22/c_extr_22_2.pdf (accessed: 15th July 2020) 




evaluation of the relationship between intellectual property rights and genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge.285  The inclusion of such a requirement would allow UPOV 
members to develop PVP solutions that meet the broader definitions of effective sui generis 
protection and to proactively fulfil their obligations arising out of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity and its Nagoya Protocol.  Thus, the restriction on further criteria 
appears to unnecessarily isolate the UPOV regime from the other interrelated and 
substantive obligations of contracting parties which may in turn make it difficult for states 
parties or potential states parties to effectively balance competing responsibilities.  
3.4 UPOV as a tool for addressing food security concerns 
It was observed in section 3.2.1 that one of the driving forces for the development 
of an intellectual property right for plant-based innovations was the food insecurity 
experienced in Europe in the post war period.  One of the questions central to this research 
is whether IP protection for plant-based innovations is a useful tool for encouraging 
innovations and addressing food security concerns.  To that end, the utility of UPOV in 
tackling food security concerns is considered here. 
The answer from UPOV’s vantage point appears to be a resounding yes.  However, 
this is only true from a specific vantage point.  In 2005, UPOV published its own study on 
the impact of introducing a system of plant variety protection, titled the ‘UPOV Report on 
the Impact of Plant Variety Protection’ (impact study).286  The study describes the aim of 
the UPOV system as encouraging innovation in the field of plant breeding.287  It is based 
upon five case studies of contracting parties288 and considers the situation re commercial 
seed production in those countries before and after the introduction of UPOV PVP.   
The study contains four key messages that are of interest to the present 
investigation.  First, it notes that UPOV considers the availability of an effective system of 
PVP to be an impetus for the development of new varieties where there is commercial 
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viability for those varieties.289  There are two important points to note here: the first is the 
explicit link between commercial viability of varieties and the usefulness of IP protection 
for plant varieties.  This emphasises the fact that UPOV PVP is in fact aimed at industrial 
agriculture.  The second is that UPOV itself does not consider IP protection to be an 
adequate stimulus for plant-based innovation.  This is a direct contradiction of the position 
taken by the Global Forum for Agricultural Research (GFAR),290  and appears to somewhat 
contradict the original aims of the Convention.   However, as Butler points out, one of the 
original purposes of the UPOV system was to address the need to protect staple cereal 
crops or grandes cultures, with rights for other breeders as a positive by-product.291  Thus, 
although UPOV has its origins in food insecurity, it is not necessarily the same food 
insecurity that might be addressed by underutilised or niche crop species.  This is 
supported by the evidence in the impact study of the increased availability of commercial 
staple crops in Poland292 and China.293  Thus, UPOV PVP is a market driven, industrial 
property right.  Therefore, by-products such as greater innovation and increased food 
security are secondary to the regime.  
 Second, it argues that the introduction of a UPOV PVP system has brought about 
an increase in available germplasm in the countries analysed.294  Specifically, it suggests 
that PVP brings about increased foreign germplasm and that this supports plant-based 
innovation.  It is almost impossible to substantiate the veracity of this claim, as to do so 
would require proving a counterfactual.  However, if this is the case, then the success of 
UPOV in stimulating innovation relies upon the global implementation of UPOV style PVP.  
This is because the increased flow of foreign germplasm is necessarily dependent upon 
protected plant varieties being developed elsewhere, and subsequently being available to 
developers under the breeders' exemption. 
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 Third, the impact study makes it clear that even though it may be a commercially 
oriented intellectual property right, UPOV style PVP can still be a useful tool for supporting 
developments in underutilised crop species provided that there is a commercial market for 
that crop species in the state in question.  For example, varieties of crops which are 
generally considered to be underutilised, such as sorghum and lucerne, are the subject of 
plant breeders’ rights in Argentina.   This is because they are mainstream crops in 
Argentina.295   This again, reinforces the link between the utility of PVP and a commercial 
market for a crop species.  This is also true for millet and sorghum in Kenya.296  Essentially, 
UPOV style PVP can work for underutilised crop species in the same way that it does for 
any commercial crop, although this will only work if the crop is identified as a national 
priority and the relevant guidelines are developed.  Therefore, it is perhaps more accurate 
to state that UPOV style PVP can work for crops that are considered to be underutilised 
globally, but are of importance in specific countries or regions, such as the Bambara 
groundnut.  This will be returned to in chapter seven.  However, it seems implausible that 
the necessary development and funding will be applied to lesser underutilised and niche 
crop species for UPOV PVP to be a viable opportunity.  
Fourth, the impact study demonstrates that is possible for a UPOV style system of 
PVP to be implemented in a way that is useful and meaningful for states which continue 
to rely upon traditional farming practices.  In Kenya, the titles to numerous protected plant 
varieties are publicly owned, and there is provision in the national PVP law that gives local 
and subsistence farmers the privilege of using the propagated material of protected 
varieties and allowing the material to be distributed through traditional channels.297  This 
arguably, does support addressing food security concerns as it facilitates the flow of 
germplasm and gives it the potential to support the innovations of small scale farmers.  
Thus, it is possible to implement a UPOV style system of PVP which accommodates 
subsistence agriculture.  Yet we should not grant the Kenyan model too much credit in this 
regard as it does not introduce fundamental changes into the structure of UPOV PVP; 
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rather it creates a work around by assigning the plant breeders’ rights in question to public 
bodies.  Therefore, whilst this is an interesting solution, it is not necessarily something 
that can be extended universally. 
 All of the evidence that is considered here has been considered cautiously, as after 
all, it is only natural for a UPOV commissioned study to emphasise the successes of the 
system.  However, the evidence not is as important per se as what it allows us to 
understand about the UPOV system.  Specifically, it suggests that it is possible for UPOV 
PVP to support innovations in underutilised crops and that if it is a tool for addressing food 
security concerns, it is a limited one and one that is dependent upon  the availability of 
market for the crop in question. 
3.5 Summary 
UPOV appears to have successfully branded itself as an effective sui generis system 
of plant variety protection and indeed, and it is clear that UPOV PVP does constitute 
effective sui generis IP protection on the literal reading of article 27.3(b) TRIPS.  However, 
the extent to which it can be considered to be effective is limited to the number of plant 
species and genera for which protection is available in a given member state.  It is clear 
that plant variety protection as conceived by UPOV is intended for commercially produced 
varieties.  The regime has been criticised for not taking into account the diverse needs of 
its expanded membership298 and for the strict approach adopted by the UPOV organs.  Yet 
it is important to note that the structure of PVP under UPOV does not in itself preclude it 
from being useful in supporting developments in underutilised crop species.  This will be 
dependent upon the availability of adequate DUS testing guidelines and can be developed 
in line with national needs and priorities.  That being said, there does need to be a 
commercial market in a given country for a crop in order for UPOV style PVP to play a role 










Chapter 4: The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture 
4.1 Introduction 
The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(ITPGRFA, or plant treaty) is the first internationally binding treaty pertaining exclusively 
to the use and management of crop genetic resources.  It is the product of decades of 
discussions within the FAO concerning the technical, scientific, economic and social aspects 
of the international exchange of germplasm.299  The treaty is intended to serve two 
objectives: the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources (PGR) for food 
and agriculture; and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from their use, 
for sustainable agriculture and food security.300  It introduces two mechanisms in pursuit 
of these aims: the Multilateral System of Access and Benefit Sharing (‘the multilateral 
system’ or MS) and the formalisation of Farmers’ rights in international Law.  This chapter 
will consider how these developments might support and promote agricultural research 
and development, both generally and for niche crops.  It will also analyse the compatibility 
of the mechanisms created by plant treaty with the international norms governing 
intellectual property protection. 
4.1.1 Background to the Plant Treaty: the International Undertaking on Plant 
Genetic Resources 
 Broadly speaking, there were two streams of concern that led to the eventual 
adoption of the plant treaty: technical and scientific concern over the maintenance and 
conservation of plant and genetic resources; and political and legal concern over the 
ownership of genetic resources and products derived thereof.  As far back as the 1950s 
widespread concern existed over the global erosion of genetic diversity.301  In particular, 
the increase in monoculture practices that occurred as a product of the Green Revolution 
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in the 1960s led to increased awareness of the further decline in genetic diversity.302  This 
led to the FAO and the International Biological Program holding the first technical 
conference on plant genetic resources in 1967; the aim of which was to achieve a 
consensus on the importance conservation of germplasm.303 While the conference 
managed to successfully put PGFRA on the international agenda, it achieved little concrete 
progress on conservation.304  At this time, ex situ germplasm was largely held either in 
national collections or the private collections of research institutes, with access to and 
exchange of PGRFA occurred almost exclusively on a bilateral basis.  The Conference met 
again in 1973 and 1981 to discuss the technical aspects of germplasm collection, 
conservation and exchange.305  During the same period several key international 
organisations in the field emerged: of particular note are the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) in 1971 and the International Board of Plant 
Genetic Resources (IBPGR)306 in 1974. 
 The 1979 FAO Conference marked the beginning of the process of negotiations that 
would lead to the adoption of the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources 
(the International Undertaking, or IU) at the FAO Conference in November 1983.307  
Alongside which, the FAO established the intergovernmental Commission on genetic 
resources for the purposes of monitoring the arrangements included in the International 
Undertaking and reviewing all matters under the auspices of the FAO relating to in the 
field of plant genetic resources.308 
 The International Undertaking was a non-binding instrument intended to ensure 
the conservation, and preservation of plant genetic resources of social, economic or 
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agricultural interest and to make germplasm freely available for plant breeding or scientific 
purposes without restriction,309 including cultivated varieties, wild, obsolete or primitive 
varieties and specialist breeders’ varieties.310  The critical feature of the IU is article 7.  
Article 7 sets out the objective of the further developing the existing international 
arrangements for the conservation and exchange of germplasm into a coordinated global 
network under the auspices of the FAO, intended to facilitate PGR exchange and support 
the agricultural development; and the expansion and improvement of institutional capacity 
in the field of PGR of developing states.  PGRs accessed through the system were to be 
made available on the basis of mutual exchange or mutually agreed terms.311 
 As a non-binding instrument, the International Undertaking relied upon 
international cooperation and the voluntary compliance of contracting parties.  Indeed, the 
IU was approved with a number of reservations.312  Whilst the IU encouraged the free flow 
of germplasm in order to support agricultural development, it did not touch upon 
ownership PGRs, either of wild varieties or developed cultivars.  This is likely a result of 
the fact that the Undertaking was based upon the principle that plant genetic resources 
constituted the heritage of mankind.313 
4.1.2 Negotiation of the ITPGRFA 
 The discourse on ownership of PGRFA served as the impetus for the eventual 
negotiation of a binding agreement. More specifically, the increased recognition of the 
unequal flow of germplasm between the technologically advanced north and genetically 
rich south314 combined with the formal acknowledgement of state sovereignty over genetic 
resources315 meant that the provisions of the soft law provisions of the International 
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Undertaking were no longer adequate. The IU had already come into conflict with 
industrialised nations and commercial agriculture over concerns that the free exchange of 
germplasm conflicted with plant breeders’ rights.  This lead to the Agreed Interpretation316 
by the FAO Commission on Food and Agriculture, which declared that the free exchange 
of PGRFA and plant breeders’ rights were not incompatible.317  However, this was not 
sufficient to alleviate the tensions between provider and recipient states. 
 The issue of farmers’ rights had entered the debate on PGRFA at the 1983 
Conference,318 as a loosely formed concept intended to assert ownership of farmer 
innovation and redress the unequal balance between on farm innovators and the holders 
of plant breeders’ rights.319  By large, the idea was rejected by high income states in the 
north; however it gained traction with the south, in particular Latin America, from states 
with a much higher percentage of the population engaged with agriculture.  Its continued 
presence in the discourse on PGRFA eventually resulted in an FAO resolution on Farmers 
Rights in 1989;320 which was intended, alongside the Agreed Interpretation to redress 
some of the concerns surrounding the balance between breeders and farmers, developed 
and developing states.321  During this period the issue of access to PGFRA had arisen in 
the negotiation of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD); while the CBD concerned 
all biological diversity, contracting parties had recognised the unique nature of agricultural 
biodiversity, including the management of ex situ collections of PGR and the question of 
farmers’ rights.  Consequently, at the same time as adopting the CBD, contracting parties 
also adopted Resolution 3 of the Nairobi Final Act, which requested that the FAO address 
these outstanding issues.322  Subsequently, FAO Conference 1993 formally requested that 
the Commission negotiate a revision of the International Undertaking.323  The discussions 
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within the framework of the CBD and the entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement served 
to demonstrate to the agricultural sector that a non-binding agreement was no longer 
sufficient.  
 Thus, as a result of various pressures from the agricultural sector and NGOs, as 
well as both developed and developing states, the negotiation of the treaty began in 1994.  
The adoption of the premise of the multilateral system with a list of crop species available 
to be accessed as a solution for regulating access to PGRFA took place early in the 
negotiation of the treaty.324  This then raised the issue as to which crops should be included 
in the list (Annex I).  Lower and middle income states viewed Annex I as a test of the 
value and efficacy of the new system, whereas developed states were keen to promote 
access to genetic resources as an end in itself. 325  The final 64 crops included in Annex I 
represented a compromise between the extremes of the minimalist proposal of nine crops 
made by the African region and the comprehensive list of 287 submitted by the European 
region.326  The final text was adopted at the thirty-first conference of the FAO in 2001 and 
came into force on 29th June 2004.327  
4.1.3 Structure of the ITPGRFA 
  To date, the Treaty has 146 contracting parties.328  Thus, it is near global in 
application.  The decision making organ is the Governing Body of the Treaty, which is 
constituted of representatives from each contracting party.329  The Governing Body is also 
responsible for maintaining the multilateral system (see below, 4.2).330  Decisions are 
made by consensus.331  Compliance with Treaty obligations is overseen by the Compliance 
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Committee332 and on the basis of voluntary reporting by states parties of measures taken 
to ensure compliance with the treaty.333  Consequently, the effective implementation of 
the plant treaty is dependent upon the good faith of contracting parties.  This is potentially 
problematic for end users: as a result of the new form of multilateralism created by the 
multilateral system, the plant treaty goes beyond the traditional reach of international law.  
The system incorporates both public and private sector entities by means of the Standard 
Material Transfer Agreement, and thus elevates non-state entities to the plane of 
international law.  Consequently, the system is not static in nature.334  The multilateral 
system is in the early stages of operation, and as such, the implications of its unique 
structural arrangement are not clear at this stage.  
4.2 The Multilateral System of Access and Benefit Sharing 
  The multilateral system of access and benefit sharing is the legal mechanism 
created by the plant treaty intended to facilitate access to germplasm by providing a near 
global standardised approach to access to PGRFA that recognises the need for reciprocity 
in agricultural innovation and development. All PGRFA are within the scope of the 
multilateral system335.  However, the substantive obligations contained within part IV of 
the treaty only apply to crops listed in Annex I of the treaty which are under the control 
of state parties or the public domain;336 as well as the collections held by international 
gene banks of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research.  The 64 crops 
listed in Annex I are considered to be the most essential crops for human nutrition and 
food security, comprising up to 80% of total human consumption of plants.337 The fact 
that many crop varieties are not included in Annex I does not exclude them from being 
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accessed through the multilateral system; rather, non-Annex I crops simply require 
voluntary inclusion by either the state party or institution that possesses them.338   
 PGRFA included in the multilateral system may be accessed by on the basis of the 
Standard Material Transfer Agreement, which governs the terms of access and benefit 
sharing (below, 4.2.1).  Use of genetic material accessed through the multilateral system 
is strictly limited to agricultural purposes.339   This is in order to avoid overlap with other 
access and benefit sharing systems, such as that established under the Nagoya Protocol.340  
States parties agree to facilitate access to publicly owned PGFRA, which in effect creates 
a global commons.  Restricting the scope of the substantive obligations to Annex I crops 
in the public domain effectively minimises issues arising from potential conflicts with 
intellectual property rights which might arise should privately held germplasm be available 
through the multilateral system and thus streamlines the system.  However, the limited 
number of crops included in the system curtails its potential to support agricultural 
research and development.  The relatively low number of crop species included in Annex 
I is a justifiable compromise, between the inclusive approach argued for by high income 
states and the more restrictive approach advocated in by low and middle income states, 
especially given the concerns raised during the negotiation of the treaty by developing 
states about the historical appropriation of germplasm.341  Yet it is arguable that it is 
developing states that are likely to be deprived as a result of the limited amount of genetic 
material available through the system.  This point is considered in the discussion of the 
standard material transfer agreement, below. 
4.2.1 The Standard Material Transfer Agreement 
 Per article 12.4 of the plant treaty, access to genetic resources under the 
multilateral system is regulated by the standard material transfer agreement.342  After the 
adoption of the treaty, the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
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established an expert group to develop such an agreement, including terms for the 
commercial benefit sharing.343  The basic outline of the SMTA was created by the Expert 
Group on the Terms of Standard Material Transfer Agreement; it was subsequently revised 
by the Contact Group for the Drafting of the SMTA before the final version was adopted 
on 16 June 2006.344  As the agreement is intended to facilitate access to germplasm and 
to negate the need for bilateral agreements between parties, it may not be varied or 
abbreviated in any way.345  Thus the SMTA functions contractually at the international 
level.   
 The agreement regulates the relationship between the provider and the recipient 
of genetic material.346  Access to PGRFA is without charge (excluding meeting minimal 
costs)347 provided that the material accessed is used only for agricultural research, 
breeding or training;348 subject to the conditions that the recipient will not claim any IPRs 
or other rights over material received from the system.349  Should a recipient develop and 
commercialise a product using material accessed from the system, the recipient is required 
to pay into the benefit sharing mechanism specified in Annex II,350 which is the Benefit 
Sharing Fund.351 
The SMTA contains two options for payment.  The first is to pay a fixed percentage 
of 0.7%352 on the sale of the product developed using accessed material during the period 
of restriction (ie. the period during which it is the subject of an IPR).353 
 Alternatively, the recipient may opt for the payment scheme under art. 6.11. The 
alternative payment scheme can be effectively described as a subscription service.  Under 
this scheme, the recipient makes payments at a discounted rate of 0.5% for a period of 
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ten years.354  Payment is to be made regardless of whether the product is available without 
restriction.  The reward for this greater obligation is further access to other genetic 
material of the same crop without further financial obligation.355  The period of ten years 
is subject to renewal by the recipient.356  If at the end of the ten year period the recipient 
chooses not to continue making payments under art. 6.11, then the recipient will be 
required to continue making discounted payments for any products containing accessed 
material that have been commercialised that are subject to restriction.357  
The condition of access that recipients do not claim intellectual property rights or 
other rights that restrict access to PGRFA, its genetic parts or components thereof in the 
form they were received from the multilateral system is of particular interest for the 
present analysis.  As Michael Blakeney points out, this does not prevent recipients from 
claiming IPRs over modified derivatives of material accessed through the system.358  This 
is necessary feature of a system intended generally to facilitate access to359 and support 
the research, development and sustainable use of PGRFA.360  However, this then raises 
the question: at what point genetic material accessed can be considered to have been 
sufficiently modified? Blakeney suggests that a test similar to that present in laws derived 
from the Enactments of the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(UPOV) as to whether a variety is “essentially derived” from a protected variety is the 
most likely approach.361   
The example of the Australian chickpeas provides a useful illustration of the issues 
that can arise as a result of the absence of guidance as to what constitutes a sufficiently 
modified derivative.  This concerned the attempt to acquire plant variety protection (PVP) 
for two varieties of chickpeas derived from Indian chickpea lines by two Australian 
government agricultural agencies.  Agriculture Western Australia and the Grains Research 
and Development Corporation applied for PVP for two varieties of chickpeas derived from 
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material obtained from the International Crop Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics 
(ICRISAT) under the Australian Plant Breeder’s Rights Act 1994, the local codification of 
the 1978 UPOV Enactment.362  The material was obtained on the basis of a material 
transfer agreement with ICRISAT.363   The material submitted fulfilled the statutory 
requirements for a new plant variety:364 the varieties submitted were distinct, uniform and 
stable, and had not or had only recently been exploited.  The application was withdrawn 
by the applicants due to public outcry that occurred after the whistle was blown on the 
actions of Agriculture Western Australia and the Grains Research and Development 
Corporation by the Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI).  Therefore the 
application did not have the opportunity to be determined on its merits by the Australian 
Plant Breeder’s Rights Office. 365  This also means that substance of the material transfer 
agreement by which the material was obtained was not scrutinised in any way. 
The case of the Australian chickpeas predates the ITPGRFA, as it took place in 1998.  
Nonetheless, it demonstrates clearly that without sufficiently rigorous guidance as to what 
constitutes a modified derivative of genetic material accessed through the MS, the material 
made available through the system is insufficiently protected from appropriation.  Neither 
the ITPGRFA nor the SMTA provide this.  It was noted at the time of the controversy that 
even with a legally binding treaty regulating the exchange of germplasm that the 
monitoring of abuses would be difficult as neither the FAO nor the CGIAR have the 
resources to truly manage the extent of germplasm held on trust by international gene 
banks.366  Since the entry into force of the ITPGRFA, it could be argued that the limitation 
of Annex I to 64 crops might make this task more manageable, although the scope of the 
MS is not strictly limited to Annex I crops.  This suggests that the complete absence of a 
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concept of sufficiently modified derivatives is a serious inadequacy, at least from the 
perspective of providers of genetic material.  
It is interesting to note that as late as 2010, the test for ‘predominantly derived’ in 
Australian PVP legislation was held to be ‘insufficiently rigorous’.367  This highlights the fact 
plant variety protection legislation, including that based on the various UPOV Enactments, 
can play mutually supportive role in ensuring that material accessed through the MS is not 
unjustly appropriated.  It is submitted that the multilateral system would benefit from the 
development of a shared concept of modified derivatives.  In the same vein as the UPOV 
system, such an inclusion would lend a degree of certainty to both end users and providers 
of PGRFA.  While it is highly unlikely that such an addition might find its way into the text 
of the treaty itself, there is scope for the requirement to be included in the SMTA, given 
that this is the mechanism which sets out parties’ responsibilities concerning access to 
PGRFA within the multilateral system.  The practical challenge that would arise out of the 
inclusion of the modified derivatives requirement would be the provision of appropriate 
technical guidance.  Nonetheless, using SMTA to contractually oblige parties to adhere to 
guidance as to what constitutes a sufficiently modified derivative would also have the 
advantage of being flexible if required, as it could allow the concept to be adjusted in a 
similar matter as how the UPOV Council routinely updates it Explanatory Notes on 
Essentially Derived Varieties.368  This is particularly relevant given that compliance with 
the SMTA is regulated by the Governing Body of the Treaty.  
The lack of guidance from the treaty bodies as to what constitutes a modified 
derivative of genetic material accessed through the system is detrimental to establishing 
a properly functioning multilateral system, as ambiguity remains around parties’ 
obligations to pay into the system.  This has two potential consequences.  It could serve 
to deter research and development involving material included in the multilateral system, 
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as uncertainty as to their potential contractual obligations is unlikely to encourage either 
private or public actors to seek IP protection from developments made with genetic 
material from the MS.  This in turn, will limit the extent to which payment is made into the 
benefit sharing fund.  
On the other hand, the lack of definition of a modified derivative may in fact serve 
to encourage plant breeders to acquire IP protection for varieties derived from material 
accessed from the MS with minimal development or modification.  This is particularly true 
given that the authorities responsible for granting IP protection over plant varieties (such 
as the Plant Variety Rights Office369 or in some states, the local patent office370) will not 
necessarily have access to material acquired from gene banks or third-party institutions 
in order to consider it as prior art for the purposes of the application for the IPR.  The issue 
as to whether this is of any benefit to the MS will depend upon whether the holder of the 
IPR in question chooses to continue to make the new variety available for further research 
purposes or not.  If the variety is not available for research purposes, then the right holder 
will be required to make financial contributions into the Benefit Sharing Mechanism.  In 
this situation, it is arguable at least, that some benefit is being redirected through the MS.  
If, however, the right holder commercialises a crop variety that is minimally derived from 
genetic material accessed from the MS and chooses to make the new variety available for 
research purposes, then the absence of a clear definition as to what constitutes a modified 
derivative has arguably created a loophole through which it is possible to commercialise, 
with minimal effort, material accessed through the MS without contributing in any way to 
the regime.  It is possible to assert that the rights holder has contributed to the MS by 
making the protected variety available for research purposes, and has thus conferred the 
benefit of additional options for addressing food security concerns.  However, this is 
untenable in the case of a minimally developed variety as it will not be significantly 
different from the material from which it was derived and therefore, cannot fairly be said 
to be a research-based contribution. 
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 The real possibility of breeders taking advantage of a lack of minimum standards 
for modification of genetic material acquired through the MS is illustrated by the patenting 
of several varieties of rice derived from Basmati rice from Pakistani Basmati genetic 
material. 371  A US based corporation, RiceTec, sought patents over a number of varieties 
derived from Basmati rice under the names of Texmati, Kasmati and Jasmati;372 the 
patents in question would have granted RiceTec a commercial monopoly over the 
production of Basmati Rice in the US.  The patents were granted in 1997.373  Of particular 
controversy was the fact that the genetic material used to breed the varieties at issue was 
derived from 22 Pakistani Basmati rice lines acquired from the World Germplasm Collection 
of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).374  Similarly, the involvement of 
Hank Beachell, a former breeder at the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), who 
was credited as one of the ‘inventors’ of the strain in question also raised eyebrows.375  
The acquisition of the germplasm in question was perfectly legal, as it took place before 
the entry into force of the Convention on Biological Diversity and prior to the negotiation 
of the ITPGRFA.  Nonetheless, the grant of the patents provoked an adverse reaction from 
both non-governmental organisations, such as RAFI and Research Foundation for Science, 
Technology and Environment (RFSTE), as well as developing states with a vested interest 
in safeguarding their local varieties and genetic heritage, most notably India.  Significant 
concerns were raised over the ethics of patenting a “new” variety of Basmati rice, but also 
as to the technical legal questions concerning whether such varieties were capable of 
fulfilling the requirements of novelty and inventive step.376  In challenging this, the Indian 
government submitted to the US Patent and Trademark Office some 50,000 pages of 
scientific evidence detailing how existing high quality basmati varieties already possessed 
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the characteristics for which the new varieties has been granted patent protection.377  
Ultimately, RiceTec surrendered its claims to the patents when the US government filed 
for re-examination in 2000.378  What the Basmati rice case serves to highlight, regardless 
of the fact that it predates the ITPGRFA, is that without more precise contractual 
obligations regulating access to genetic material, the providers of genetic resources will 
need to rely upon local IP Offices to divine whether a new variety is sufficiently distinct 
from the material from which it was derived. This may not be possible based upon the 
information available at the time of examination.  If, like in the Basmati rice case, an IPR 
is challenged after the grant, this may require considerable resources and take years to 
resolve.  Indeed, the Basmati rice case required no less than the intervention of the Indian 
government.  It is also possible that the outcome of the resolution of the dispute will be 
dependent upon the local domestic IP regime and its examiners being favourable.  
Whereas the existence of a contractual requirement for sufficient modification of 
derivatives would be of benefit to both providers and recipients of genetic material as it 
would afford assurance to the former that genetic material they have provided will not be 
unfairly commercialised and provide the later with clarity and legal certainty over their 
obligations towards genetic material accessed through the MS.  Additionally, it would 
provide alternative recourse for dispute resolution.  It is not suggested that the 
modification of the access regime to support a concept of modified derivatives would be 
either a quick or a simple process.  However, given the quantity of scientific data provided 
to challenge the patents in the Basmati rice case, the existence of some guidelines on the 
matter may serve to prevent such long and complex disputes from arising. 
 
4.2.2 Benefit Sharing  
 There are two aspects to benefit sharing within the framework of the ITPGRFA.  The 
first of which is the agreement that developments made using material accessed through 
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the system will be freely available (where payment into the system for commercial benefits 
is not made).379  Thus, in theory, everyone should benefit from the newly available 
knowledge.  This in turn, will support the achievement of the wider aims of the Treaty in 
addressing food security concerns. 
 The second type of benefit sharing is the redistribution of the financial benefits 
arising from the commercialisation of products developed using material accessed through 
the system.  As is outlined in section 4.2.1 above, parties are required to make pro rata 
payments to the Benefit Sharing Fund, which sit alongside voluntary contributions from 
contracting parties and the private sector.380  As such, the Benefit Sharing Fund is a third 
party beneficiary to the SMTA.381  Financial benefits are not redistributed on the basis of 
the origin of germplasm accessed through the system.  Rather, it is directed towards 
specific projects which are intended to address specific PGFRA concerns, such as 
conservation, sustainable use and adaptability to climate change, with emphasis on 
supporting projects not being pursued elsewhere.382  This creates a parallel system of 
financial support for agricultural research and development which may serve to promote 
innovation where a recognised commercial market may not exist, or it may support the 
early stages of research which may not lead to the development of a commercially viable 
crop variety but may nonetheless support the alleviation of food security concerns. 
Funding is distributed on the basis of calls for project proposals made by the Treaty 
Bureau; proposals are independently selected and approved by experts before being 
approved by the Treaty Bureau.383  The ITPGRFA Secretariat is then responsible for 
establishing a contractual relationship with the executives of the funded project and for 
subsequent reporting and monitoring.384  To date, there have been four calls for 
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proposals.385  11 small scale projects were funded by the first cycle of funding;386 19 
projects by the second cycle;387  22 projects by the third cycle of funding388 and 20 projects 
under the fourth cycle.389  It is noteworthy that under each round of funding there have 
been a number of projects funded that engage with underutilised and landrace crop 
varieties, or supporting small scale and local agriculture funded.390 
 Thus, the salient attribute of the benefit sharing regime under the plant treaty is 
that it is not concerned with direct remuneration for originators of germplasm in the 
system.  Rather, its limited resources are devoted to addressing food security concerns 
more generally.  This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that the financial aspect of benefit 
sharing under the regime is also oriented towards funding the creation of agricultural 
knowledge and the maintenance of agrobiodiversity.  
4.3 Farmers’ Rights 
 Prior to the entry into force of the ITPGRFA, the concept of farmers’ rights had not 
found expression in international law.  As noted in section 4.1.2 above, the idea found its 
way into the debate on plant genetic resources during the 1980s, and was adopted by 
many developing states and promoted by NGOs as a potential means of addressing the 
perceived unequal flow of germplasm between developed and developing states.391  The 
forum for this discussion was the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, 
which continued to host the discussion surrounding PGRFA after the adoption of the 
International Undertaking.392  The notion of farmers’ rights was formally acknowledged for 
the first time by a resolution of the Conference in 1989 which loosely defined farmers’ 
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rights as those arising out of ‘the past, present and future contributions of farmers in 
conserving, improving and making available plant genetic resources’.393  The initial 
endorsement of the concept recognised inter alia: the necessity of promoting the need for 
conservation globally alongside adequate funds to ensure this; the need to assist farmers, 
especially in the developing world in to protect and conserve their plant genetic resources; 
and to allow farmers in the developing world to participate fully in the benefits derived 
from the improved use of plant genetic resources.394  Further discussion of the concept in 
1991, affirmed national sovereignty over genetic resources and that farmers’ right would 
be implemented through an international fund for PGRFA, that would support conservation 
and utilisation programmes.395  Although the idea that farmers’ rights should serve as a 
counter balance to formal intellectual property rights arose during the negotiation of the 
IU, it did not gain traction during the negotiation of the final instrument.396  This can be 
explained, at least in part, by the considerable difficulty achieving any consensus on the 
issue of farmers’ rights. It can also be attributed to a lack of mandate to address 
intellectual property issues, the implications of which are discussed below.  
Farmers’ rights are contained within article 9 of the ITPGRFA, which marks the first 
and only binding provision on the subject contained in an international instrument. Article 
9.1 recognises the role and continued contribution of local and indigenous communities to 
the conservation and development of PGRFA. Secondly, and more significantly, article 9.1 
unequivocally places responsibility for the realisation and promotion of farmers’ rights 
squarely at the feet of contracting parties, so that they may be developed in accordance 
with national needs and priorities.  Third, the article acknowledges the need to protect TK 
relating to PGRFA;397 in addition to giving local and indigenous farmers the right to 
participate in benefits arising from the use of PGRFA398 and the right to participate in 
decision making relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of PGRFA at the national 
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level.399  Furthermore, article 9 does not limit any seed saving or exchange rights that 
farmers may have under national law.400 
 The version of farmers rights embodied in article 9 is a relatively restricted view of 
the construct.  This is because it only addresses the three issues outlined above; whereas 
the term ‘farmers’ rights’ has been applied to a much broader range of social, economic, 
political and cultural rights.401  Article 9 does identify several elements which are almost 
universally recognised as being core concerns of rural and indigenous farmers, such as 
seed saving and exchange practices and the need to preserve TK.  However, the only 
concrete rights identified under the ITPGRFA are procedural concerns: namely the right to 
participate in decision making relevant to the conservation and use of PGRFA.  Thus, the 
treaty’s version of farmers’ rights is somewhat vague.402  Moreover, as a result of the 
national implementation approach adopted in article 9.1, it is possible for the provisions 
to become further diluted.  This in turn, places serious limitations on our ability to assess 
the impact of article 9.  First, because the variation in implementation yields a lack of 
comparability and second, because legislation and regulation developed at the national 
level have much greater impact on either breeders or small farmers.403  Indeed, this 
approach has been criticised by farmers’ rights campaigners as mitigating the strong, 
affirmative nature of farmers’ rights.404  However, other stakeholders in the global food 
chain, such as the International Seed Federation (ISF), argue that the Plant Treaty’s 
approach to farmers’ rights is correct, given the variation in national policy approaches to 
seed saving and exchange practices, in order to avoid any farmers’ privileges impinging 
upon plant breeders’ rights.405  Whilst this may very well be true, this position serves to 
limit the discourse on farmers' rights to just seed saving and exchange practices, rather 
than their wider social, economic and cultural implications.  To a certain extent, it is 
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possible to justify the exclusion of the wider reaching aspects of farmers’ rights by 
reference to the fact that the treaty was negotiated under the auspices of the FAO, and as 
a result is limited to the subject matter within its mandate.  Prior to and throughout the 
negotiation history of the ITPGRFA, the implementation of farmers’ rights was centred 
upon the creation of fund for the conservation and utilisation of PGRFA,406 rather than the 
establishment of specific individual or community rights for farmers.  To that end, it is 
arguable that the manifestation of farmers’ rights in article 9 is entirely adequate.  
 Nonetheless, article 9 still fails to address one critical aspect of farmers’ rights: that 
is, the role of farmers and on farm innovation.  The article makes the explicit assumption 
that farmers have an active role in conserving local and traditional landrace varieties; 
however it does not acknowledge the existence of on farm innovation.407  Curiously, the 
role of on farm and farmer innovation is recognised, albeit obliquely, by the Governing 
Body of the Treaty.408  This inconsistency appears to reflect the prolonged difficulty and 
concessions made during the negotiation of the treaty.409  Even so, the result of the 
omission from article 9 is that there is a lack of foundation for the protection of farmers' 
and local varieties.  Arguably, it fails to adequately recognise the dynamic nature of seed 
systems and potentially impedes the realisation of farmers’ rights.  This is somewhat 
troubling given the fact that the treaty was both negotiated and is administered under the 
auspices of the FAO, a forum that includes and encourages participation by agricultural 
stakeholders, including NGOs representing small farmers and farmers from developing 
states.  It is arguable that the failure to address the IP related aspects of farmers’ rights 
has been excluded on the basis that the provision of proprietary rights is outside the 
purview of the FAO, an organisation whose primary aim is to eliminate hunger, food 
security and malnutrition.410  Linked with this, it is can be contended that there are other 
more appropriate forums, such as the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) or 
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the World Trade Organisation (WTO) for the discussion and development of the IP related 
aspects of farmers’ rights.  However, it is difficult to see how either WIPO or the WTO is a 
suitable forum for those discussions in practice.  Considering the two organisations in turn, 
WIPO defines its mission as the development of a balanced and effective system of 
intellectual property protection, which enables innovation and creativity for the benefit of 
all.411  Therefore, the advancement of the IP related aspects of farmers’ rights is clearly 
within its ambit.  However, based upon historical evidence, it is difficult to view WIPO as 
a forum that will yield significant developments in this regard, as the IP related aspects of 
farmers’ rights appear to fall outside of WIPO’s agenda.  Although the issues related to the 
realisation of the IP aspect of farmers’ rights have been under discussion by of the 
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional 
Knowledge and Folklore412 (WIPO IGC) since 2001, no WIPO administered instruments 
have addressed the issues arising from the implementation of farmers’ rights.413  Nor does 
its current methodology for the ‘Development of National Intellectual Property 
Strategies’414 ask any questions or provide any information pertaining to farmers’ rights 
or the realization of their IP related aspects.  The purpose of the Development of National 
Intellectual Property Strategies is to support the main aim of WIPO to assist developing 
and least developed countries in the formulation of national IP institutions, infrastructure 
and resources.415  It seems logical that such a device would take into account the concerns 
of states which need to be balanced against the development of the local IP framework, 
such as food security concerns, so that framework can be appropriately formulated to local 
needs.  However, the development referred to appears to be conceived in a strict, technical 
sense rather than focused on substantial issues.  The methodology does raise the issue of 
plant breeders’ rights; however, it does so in a manner that reflects UPOV style 
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institutional arrangements.416  It does not consider or promote existing non-UPOV forms 
of plant variety protection, such as those developed by India, Thailand or Malaysia.417  This 
brings into question the extent to which the methodology is intended to aid the 
development of a unique national IP framework appropriate to local needs. 
Secondly, as previously outlined in chapter 2418 and in section 4.4 below, the facet 
of the WTO that pertains to intellectual property rights, is concerned with the Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). TRIPS, is centred upon the universal availability 
of minimum standards of IP protection across states parties419 in order to reduce 
distortions and impediments to international trade.420  Accordingly, the WTO is not 
concerned with the development of IP standards beyond the implementation of minimum 
standards, or addressing specific concerns which do not pertain to trade.  Given that non-
UPOV sui generis IP protection for farmers or local varieties is a niche form of IP protection, 
and that is unlikely to be used for trade on more than a limited scale, the development of 
IP protection for farmers’ varieties can be said to be outside the remit of the WTO.  Thus, 
from the vantage point of improving food security concerns, it is difficult to envisage how 
either forum is more appropriate than the FAO for the development of the IP related 
aspects of farmers’ rights. 
 However, it is perhaps unwise to take article 9 at its face value.  Rather, it might 
be better understood as supporting a ‘human rights based approach’ to farmers’ 
rights.421422  From this vantage point, farmers rights set out in article 9 should be viewed 
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as a normative standard towards which parties should aim in order to effectively fulfil 
farmers’ rights; thus they are normative rather than prescriptive. This approach would 
suggest a more positive and successful outcome of article 9.  It would also reflect the 
approach taken more broadly in the Treaty: given the new approach to multilateralism 
undertaken in the ITPGRFA, it might be suggested that the aim of article 9 is to improve 
the standing of farmers and farmers groups within the ambit of the multilateral system, 
rather than as a finite statement of farmers’ rights.  Furthermore, this is supported by the 
work undertaken towards implementing article 9 within the framework of the treaty. 
The development of farmers’ rights has remained a constant item on the agenda 
of the Governing Body since its first meeting.423  Although during the early meetings little 
was achieved in this area other than acknowledging the need to engage with 
stakeholders,424 later sessions have produced more substantial resolutions on the 
implementation of article 9.  At the third meeting, the governing body adopted Resolution 
6/2009, which called for regional consultations on the national implementation and 
realisation of farmers’ rights.425  Consultations did not take place due to a lack of financial 
resources and capacity.  Nonetheless the Governing Body continues to encourage 
contracting parties and other relevant organisations to feedback their views, experiences 
and best practices on the implementation of article 9 in consultation with farmers groups 
and other stakeholders.426  Subsequent meetings have similarly emphasised voluntary 
participation and review of the implementation of farmers’ rights by contracting parties.  
Most recently, the governing body has encouraged contracting parties to convene their 
own workshops and consultations in order to feedback experiences and views on national 
implementation of farmers’ rights which will contribute to a body of knowledge that may 
be of wider benefit to other states parties in their implementation and development of 
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article 9.427 This should in turn facilitate the elevation of stakeholder concerns at the 
international level. 
 The approach undertaken by the Governing Body based upon encouraging 
consultation and participation by stakeholder groups is consistent with the human rights 
based approach and thus suggest that this is the yardstick by which the success of article 
9 should be judged. Viewed in context, it can undoubtedly be said to be more successful 
than when judged on content alone, even if it is somewhat handicapped by the voluntary 
nature of farmers’ rights development.  However, if article 9 is successful because it is 
driven by a human rights based approach, then the omission of the concept of farmer 
innovation from article 9 is even more difficult to reconcile.  This is because a human rights 
based approach is driven by reconciling stakeholder concerns with the norms laid out in 
the Treaty by addressing the barriers to their realisation.  As such, without the normative 
recognition of on farm innovation it is unlikely that discussion and development of this 
essential aspect of farmers’ rights will be undertaken either by contracting parties or 
stakeholders. 
4.4 ITPGRFA and intellectual property protection 
While as an instrument, the ITPGRFA is not specifically concerned with intellectual 
property protection, it is clear from what has been discussed above that it touches upon 
several areas directly linked with intellectual property protection.  Namely, intellectual 
property protection for innovations arising out of material accessed through the 
multilateral system and IP salient aspects of farmers’ rights.  These aspects overlap with 
the commitments of contracting parties to the UPOV Conventions and states parties’ 
obligations under article 27.3(b) TRIPS. 
The issue that then arises is reconciling the norms arising under the ITPGRFA and 
TRIPS and the UPOV Conventions, since while they touch upon the same subject matter, 
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they do not have the same ideology or objectives. 428   Both TRIPS and the various UPOV 
Enactments are IP-centred instruments that are founded on the idea that the availability 
of intellectual property protection should provide incentives for investment in agricultural 
biotechnology, whereas the ITPGRFA aims to maintain an open access system of PGRFA 
and redistribute commercial benefits arising from the use of those resources. 429  As 
examined in section 4.3 above, the ITPGRFA avoids dealing with the aspects of farmers’ 
rights relating to ownership of farmers’ varieties.  However, article 9.3 does provide for a 
potential seed saving exemption that needs to be considered in the light of the pertinent 
IP instruments.  More prominently, there is a need to review the questions pertaining to 
IP protection arising out of the multilateral system in the context of the overlap between 
the ITPGRFA, and TRIPS and the various UPOV Enactments.  Issues arise out of article 
12.3(d) ITPGRFA, which restricts the recipients of genetic material from the multilateral 
system from claiming intellectual property rights over the material acquired through the 
multilateral system or components thereof.  Also at issue is article 13.2(d)(ii) ITPGRFA, 
which requires that recipients who commercialise a product that is PGFRA and incorporates 
material accesses through the MS pay into the benefit sharing mechanism where the 
product is not available without restriction, or to make voluntary contributions where 
commercialised material is freely available. 430  This can be divided into two separate 
issues: the availability of commercialised material for further breeding and research 
activities and the requirement to pay into the benefit sharing mechanism in order to 
commercialise a product using material derived from the multilateral system.  The 
compatibility of these provisions with TRIPS and UPOV are considered in turn. 
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As considered in chapter two, the purpose of the TRIPS Agreement is the 
harmonization of intellectual property protection with the aim towards facilitating 
international trade.  Article 27.3(b) TRIPS provides that patent protection is to be available 
for inventions that are new, non-obvious and useful, which may be excluded for plant 
varieties if sui generis intellectual property protection (such as plant variety protection) is 
available.  Thus, states parties are obligated to provide some form of IP protection for 
plant varieties without restriction, save for the possible exception provided for in article 
8.1 TRIPS, which allows WTO members to adopt measures necessary to protect public 
health and nutrition, so long as they are consistent with the provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement.  Aside from this, the obligations arising out of TRIPS are relatively limited to 
the TRIPS provisions that govern intellectual property rights generally, as the requirement 
that IP protection for plant-based innovations exists as an exception to patentability.  
These general obligations include the requirement to provide permit effective action 
against infringement, including remedies, and fair and equitable enforcement 
procedures.431  They also include broader guiding conventions of international law, such 
as the principles of national treatment432 and most favoured nation treatment.433 However, 
there is no conflict between these provisions and the substantial obligations of the plant 
treaty, as they dictate the national governance of IPRs as opposed to the standards for IP 
protection. 
Article 12.3(d) ITPGRFA serves to impose limitations on the availability of 
intellectual property protection for plant genetic resources or genetic material in the form 
it was accessed through the multilateral system.  However, this is entirely compatible with 
the requirements of TRIPS, as intellectual property protection need only be available for 
novel inventions.  Nonetheless, some practical difficulty may arise where a domestic IP 
framework sets a low threshold for novelty.  For example, in some jurisdictions it is 
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possible for an isolated DNA sequence to meet the novelty criteria.434  Considering the 
benefit sharing and research promoting spirit of the ITPGRFA, this is likely the type of 
practice that the limitation in article 12.3(d) seeks to curb, or at least, benefit from.   This, 
however, does raise practical considerations at the level of the domestic intellectual 
property framework, such as the need for prior art or disclosure of origin requirements. 
The compatibility between the standards imposed by the TRIPS Agreement and the 
requirement in article 13.2(d)(ii) ITPGRFA for recipients who subsequently commercialise 
a product derived from PGRFA received through the MS to contribute to the benefit sharing 
fund, or otherwise make the product without restriction is dependent upon the extent and 
flexibility of research exemptions in national law.  That is to say, it may not be possible, 
within a given domestic IP framework for the recipients of genetic material who 
subsequently commercialise a product to offer it freely for research and development 
purposes in the manner envisaged by the IPGRFA.435  However, there is no particular issue 
arising out of the requirement for recipients of PGRFA to pay into the benefit sharing 
system as TRIPS does not concern itself with the financial administration of IPRs.   To that 
end, contributions made to the benefit sharing system can simply be viewed as an 
additional fee for acquiring the IPR in question. 
There is limited potential conflict between article 9.3 ITPGRFA and TRIPS, as article 
9.3 purports that nothing in article 9 should be interpreted as limiting any rights that 
farmers may have under national law to save, use, exchange and sell farm-saved seed or 
propagating material.  The negative drafting of this provision restricts its impact to 
upholding existing seed saving exemptions in national law; therefore, it should not impose 
upon IPR holders’ rights per se.  However, certain seed saving exemptions may be 
formulated so as to permit the sharing of seeds which are the subject of a third party’s 
IPR.  It could be argued that allowing such a seed saving exception might be considered 
an exception for the purposes of public health and nutrition under article 8.  However, it 
is unlikely that article 8 TRIPS can be used as basis for the creation of such a broad 
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exception. 436  To that end, article 9.3 is potentially problematic; however, this will depend 
upon its implementation in the national law of states’ parties.  
4.4.2 UPOV 
As is discussed in chapter three, the various enactments of the UPOV Convention 
are intended to provide uniform standards of sui generis intellectual property protection 
in line with the guidance provided by the UPOV Council.  Therefore, the question that 
needs to be addressed is whether there is a conflict between these standards and the 
highlighted provisions of the ITPGRFA. 
The article 12.3(d) ITPGRFA restriction on claiming intellectual property rights over 
material accessed through the Multilateral System can be read as constraining the 
availability of intellectual property protection to plant breeders.  However, this limitation 
does not conflict with the principles of the UPOV Enactments.  This is because in order for 
a breeder to claim UPOV style plant variety protection, they need to be able to demonstrate 
that the variety meets the requirement of being new and distinct.437   Therefore, UPOV-
based plant variety protection would not be available for material in the form that it was 
derived from the MS should not be able to satisfy the new and distinct.  Moreover, while 
UPOV prescribes standards for plant variety protection be available in member states, 
plant breeders are in no way obliged to seek PVP for their developments.  Therefore, the 
only situation in which a conflict should arise between the provisions is through deliberate 
attempts to acquire rights over PGRFA as it is received from the MS. 
Much in the same vein as with the TRIPS Agreement, there is potential conflict 
between UPOV and article 13.2(d)(ii) ITPGRFA. The requirement for recipients of PGRFA 
who develop a product therefrom to either pay into the benefit sharing fund or make the 
product freely available for further research and development will be problematic if there 
is no scope in a given UPOV member state’s PVP regime for protected varieties to be 
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available freely for research and development purposes.  This will depend upon the 
domestic implementation of UPOV standards. However, the most recent iteration of UPOV 
contains exceptions to the breeder’s right, which include acts done for experimental 
purposes or for the purpose of breeding other varieties.438    This would seem to be a 
harmonious counterpart to article 13.2(d)(ii) ITPGRFA, although there remains the 
question as to whether the grant of PVP would automatically trigger benefit sharing 
obligations.439   Furthermore, nothing within the UPOV Enactments produces any difficulty 
with the requirement to pay into the benefit sharing mechanism, as a requirement for 
obtaining PVP.   
The seed saving exemption in article 9.3 ITPGRFA has greater potential for difficulty 
in the context of UPOV.  On the surface, it appears to be in direct conflict with exclusive 
PVP for plant breeders.  This is mitigated by a number of factors.  First, the UPOV 
conventions only apply to varieties that are the subject of plant variety protection.  
Therefore, there is a spectrum of crop varieties (including unprotected varieties, land races 
and wild relatives) that do not fall within the ambit of the UPOV convention but may be 
relevance within the ITPGRFA framework or for food security purposes.440   Secondly and 
in the same vein, UPOV does not require farmers to grow protected varieties. 441  Third, 
the most recent UPOV 1991 Enactment contains both a mandatory exception for acts done 
privately and for non-commercial purposes442 and an optional exception for states parties 
to restrict a breeder’s right to allow farmers to propagate the product they have obtained 
from planting a protected variety on their land. 443  This appears to deliberately mirror 
article 9.3 of the ITPGRFA and it stands to reason that the same states that wish to uphold 
farmers’ seed saving rights would also opt for such an exception in their national PVP 
framework.  Finally, as discussed in section 4.3 above, article 9.3 serves only to affirm 
existing farmers’ rights in domestic legal regimes.  It does not confer rights where they 
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do not already exist.  Thus, article 9.3 presents no particular difficulties from the 
perspective of UPOV, provided they are implemented harmoniously into domestic IP 
regimes. 
4.5 Small farmers’ innovations and the MLS 
An issue that was avoided by the SMTA was the relationship between small farmers 
and intellectual property protection for developments derived from genetic resources 
accessed through the multilateral system.   The issue as to whether small farmers should 
be given special consideration concerning financial contributions into the benefits sharing 
mechanism in article 13 was considered by the Expert Group on the Terms of the Standard 
Material Transfer Agreement.  The opinions considered included, inter alia, that the 
concept of small farmers varies from country to country, and only those recognised as 
small farmers by national legislation should be exempt;444 that small farmers in developing 
countries and economies in transition were primarily concerned with small scale and 
subsistence agriculture and therefore unlikely to engage in the breeding activities 
envisaged;445 and, should small farmers find themselves so fortuitous as to be benefiting 
financially from a variety that they have developed using material from the MS through 
the mechanism of a proprietary right over that variety, then such small farmers were to 
be considered as a breeders and required to pay into the multilateral system.446  It is 
interesting to note alongside this is that the ISF considered the question concerning small 
farmers to be irrelevant as small farmers simply would not be paying into the Benefit 
Sharing Mechanism.447 Furthermore, because according to this line of reasoning, small 
farmers would not be paying into the benefit sharing mechanism, the ISF argued that the 
only way it would be possible to effect an exemption for farmers or small breeders would 
be as a financial exemption for small farmers could only exist as a subsidy for seed 
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companies selling to small farmers, thereby providing them with an equivalent financial 
benefit.448  This, it argued, would be almost impossibly complex and open to fraud. 
However, small farmers were to receive no special mention in the final text of the 
SMTA, leaving the conclusion to be drawn that the view that small farmers who acquired 
IP rights over varieties they have developed were to be considered simply as commercial 
plant breeders and therefore any exception would be inappropriate.  This is undoubtedly 
the simplest approach as it does not require additional development of the matter either 
at treaty or domestic level and is not incorrect per se.  However, it is somewhat 
disappointing, if not in its outcome, but in what it expresses about how, both contracting 
parties and the governing body of the treaty view the function and purpose of the MS.  
Taking the viewpoint that the roles of breeders and farmers are separate but may 
potentially overlap in a small number of circumstances appears to indicate that even 
though the purpose of the MS is to support agricultural research and development it has 
evolved in a way that de facto is better suited to supporting commercial agricultural 
development.  This is because it assumes that all crop development and subsequent 
application of intellectual property protection follows a specific archetype.  It does not 
appear to accommodate alternative models of agricultural development.  Despite the 
multitude of agricultural interests, the treaty purports to represent, it is actually caught in 
a very traditional paradigm concerning the flow of germplasm, i.e. from centres of origin 
to industrialised nations.  That is, it does not yet at least, appear to have fully recognised 
the potential for material accessed through the system to benefit crop research and 
development activities taking place in other states or by other institutions. This is 
especially true in the case of subsistence crops, where the availability of PGRFA may be 
mutually beneficial to research and development and consequently help address food 
security concerns.  For example, in the case of the Bambara groundnut449 (vigna 
subterranea) the availability of material developed in West Africa may be of benefit to 
research taking place in South Africa or south east Asia. This is viewpoint is surprisingly 
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supported by the ISF, a non-governmental organisation whose membership is drawn from 
professional seed producer associations.450  The ISF argues that the limited number of 
genetic resources included within the MS is more detrimental to germplasm exchange 
between developing countries than for commercial plant breeders, as commercial breeders 
have other means of developing crop varieties than the introduction of new genetic 
material.451  While it is important to note that despite this assertion, the introduction of 
further genetic material into the MS would still be to the benefit of ISF members, the point 
that the MS as it stands, has not been developed in such a way as to support smaller scale 
crop development (which in turn, might supplement food security concerns).     
It is important not to judge the ITPGRFA too harshly for this, as is outlined in section 
4.1.2 above, the final text represents an almost impossible compromise of competing 
interests and priorities.  To a certain extent, it could be argued that developing states and 
states with high biodiversity may have perpetuated this dynamic in their understandable 
attempts to maintain sovereign control over their genetic resources.  Against this 
background, it is difficult to reconcile the inclusion of additional crop species.  However, 
the increased availability of genetic material through the MS combined with a 
reconsideration of the relationship between the roles of farmer and breeder within the 
ITPGFRA framework should serve to promote smaller scale innovation, and begin to 
address the primary concerns of the treaty, encouraging crop diversity and alleviating food 
security concerns.  It is also possible for domestic ABS and PVP to effectively bridge the 
divide in the international framework between farmers and breeders.  This can be achieved 
by designing national frameworks which adequately balance the competing priorities of 
the commercial seed industry and small scale developers.  Perhaps the best example of 
this is the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers Rights Act 2001 (PPVFRA) of India.452  
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The PPVFRA attempts balance the diverse agricultural needs of the state. 453  It contains 
three distinct forms of plant variety protection in order to so. The first, Protection for New 
Varieties, tracks the UPOV standards for plant variety protection.454455  However, it is 
modified to allow the joint registration of a variety.456  It also allows any breeder, including 
farmers, groups of farmers, communities and agricultural institutions to register a plant 
variety.  This is balanced against the requirement to register the geographical origin of 
genetic material involved in the development of the variety, including all information 
pertaining to the contributions of farmers, communities or organisations involved in the 
development of the variety,457 including traditionally conserved material from rural 
communities.458  This is subject to a declaration that the material has been legally 
obtained.459  As such, the registration of a new variety requires a benefit sharing 
agreement to have been reached with the originators of genetic material used in 
developing the variety.  This provides an appropriate opportunity for financial 
considerations, including those pertaining to payments into the benefit sharing fund to be 
addressed as a part of the process of acquiring a plant breeders’ right.  Thus, the Indian 
model of plant variety protection for new varieties successfully achieves an equilibrium 
which recognises the role of both the commercial seed sector and small scale developers, 
which are in turn balanced against benefit sharing and conservation objectives.  Likewise, 
the second two forms of plant variety protection included in the PPVFRA, Protection for 
Extant Varieties460 and Protection for Farmers’ Varieties461 are tailored to specific national 
needs and provide IP protection for known extant and farmers’ varieties, respectively.   
Thus, it is possible for a domestic PVP framework to adequately support more than one 
kind of plant-based innovator.  However, the issue remains that not all developing states 
or states in the process of developing their domestic IP regime for plant varieties have the 
 
453 Srividhya Ragavan & Jamie Mayer O’Shields, ‘Has India Addressed Its Farmers’ Woes- A Story of Plant 
Protection Issues’ [2007] 20 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 97 at 98 
454 PPVFRA, s.15 
455 Ragavan & O’Shields, n453 above, at 98 
456 PPVFRA, s.16 
457 PPVFRA, s.18(1)(e) 
458 PPVFRA, s.40 
459 PPVFRA, s.18(1)(e) 
460 PPVFRA, s.15(2) 




same resources or expertise available as India in terms of tailoring their domestic regimes 
to their specific national needs, therefore, more comprehensive guidance from the 
international framework would be beneficial.  
4.6 Summary 
To a certain extent, this chapter has not focused upon the issue of food security 
concerns.  This is because the aim of addressing food security concerns is intrinsic to the 
ITPGRFA, and thus it is more appropriate to turn our attention to how the regime serves 
to promote agricultural innovation.    
The plant treaty represents real progress in the sphere of agricultural biodiversity.  
Although the treaty has been in force for over a decade, the necessary developments to 
establish the operational aspects of the treaty have only recently come into effect, and as 
such, its youth makes it very difficult to assess the success of the regime.  Additionally, 
the structure of the access and benefit sharing regime will continue to make it difficult to 
quantify the impact of the regime.   
 Nonetheless, it can be stated with certainty that the mechanisms introduced by the 
multilateral system have provided a means of facilitate access to publicly held germplasm 
and as such, should support plant-based innovations, provided that this is supported by 
adequate safeguarding measures in a state party’s national IP regime.   Where the benefit 
sharing aspect of the plant treaty is concerned, its role in helping to address food security 
concerns will be dependent upon the success of the projects funded by the mechanism.  
The role of both the access and benefit sharing mechanisms of the MLS will be returned 
to in chapter seven.   
Furthermore, we have assessed that there should be no compatibility issues 
between the ITPGRFA and the requirements of TRIPS and UPOV, provided that they are 
implemented by states parties in a manner sensitive to one another.  It is possible for 
them to co-exist as part of a wider sui generis system of IP and access and benefit sharing. 
Finally, while the fact that farmers’ rights have been included in the treaty is a 
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Chapter 5: The Convention on Biological Diversity and its Nagoya Protocol 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to widen the scope of the current exploration of the 
international legal frameworks that apply to genetic resources.  In the previous chapter, 
we considered the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(ITPGRFA), a specialist regime that applies specifically to plant genetic resources for food 
and agriculture.  In this chapter we will consider the regimes that apply to access to genetic 
resources generally: the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity462 (CBD) and its Nagoya 
Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits 
Arising from the Utilization (NP).   The CBD was the first international treaty to explicitly 
address all aspects of biodiversity, including the sustainable use of biological resources 
and access to biotechnology.463  Its objectives are: the conservation of biological diversity; 
the sustainable use of its components; and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising 
out of the utilization of genetic resources.464   Since being opened for signature at the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio,465 it has achieved 
near universal membership.466   Thus, it is of unparalleled relevance to the conservation 
and use of genetic resources.  The 2014 Nagoya Protocol builds upon the foundations of 
the CBD, to produce a binding international access and benefit sharing (ABS) regime.  To 
that end, it has greater impact upon the development of states parties’ national ABS 
frameworks, and it is possible to evaluate with greater certainty its significance for 
research and development involving genetic resources.  For these reasons, the Nagoya 
Protocol warrants more in-depth analysis. 
This chapter is split into two main parts: the first, shorter part will consider the 
Convention on Biological Diversity.  This exploration will be limited to its effect upon access 
to genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge, and the benefits arising from 
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their use.  It will consider the development of the biodiversity concept in international law; 
the status of the CBD as a ‘framework’ convention’ and the consequences of this 
arrangement; before discussing ABS under the Convention.  Finally, it will consider the 
relationship between the CBD and intellectual property.  The first part will provide building 
blocks for the discussion of the Nagoya Protocol in the second part.  It is important to note 
at this stage that in 2002, the Conference of the Parties to the CBD adopted the Bonn 
Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit Sharing.  These voluntary 
guidelines built upon the ABS principles enshrined in the CBD.  However, they have been 
effectively superseded in states that have acceded to the Nagoya Protocol.  Therefore, 
they will not be discussed here.  
The second part will consider the emergence of a binding ABS regime, and the 
effect of this on the content and substance of the obligations arising out of Convention on 
Biological Diversity.  It will then analyse the principles access to genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge, direct and indirect benefit sharing as developed in the Protocol; 
before considering the various compliance mechanisms introduced by the Protocol.  
Finally, it will consider how the ABS principles and regimes under both the Nagoya Protocol 
and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(ITPGRFA) interact with one another. 
5.2 The Convention on Biological Diversity 
5.2.1 History and background to the Convention 
There were several distinct initiatives that stimulated the negotiation of an 
internationally binding agreement concerning biological diversity.  In 1980, the ‘World 
Conservation Strategy’467 produced by International Union for the Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF) created the ‘real foundation’ for the biodiversity concept in international law.468  It 
contained three specific objectives for living resource conservation; the second of which, 
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‘to preserve genetic diversity’ represents the essence of the biodiversity concept469 and 
was subsequently developed into the provision for the conservation of the Earth’s vitality 
and diversity as a component of sustainable living, which made explicit reference to the 
conservation of biodiversity, when the World Conservation Strategy was revised.470  
Equally, the third objective, ‘to ensure the sustainable utilization of species and 
ecosystems’ can be viewed as a clear predecessor of the aims later expressed in the CBD.  
In the same vein, in 1982 the UN General Assembly adopted the World Charter for 
Nature471 which asserted the general principle that the ’genetic viability of the Earth should 
not be compromised.’472 
 The international concern for maintenance of biodiversity crystallised at the 14th 
meeting of UNEP’s Governing Council (the GC) in 1987.  In the weeks prior to the GC, the 
World Commission on Environment and Development presented its report ‘Our Common 
Future’ (otherwise known as the Brundtland Report).473  The report highlighted, inter alia, 
the need for new imperative for international cooperation in the environmental sphere and 
for economic development based upon policies that sustain and expand the natural 
environmental resource base.  In essence, the preservation of biodiversity is essential for 
sustainable development.  It suggested that, as the only intergovernmental organisation 
with universal membership, the UN should take the lead in developing this cooperation.  
The report also advocated the need for formal recognition of rights and responsibilities 
concerning environmental protection and sustainable development.  The recommendation 
of the report was a universal declaration on environmental protection and sustainable 
development, to be followed up by a binding convention within three to five years.474  
Indeed, the report contained a list of proposed legal principles for environmental protection 
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and sustainable development.475  However, due to the proximity of the publication to the 
GC, the laying of ’the foundation stone’ to the CBD went virtually unnoticed.476  
At the GC meeting, the United States put forward an initiative for a global umbrella 
convention on biological diversity.477  At the same time, the IUCN was working on the 
drafting of a global convention on the in situ conservation of flora and fauna between 1984 
and 1989.478  It is useful to note, that at that point in time, there was no suggestion of a 
linkage between biodiversity and biotechnology.479  This is indicative of the era in which 
the Convention was negotiated. 
The starting point for the CBD can be regarded as being the meeting of an Ad Hoc 
working group of experts convened by the Executive Director of UNEP in 1988 to 
investigate the proposals made by the US and the IUCN.480  The meeting concluded that 
the extent of existing conventions could not address the full range of issues associated 
with biodiversity and therefore action was required.481  Thus, in 1989 the GC initiated the 
drafting of a convention on the conservation of biological diversity,482 which was to include 
the proper consideration of the financial and technological transfers from the beneficiaries 
of biological resource exploitation to the owners of biological resources.483  This was 
subsequently folded into the mandate for United Nations Conference on the Environment 
and Development to be held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.484 
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The negotiation of the CBD took place over a series of ten meetings, nine of which took 
place between 1990 and 1992.  This represents an unusually short period of negotiation 
for a multilateral environmental agreement.485  The majority of key issues were laid out in 
the course of the first meeting.  The two most relevant aspects for present purposes, 
intellectual property rights and ex situ conservation were included at the second meeting.  
Alongside many of the other key issues, these remained contentious until the end of the 
negotiations.486  Indeed, the final meeting opened with issues remaining in twenty seven 
of the forty two articles of the Convention.487  Many of which were only resolved through 
diplomatic pressure and under the threat of the Rio deadline.488  In order to reach a final 
text many of the key provisions of the Convention had only been agreed upon as a result 
of specific and deliberate concessions made in the Sub-Working Groups.489  Some of the 
consequences of which are discussed below.  Nonetheless, the Convention was opened for 
signature at the Rio Earth Summit and came into force on 29th December 1993.   
The ultimate result of hasty negotiation of the Convention is that the substantive 
content of the CBD is, generally speaking, framed in aspirational language and soft 
obligations.  For example, the qualification ‘as far as possible and as appropriate’490 
appears eight times in the Convention text in relation to substantive obligations.  Similarly, 
soft phrases such as ‘promote and encourage’ 491’promote and cooperate’492 and 
‘support’493 among others are laced throughout the text. 
Indeed, the final text of the Convention has been polarising among commentators. 
While some, such as Desiree McGraw,494 highlight the success of the CBD through the 
concessions achieved by developing states; others, such as Alan E. Boyle495 criticise the 
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final treaty as being a poor interpretation of customary international law and weaker than 
its contemporaries, both in terms of guiding principles and institutional structure.  Boyle 
is also cynical of its role in reorienting economic benefits to the developing world.  Thus, 
the compromises achieved by the Convention left much to be desired. 
5.2.2 ‘The Framework Convention on Biological Diversity’ 
The adoption of the CBD was a milestone for the recognition of the importance of 
the conservation of biodiversity and the recognition of stakeholder interests in biodiversity.  
However, as is noted above, it is largely composed of soft obligations.  To that end, it is 
necessary to consider the legal character of the final agreement  
Unlike its contemporary, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change,496 
(UNFCCC) the CBD does not expressly define itself as a framework convention.  
Nonetheless, its role in relation to existing multilateral environmental agreements was a 
point of deliberation during the negotiation of the Convention.  More specifically, the 
mandate of the original ad hoc working group was to investigate a potential umbrella 
convention which might serve to organise the various activities in the sphere of biodiversity 
conservation and incorporate other relevant areas.497  However, the final text of the 
Convention is widely conceived as being a framework agreement.498  This is because rather 
than adopting a prescriptive approach and encompassing previous agreements,  the CBD 
lays down guiding principles at the international level which states parties are then obliged 
to take into account when developing national law and policy.499  As such, it seeks to fill 
in the biodiversity gaps in existing regulation500 and with the option to address specific 
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issues by means of subsequent supplementary agreements.501  Indeed, the negotiation 
and adoption of annexes and protocols to the Convention is envisioned in article 23.4. 
The framework character of the Convention makes the implementation of the 
Convention at the national level particularly important, as it is concerned with the 
management of resources over which states have sovereignty.502  Accordingly, it is 
appropriate to briefly consider the compliance mechanisms and the institutional framework 
of the CBD, so that it is possible to properly evaluate the scope of states parties’ obligations 
in the context of substantial provisions of the Convention. 
 Article 23.1 provides for the establishment of the Conference of the Parties as the 
body of the treaty and for regular meetings of the COP.  Alongside which, it also establishes 
a Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA), 503 which 
is charged with providing scientific and technical advice to the COP.504  The primary 
function of the COP is to keep under review the implementation of the Convention.505  This 
is broadly defined so as to include, inter alia: the review of scientific, technical and 
technological advice provided by the SBSTTA;506 the adoption and amendment of annexes 
and protocols to the CBD;507 and a rather open-ended provision to ‘consider and undertake 
any action that may be required for the achievement of the purposes of this Convention 
in the light of the experiences gained in its operation.’508  Indeed, the basic institutional 
structure has been supplemented by a number of specialist working groups,509 including 
the Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing;510 the Working Group on Review of 
Implementation of the Convention;511 the Working Group on Protected Areas;512 and the 
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Working Group on Article 8(j).513  All of which have been supplemented by various ad hoc 
technical groups.514  The Working Groups have produced a number of formal outputs.   
They have also provided a forum for the continued debate and development of the 
principles established in the Convention.  Thus, the Working Groups have served to expand 
upon and clarify the issues arising under the CBD and to incorporate the views of non-
state actors. 
While the flexible mandate assigned to the COP and the SBSTTA are appropriate 
given the framework nature of the CBD, institutionally it lacks a more rigorous mechanism 
intended to systematically and effectively monitor national implementation and 
compliance.515  This is true both in terms of the original Convention and any subsequent 
developments arising from the Working Groups.  States parties are required to submit 
reports at regular intervals to the COP;516 however no mechanism has been developed to 
either formally encourage states parties to improve their compliance or to chastise them 
for not doing so.  Additionally, there is no arrangement in place for the systematic review 
of the reports submitted by states parties.517  Instead, the system is based around 
encouraging cooperation.  Thus, it is unlikely that this vague system of review can be 
successful as a means of monitoring states parties’ implementation of their obligations.518 
On this basis, the institutional framework of the CBD must be viewed as seriously 
curbing the efficacy of any of the provision of the convention. When combined with the 
soft language of the text, this then raises the question as to whether any of the content 
of the Convention carries real normative force or if it is best viewed instead as agreed 
guidelines on best practice in the fields it encompasses.   
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5.2.3 Access and Benefit Sharing under the CBD 
The fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic 
resources is one of the primary objectives of the Convention, as is established by article 
1.  The Convention’s entry into force represented a paradigm shift from the previously 
widely recognised status of genetic resources as forming the common heritage of humanity 
towards exclusive state sovereignty over their genetic resources.519  To that end, in 
drafting the Convention states parties sought to establish principles governing the access 
to genetic resources and potential benefits to be shared with states providing genetic 
resources that could form the basis of domestic law concerning ABS.  Interestingly, the 
preamble makes an explicit link between access to and sharing of genetic resources with 
the conservation of and sustainable use of biological diversity for the purposes of meeting 
the food (and other) needs of the world’s population.  Accordingly, the regulation of access 
and benefit sharing is not limited to research-based activities but is inherently linked with 
all of the aims of the Convention. 
5.2.3.1 Access to Genetic Resources 
The Convention defines ‘genetic resources’ as ‘genetic material of actual or 
potential value’;520 with ‘genetic material’ being defined as any plant, animal, microbial or 
other material containing functional units of heredity.521  Thus, for present purposes, the 
scope of the CBD includes all plant genetic material of actual or potential value, including 
that found in seed form.  The CBD applies to genetic resources both in situ522 and ex 
situ.523  However, it does not extend to cover derivatives.  As such, potentially 
commercially valuable biologically derived chemicals are excluded from the scope of the 
CBD.  This does not preclude states parties from including derivatives in their national (or 
regional access) legislation.  However, it does present a considerable loop hole given that 
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derivatives may be the source of benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources, 
as opposed to raw genetic resources per se.524 
Article 15 addresses access to genetic resources.  Under article 15, states parties 
are recognised as having sovereignty over their genetic resources and the authority for 
determining access rests with the national government.  However, states parties are 
required to ‘endeavour to create conditions’ to facilitate access to genetic resources and 
not to impose restrictions that run counter to the principles of the Convention.525  Where 
access is granted, it is to be on the basis of mutually agreed terms (MAT)526 and subject 
to the prior informed consent (PIC) of the providing party.527  As such, whilst article 15 
establishes states parties’ sovereignty over their resources, the prevailing sentiment of 
the provision is directed towards encouraging the sharing of genetic resources, at the 
same time as defining the two pillars of access to genetic resources.  Accordingly, the 
wording of the provision is relatively dilute and aspirational.  Thus, while article 15 does 
impose substantial obligations upon states parties, its primary achievement is to redefine 
ownership of genetic resources in international law rather than to impose concrete 
obligations.  As the substance of the provision is directed towards national governments, 
there exists a relatively straightforward opportunity for states parties to comply with article 
15 without fully developing a nation level ABS regime.  It is within the scope of article 15 
to implement ‘enabling legislation’, which charges a competent national authority with the 
task of examining the issues arising under article 15 and with the future implementation 
of more specific guidelines or regulations.528  Lyle Glowka notes that in a number of his 
examples, the enabling legislation did not address the key issues of PIC and MAT.529  
Indeed, a survey of nation implementation approaches conducted by Glowka in 1997, four 
years after the entry into force of the Convention, suggested that this approach was 
popular with a number of states in complying with their obligations under the 
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Convention.530  Glowka’s study is particularly helpful in directing our attention towards 
appropriate post-CBD ABS legislation and regulation, as ABS developments that have 
emerged since the signature of the CBD531 make it difficult to retrospectively analyse the 
actual effect of the CBD in encouraging the development and implementation of ABS at 
the national level.  As such, it provides a useful snapshot of ABS approaches at the time.532   
The option to implement enabling legislation serves to demonstrate that strictly 
interpreted, compliance with article 15 is relatively meaningless.  This is because enabling 
legislation represents sufficient compliance with an obligation to ‘endeavour to create 
conditions’ to facilitate access to genetic resources.  However, if we return to Glowka’s 
study, we can see that enabling legislation is only the first of five categories of approaches 
to ABS implementation.533  
The second category includes states that had opted to implement framework 
biodiversity laws intended to implement the concepts embodied in the CBD.534  The 
biodiversity regimes in these states tended to be more comprehensively drafted than the 
enabling legislation and implemented the CBD by clearly establish PIC and MAT 
requirements.  The third and most comprehensive approach is that adopted by the 
Philippines,535 which is a collection of the national instruments intended to regulate access 
to genetic resources.536  What is particularly distinctive about the Philippines’ regime is 
that it is uniquely thorough and precise in its drafting.  This approach is particularly 
comprehensive as it submits all wild flora and fauna are owned by the state and the 
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‘disposition, development and utilization thereof’ are subject to full state supervision and 
control.537  The regime is particularly successful in addressing not only conceptual issues538 
but also in exhaustively laying out the related procedural requirements.539  For example, 
the regime requires a separate agreement to be made for the transfer of royalties, benefits 
and technology.540  Of particular note is the fact that the regime sets out measures to 
penalise non-compliance.541 
The fourth approach taken was the modification of existing laws, usually existing 
regulation concerning the conservation of National Parks, to better reflect concerns over 
access to and the removal of genetic resources.542  This approach has also been adopted 
at the subnational level.  This was the approach initially adopted by the Malaysian state of 
Sarawak.543  Essentially, this is a very basic approach, although one with more precise 
requirements than enabling legislation.  The final category is the development of a regional 
regime on access to genetic resources. The only contemporary example of which was the 
Andean Pact’s Decision 391544 which provided for the implantation of minimum standards 
across the five member states.  As such, member states were able to implement more 
comprehensive regimes concerning access to genetic resources. 
What all of these examples have in common is that they originate in biodiversity 
rich states which had a manifest interest in controlling access to biodiversity, with 
particular emphasis on regulating bioprospecting and protecting their national resources 
from biopiracy.  Indeed, these are the laws and draft laws of the states which argued 
fervidly for the recognition of state sovereignty over genetic resources during the 
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negotiation of the Convention.545  As such, the implementation (or pending 
implementation) of these national regimes in the time period immediately around the 
adoption of the CBD is somewhat misleading, as the fact of their implementation is not, in 
itself, evidence of the successful promotion of ABS values by the CBD. 
It is a relatively common argument that the imposition of access regulation may 
serve to stifle innovations in biotechnology; however, from the perspective of research 
and development, the implementation of clearly drafted access regulation is actually 
advantageous as it provides legal certainty concerning the status of the resources 
accessed.  This serves to protect the party conducting research and development involving 
genetic resources from a state with access regulation from subsequent difficulties should 
the research result in a commercialised product.  This point will be returned to in chapter 
seven.546 
What the examples considered serve to demonstrate is that what is missing from 
the realization of the ABS values encapsulated in article 15 is balance.  The notion of 
benefit sharing is only vaguely defined by the CBD.  While it is possible to leave the concept 
of equitable benefits open to negotiation on a case by case basis, relying upon MAT as the 
sole means of implementing benefit sharing creates serious practical considerations.  The 
key substantive issue is whether there is sufficient scope in a state party’s national legal 
framework to support benefit sharing.  Potential benefit sharing issues include: whether 
the holder(s) of a genetic resource have legal personality, whether the benefits in question 
fit within the scope of contractual obligations as defined in that jurisdiction; and the 
availability and ability of the resource holders to enforce benefit sharing obligations, 
among others.  Linked with this, is the concern as to whether the holders of genetic 
resources are able to effectively negotiate a fair and equitable access and benefit sharing 
agreement.  This raises questions regarding both legal and scientific capability.  Thus, 
relying upon the concept of MAT alone as a means of ensuring benefit sharing seems 
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unlikely to produce fair and equitable benefit sharing without a thoroughly detailed 
national ABS regime.  The examples above demonstrate that this was rarely the case.  Not 
only that, but the absence of an adequate compliance mechanism at the international level 
means that even where a comprehensive national ABS regime has been developed (such 
as that of the Philippines) it will lack teeth if states parties are unable to effectively hold 
other states parties responsible for upholding the benefit sharing obligations of either the 
state itself or legal personalities within its jurisdiction.  This point is returned to in chapter 
six.547 
5.2.3.2 Access to traditional knowledge 
The CBD does not contain a provision which exclusively treats access to associated 
traditional knowledge.  Rather, TK is addressed as an element of in situ conservation.  
Article 8(J) provides that contracting parties are to respect, preserve and maintain and 
promote the wider application of the knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous 
and local communities relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity, with the approval and involvement of the holders of the knowledge, innovations 
and practices in question.  The provision is limited subject to national legislation and by 
the general caveat of ‘as far as possible and as appropriate.’  Contracting parties are also 
to ‘encourage’ the equal sharing of benefits arising out of the knowledge in question.  On 
its own, article 8(j) does little more than express an ideal that states parties approach the 
issue of access to TK and the distribution of the benefits arising from the access and 
utilization of TK with some degree of fairness towards the holders of the knowledge in 
question.  As such, while the CBD does pay due notice to TK, and in doing so cements it 
as an ABS issue to be considered by the international community, any actual ABS 
developments are solely within the discretion of states parties.  This is likely a result of 
the incredibly diverse and undocumented nature of much traditional knowledge, laws and 
practices.  It is also attributable to the fact that issues concerning access to TK do not 
 




arise in all contracting parties.  However, this ambiguity is of little utility to either the 
holders of or to potential end users of TK. 
It is clear from the fact that TK is not addressed in a separate provision that it is 
not a primary concern of the CBD.  Nonetheless, the issue of associated TK has not 
remained static within the framework of the Convention.   Aside from being developed 
under the subsequent Nagoya Protocol, it is also the subject of continued study and 
scrutiny within the ambit of the CBD itself.  The fourth meeting of the COP established a 
Working Group on Article 8(j) (traditional knowledge) in 1998 (WG8J).548  The COP adopted 
a programme of work for the Working Group at its fifth meeting.549  This included, inter 
alia, the implementation of participatory measures needed to ensure the full participation 
of indigenous and local communities;550 the need for case studies to be developed in 
conjunction with indigenous and local communities in order to create a ‘meaningful 
assessment’ of existing legal and other relevant methods for the protection of the 
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities;551  and to 
explore the possibility of the development of legal and other forms of protection for TK.552   
While article 8(j) does not provide any kind of structured obligation for states 
parties where the relationship between indigenous and local communities, forms of 
indigenous knowledge and biodiversity are concerned, through the Working Group it has 
provided a platform for elevating the concerns to the international level.  While progress 
may be slow on this front, it is arguably more valuable that such a forum exists for a 
debate that includes the interested parties, as opposed to the imposition of a binding but 
otherwise unhelpful treaty provision.  The Working Group has experienced success in 
addressing some of the issues within its mandate; the most pertinent example is the 
development in 2015 of: ‘Draft Voluntary Guidelines for the development of mechanisms, 
legislation, or other appropriate initiatives to ensure the [free,] prior informed consent [or 
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approval and involvement] of indigenous peoples and local communities for accessing their 
knowledge, innovations and practices, the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising 
from their use and the application of such knowledge, innovations and practices relevant 
for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and for reporting and 
preventing unlawful appropriation of traditional knowledge’ (‘draft guidelines’).553  While 
the draft guidelines have not yet been formally adopted, they are debatably already of 
value, as they not only demonstrate areas in which a consensus has been achieved, but 
also they provide useful guidance for outside parties seeking to access TK, especially where 
the national ABS regime may be under developed.   
5.2.4 Intellectual Property and the Convention on Biological Diversity 
The Convention on Biological Diversity was negotiated in the UNEP forum at the 
same time as the negotiations were taking place in the GATT that would lead to the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS).  Although the issue 
of intellectual property protection was fiercely debated during the negotiation of the 
CBD,554 the debate was largely centred upon what would become article 16, which 
concerns access to and transfer of technology.  Article 16 provides for the facilitated access 
to biotechnology as a means of achieving the development of objectives of the Convention.  
As such, the debate focused upon the extent of protection afforded IPRs in technology 
transfer.  The question of IP protection for genetic resources or products derived thereof 
is not addressed by article 15.  This can partly be attributed to the era in which the 
negotiation of the Convention took place; as during the late 1980s and early 1990s the 
potential of biotechnology was not yet fully understood.  It can also be attributed to UNEP 
not being perceived as an appropriate forum for the discussion of IP concerns when other 
more appropriate forums, such as the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 
GATT, and UPOV existed.  Another factor is that the issue of IP protection for genetic 
resources or products derived thereof can be argued to be within an individual state’s 
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sovereignty over their resources, and as such did not require addressing by the Convention 
as the issue was discretionary.  Thus, the CBD does not explicitly or adequately confront 
the relationship between IP and genetic resources.  Given the fact that article 27.3(B) 
TRIPS requires its member states to make available IP protection for plant-based 
innovations, the failure to address the relationship between genetic resources in a 
substantive way in the CBD is firmly to the detriment of the holders of genetic resources.  
However, the issue of IP in the context of ABS would later be addressed in the development 
of the Bonn Guidelines and the Nagoya Protocol, and is considered in section 5.3.3 below.  
5.2.5 Summary: Convention on Biological Diversity 
The primary achievement of the Convention on Biological Diversity was the 
introduction of basic principles relating to the conservation and use of the natural world in 
to international law.  This includes the principles of access and benefit sharing.  However, 
as the provisions are relatively dilute, their effect is ultimately at the discretion of states 
parties. As a result, it does not offer much certainty for stakeholders or users of genetic 
resources and is therefore of limited use.  The area in which this deficit is particularly 
evident is the failure to adequately address the relationship between genetic resources 
and IP rights.  Nonetheless, the CBD has succeeded in creating both a framework and a 
forum for these issues to be discussed and developed.   As can be seen from the first part 
of the chapter, this was a major achievement at the time.  The results of this 
accomplishment are considered in section 5.3 next. 
5.3 The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization 
5.3.1.1 Negotiation History of the Nagoya Protocol 
In 2002, the attendees of the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 
Johannesburg agreed to begin negotiations on an international benefit-sharing regime.555  
At the following Conference of the Parties to the CBD in 2004, the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on Access and Benefit Sharing (Working Group, or WGABS) was given the mandate to 
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collaborate with the ‘Ad Hoc Open ended Inter-sessional Working Group on Article 8(j) and 
related provisions’ to elaborate and negotiate a new international access and benefit 
sharing (ABS), with the aim of adopting instrument(s) to effectively implement articles 15 
and 8(j), in addition to complying with the three central aims of the Convention.556  The 
mandate of the Working Group required that indigenous and local communities, NGOs, 
intergovernmental organizations and industrial, scientific and academic institutions be 
invited to participate in the debate.557  The Decision included an Annex which contained 
detailed terms of reference, including the process, nature, scope and elements of such a 
regime.558 
The Working Group met eleven times between 2005 and 2010.  The introduction 
of a draft Protocol text at the Fourth Meeting in January 2006559 served to highlight the 
divergence between industrialised states on one side and the group of Like Minded Mega 
Biodiverse states and the G77 on the other.  The first group questioned the necessity and 
scope of a legally binding regime, as the draft text did not adequately reflect their views.  
Collectively, the industrialised states were concerned that the scope of the subject matter 
that might be included in the protocol was too broad.560  Several also expressed the 
strongly held view that a legally binding regime would be too restrictive, as it could 
potentially prevent bio-prospecting altogether.  In the words of the Australian APEC561 
Study Centre, such a regime would constitute ‘onerous regulation’.562  Such regulation 
would lead to a reduction in the commercial benefits arising out of the exploitation of 
genetic resources, and this in turn would lead to fewer benefits being shared with providing 
states. 
Furthermore, the opinion was raised that some of the proposals for the regime 
which would create a right for governments to have a say in how genetic resources or 
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products derived from genetic resources, including patented products or products are 
otherwise the subject of IP protection, are to be used would undermine intellectual 
property law, and what they considered to be its role in managing access to genetic 
resources.563 
The second group considered the draft text to be an adequate starting point for the 
elaboration of a comprehensive regime that would include, inter alia: capacity building; 
compliance; transfer of technology; access to justice; ensuring that genetic resources and 
associated traditional knowledge are accessed on the basis of Prior Informed Consent (PIC) 
and Mutually Agreed Terms (MAT); the effective participation of local and indigenous 
communities; disclosure requirements for intellectual property protection; and operate as 
effective guidance for national legislation.564 
The Working Group continued to address the nature, objective and scope of an 
international regime through its fifth, sixth and seventh meetings and COP-9, as well as 
at Expert Meetings between COPs 9 and 10.  At the eighth meeting of the Working Group, 
all of the debate on the content and nature of the regime was developed into a single 
negotiating text which incorporated all of the possible elements and the views of all of the 
parties, referred to as the ‘Montreal Annex’.  The draft text was over 57 pages in length 
and contained over 3400 squared brackets,565 representing issues that had been raised 
but not yet agreed upon.566  The overwhelming and divergent nature of the combined 
document led many negotiators to doubt whether it would be possible to reach an 
agreement on the basis of this text.567 
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In order to push the negotiations forward, a draft text of the Protocol was prepared 
by the co-chairs of the Working Group. This was accepted as the basis for negotiations 
from the ninth meeting in Cali, Colombia, in place of the Montreal Annex.568   However, 
despite significant progress, the Working Group failed to finalise the text of the Protocol.  
In light of the approaching deadline for adoption at COP-10, a second session was 
convened.  Many of the key issues remained contentious until the last minute. The issues 
included the economic scope of the Protocol: whether it would support ABS frameworks 
for just naturally occurring gene sequences or whether it would include naturally occurring 
compounds that result from the metabolic process of cells; the geographical scope of the 
Protocol; the status of non-commercial research under the Protocol; the scope obligations 
of parties to provide access to genetic resources over which they have sovereign rights; 
the relationship between the Nagoya Protocol and other international instruments; the 
extent to which the Protocol would enable originating states to challenge the misuse of 
genetic resources and breaches of relevant contracts in other states’ jurisdictions; whether 
the Protocol would apply to genetic resources and TK accessed before the Protocol entered 
into force: access to ex situ collections of genetic resources; whether the Protocol would 
address access and benefit sharing for associated traditional knowledge in a manner equal 
to ABS for genetic resources; and how the Protocol would complement states’ general 
obligation to combat biopiracy.569  A bargain between the user and provider countries of 
genetic resources was only possible as the result of the intervention of the Japanese COP 
presidency.570 
The compromise text of the Protocol was adopted on 20 October 2010 and was 
open for signature until 1 February 2012; during which time it was signed by 92 states 
parties.  It entered into force on 12 October 2014, ninety days after the deposit of its 
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fiftieth instrument of ratification.  Currently, there are 124 states parties to the Protocol.571  
Its membership is substantially smaller than that of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
a fact that can at least in part be attributed to the many compromises made on polarising 
issues contained in the final draft of the Protocol. 
5.3.1.2 The objective and scope of the Nagoya Protocol 
The objective of the Protocol is stated as being the fair and equitable sharing of the 
benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources, including appropriate access to 
genetic resources, with the aim of contributing to the conservation of biological diversity 
and the sustainable use of its components.572  The primary objective of the Protocol is 
identical to the third objective of the CBD, which is complemented by the supplementary 
goals of biodiversity conservation and the sustainable use of resources, which reflect the 
first and second goals of the Convention.  Thus, the Protocol posits ABS as a specific tool 
for achieving all of the goals of the Convention. 
It is noteworthy that associated traditional knowledge (TK) is not referenced in the 
objectives of the Protocol, either in terms of access to TK or the redistribution of benefits 
arising from its use, despite it being the subject of several substantial provisions of the 
Protocol, including article 3 concerning its scope.573 
The Protocol builds upon the principles of the CBD by providing a flexible 
framework, which attempts to accommodate the concerns of both user and provider 
states, in line with their development capacities.  It is intended to encourage partnerships 
between national and local authorities, local and indigenous communities, and the private 
sector.574  Thus, the access and benefit sharing regime envisioned by the Protocol operates 
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primarily bilaterally, on a contractual basis between the user and the owner of the genetic 
resources in question, subject to Mutually Agreed Terms.575 
The scope of the Protocol is stated as being the utilization of genetic resources and 
associated TK within the purview of article 15 of the CBD and the benefits arising from 
those resources and/or knowledge.576  Article 3 does not provide a list of genetic resources 
that is either included or excluded from the scope of the Protocol, as this could not be 
agreed upon during the negotiation process.577  Instead, article 2 defines the ‘utilization 
of genetic resources’ to mean conducting research and development on the genetic and/or 
biochemical composition of genetic resources.578 This includes biotechnology579 and 
extends to naturally occurring derivative compounds, even where they do not contain 
functional units of heredity.580 
5.3.2.1 Access to genetic resources under the Nagoya Protocol 
Access to genetic resources is outlined in article 6, which builds upon articles 15(1) 
and 15(3) of the CBD.  The term ‘access to genetic resources’ is not defined by the 
Protocol, however access may be considered to constitute the beginning of the conduct 
aimed at research and development of genetic resources acquired in another state party.  
Elisa Morgera et al. suggest that there are a number of activities in the jurisdiction of the 
Party providing genetic resources that constitute ‘access’ in practice.  They include: 
collecting wild biological material, obtaining samples from gene banks, research 
institutions or the private sector, and potentially, accessing digital information about the 
composition of genetic resources.  Given the relative simplicity of defining access based 
on scientific and research and development practice, the inclusion of a definition of ‘access’ 
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in domestic ABS frameworks would lend legal certainty and clarity among states parties, 
as well as facilitate compliance monitoring.581 
Article 6.1 reaffirms state parties’ sovereignty over their genetic resources.  This 
limits the scope of the Protocol to genetic resources directly within the state’s control or 
privately controlled genetic resources within a state’s jurisdiction, such as national gene 
banks. As such, the collections of international gene banks are excluded.582 
Article 6.1 qualifies that access to genetic resources for the purpose of their 
utilization must be on the basis of Prior Informed Consent (PIC), unless the provider 
country determines otherwise.  There are two consequences of this provision.  The first is 
that as a result of their sovereign rights over their genetic resources, it continues to remain 
within states parties’ discretion whether or not they choose to implement a national ABS 
framework.  Thus, states which are primarily the recipients of genetic material may choose 
not to develop an ABS regime that would otherwise serve little purpose.  In such cases, 
states are only obliged to establish compliance control.583  In contrast with a national ABS 
framework for genetic resources, the obligatory compliance control requirements 
necessitate a national framework regulating the utilization of imported genetic resources, 
which serves to support the ABS regime of the state providing the genetic resources in 
question.584 
The second consequence of article 6.1 is that subjecting access to genetic resources 
to the requirement of PIC may create a loophole concerning the legitimate access of 
genetic resources.  Neither the CBD nor the Nagoya Protocol mandate that states parties 
introduce a law concerning PIC; they merely require that where genetic resources are 
accessed for utilization that such access is subject to the domestic PIC requirements of 
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the state providing the genetic resources. Essentially, this means that the existence of 
domestic arrangements concerning PIC is a pre-requisite for provider countries PIC.585  
Accordingly, the lack of a domestic regime can be interpreted as waiving the obligation for 
PIC.  Resolving this ambiguity is likely to be of little difficulty for states that are primarily 
recipients of genetic resources. However, it is a more serious issue for developing states 
that are predominantly the providers of genetic resources, as it appears to equate the lack 
of a domestic regime for PIC with legitimate free access to a state party’s genetic 
resources.586  There remains some academic disagreement as to the effect of a lack of 
domestic PIC requirement upon the benefit sharing obligations attached to access to 
genetic resources. 
Gurdial Singh Nijar argues that this approach could be viewed as condoning 
biopiracy587 and that this is particularly problematic given the historic difficulties 
experienced by many developing and provider states in ABS regimes in compliance with 
their obligations under the CBD.  He suggests that rather than affirming and building upon 
the rights secured in the CBD, the imposition of detailed conditions for access imposed by 
the Protocol has in fact, limited the sovereign rights of states over their genetic resources, 
without any real, corresponding developments concerning benefit sharing. 
Morgera et al. agree that this provision is a source of difficulty, especially when 
read in conjunction with article 6.3, which requires states parties requiring PIC to take 
necessary legislative, administrative or policy measures to implement the minimum 
standards outlined in article 6.3.588  Consequently, article 6.3 can be interpreted to mean 
that the requirement for PIC (or lack thereof) must be explicitly laid out in the domestic 
ABS framework.  If this is the case, it then raises the issue as to whether responsibility for 
compliance with PIC resides with the user, if there is no indication from the state party in 
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question, or whether the obligation ultimately lies with states parties to ensure that their 
position regarding PIC is clear. 
The precise nature of the requirement for PIC is perhaps best understood in the 
context of a more nuanced reading of the wording of the exception in article 6.1: 
‘access to genetic resources shall be subject to prior informed consent….unless otherwise 
determined by that Party’ [emphasis added] 
The use of the imperative ‘shall’ in conjunction with the caveat ‘unless otherwise 
determined by that Party’ suggests that the requirement for PIC effectively functions as 
an ‘opt out’.  In other words, it should be presumed that PIC is required589 unless there is 
clear evidence that a state party has chosen to waive the requirement.590  It is therefore 
clear that there is a need to distinguish between provider states that have made a 
deliberate and obvious choice to exclude the requirement for PIC591 and provider states, 
which have not yet implemented national ABS frameworks.  This view is supported by the 
work of the Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Committee for the Nagoya Protocol.592 Thus, a 
cautious approach is advised for users of genetic resources where PIC requirements are 
unclear in a particular state. 
Article 6.2 addresses the intra-state component of PIC by requiring states parties 
to take appropriate measures ‘with the aim of ensuring’ that the PIC or the ‘approval and 
involvement of local and indigenous communities’ for access to genetic resources where 
they have an established right to grant access to those resources.  This represents a 
considerable development from the CBD, as its treatment of access to genetic resources 
does not touch upon the rights of indigenous and local communities over genetic 
resources.593  Furthermore, the CBD provision dealing specifically with local and indigenous 
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knowledge, innovations and practices594 is limited to ‘promoting’ and ‘encouraging’ the 
approval and involvement of the communities in question.  It is therefore clear that Nagoya 
has played an important role in the cementing of indigenous rights in international law.595  
However, the impact of article 6.2 is limited by the fact that the requirement for the PIC 
of indigenous and local communities is reliant upon ‘an established right’ over the 
resources in question.  Thus, article 6.2 does not provide the foundation for the rights of 
local and indigenous communities over genetic resources where such rights do not already 
exist in domestic law.  Nonetheless the situation concerning the rights of local and 
indigenous communities is arguably somewhat ambiguous, as Federico Lenzerini purports 
that indigenous peoples have emerged as a distinct subject of international law.596  As 
such, the issue of the recognition of indigenous sovereignty over territory and resources 
within the scope of the Nagoya Protocol is perhaps more complex than it initially appears.  
If indigenous communities are de facto subjects of international law, then the drafting of 
the Protocol is inadequate.  It is logical to extend that as distinct sovereign subjects of 
international law, that communities’ customary rights over resources should be equally as 
valid as relying upon an established right arising in domestic regime.  Accordingly, the 
implementation of this apparently straightforward provision in the Protocol appears to 
demand that states parties address the relationship between domestic rights and 
customary indigenous rights over resources. 
In the same vein, article 6.2 is supplemented by article 6.3(f) which requires states 
parties to set out criteria and/or processes for obtaining the PIC or approval and 
involvement of local communities, where appropriate.  Thus, there exists an impetus for 
states parties to address the formal relationship between the state and local and 
indigenous communities in either extant or new ABS frameworks if they have not already 
done so.  However, this again is limited by the caveat of ‘appropriateness’. It can therefore 
be argued that, if a local or indigenous community does not possess the established right 
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over genetic resources mentioned in art. 6.2, then it is not appropriate to elaborate criteria 
or processes for obtaining the communities PIC or approval and involvement. 
Article 6.3 lays out the requirements that should form part of a domestic ABS 
framework for regulating and determining access to genetic resources as envisaged by 
article 6.1.  Paragraphs (a)-(g) of article 6.3 provide a list of measures to be implemented 
through legislative, administrative or policy means, as appropriate.  Details of the 
necessary components of domestic access frameworks were included in the Protocol to 
provide legal certainty, as the implementation of the much more loosely framed ABS 
obligations under the CBD had resulted in ‘over-bureaucratic and intransparent access 
procedures’.597 This was particularly true in the case of traditional provider states that had 
enacted restrictive ABS laws as a reaction to users of genetic resources taking advantage 
of the right of access under article 15.1 CBD, without fulfilling their benefits sharing 
obligations under article 15.2 CBD.598 
States parties that demand PIC are required to, inter alia, provide legal certainty, 
clarity and transparency in their domestic ABS regimes;599 to provide fair and non-arbitrary 
rules and procedures on access to genetic resources;600 information on how to apply for 
PIC;601 and the availability at the time of access of a permit indicating the grant of PIC and 
the establishment of mutually agreed terms.602  Additionally, states parties requiring PIC 
must implement clear rules and procedures for establishing MAT.603  Thus, the purpose of 
article 6.3 is the establishment of guiding legal principles rather than mandating specific 
access requirements.  This can be attributed to the fact that the development of a domestic 
regime for access to genetic resources is voluntary under the Nagoya Protocol.  Therefore, 
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the measures listed in article 6.3 are intended to balance the concerns of both users and 
providers of genetic resources, whilst allowing states parties sufficient flexibility to 
implement their domestic ABS regime according to their national needs. 
5.3.2.2 Access to associated traditional knowledge 
Access to TK associated with genetic resources is addressed separately in article 7.  
It obliges states parties to take measures, as appropriate and in accordance with domestic 
law, ‘with the aim of ensuring’ that the PIC or approval and involvement of the local and 
indigenous communities in which the knowledge originates is obtained, on the basis of 
mutually agreed terms.  The national implementation of ABS regimes should not preclude 
the exchange and use of genetic resources and traditional knowledge within and between 
indigenous and local communities for their own benefit and where it is customary 
practice.604  Alongside article 5.5 (concerning benefit sharing), the provision represents a 
significant advancement from the treatment of associated traditional knowledge in the 
CBD.  Article 15 CBD, the main ABS provision, is restricted to access to genetic resources 
and does not touch upon associated TK.605  Similarly, article 8(j) CBD, the main provision 
concerning TK is focused on state parties respecting, promoting and maintaining TK.  While 
article 8(j) CBD does contain the language of ABS: states parties should ‘promote their 
wider application with the approval and involvement of the holders … and encourage the 
sharing of benefits arising from the utilization’, it is expressed in purely aspirational terms.  
Article 7 of the Protocol however, is successful in building upon the rights of indigenous 
communities over their traditional knowledge as recognised in the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).606 Article 31.1 UNDRIP 
recognises the right of indigenous peoples to inter alia, 'maintain, control, protect and 
develop' their traditional knowledge, including manifestations of their sciences, 
technologies and cultures, which encompasses genetic resources, seeds and knowledge of 
the properties of fauna and flora.  Additionally, it recognises the right of indigenous peoples 
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to 'maintain, control, protect and develop' their intellectual property over their cultural 
heritage and traditional knowledge.  Accordingly, article 7 of the Protocol concretes these 
rights of indigenous people over associated TK by elaborating the specific requirement for 
PIC in cases of access to traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources on the 
basis of MAT and extends the right through the inclusion of local communities in the 
provision.607 
Nonetheless, the Protocol’s treatment of associated TK is somewhat more cautious 
than its treatment of genetic resources.  While article 7 undoubtedly represents progress, 
its effects are somewhat limited by heavy use of qualifiers in the provision.  Specifically, 
the insertion of 'shall take measures, as appropriate' and 'with the aim of ensuring' renders 
states parties' obligations rather dilute.  Furthermore, its potency is reduced by the 
inclusion of redundant language:  the notion of the ‘approval and involvement’ of 
indigenous and local communities is particularly unhelpful, as it does not appear to include 
anything that is not evident within the concept of PIC.608 
5.3.3 Benefit sharing 
There are two forms of distribution of benefits arising from the sustainable use of 
biodiversity envisaged under the Nagoya Protocol.  The first of which is direct benefit 
sharing, on a bilateral contractual basis, which is elaborated in article 5 of the Protocol.  
The second is indirect benefit sharing, which is outlined in article 10, concerning the Global 
Multilateral Benefit Sharing Mechanism. 
5.3.3.1 Direct benefit sharing 
Article 5.1 of the Protocol provides that the benefits of the utilization of genetic 
resources and their subsequent use and commercialisation are to be shared in a fair and 
equitable way with the provider of the genetic resources, whether that be the country of 
origin of the resources or a party that has acquired the genetic resources in accordance 
with the Protocol.  This largely reflects articles 15.3 and 15.7 CBD; however, it is notable 
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that the Protocol employs the term 'genetic resources' rather than the 'genetic material' 
referred to in the CBD.  This is of value, as combined with the inclusion of the term 
‘utilization’ in reference to genetic resources, it extends the provision to include 
derivatives.609  The inclusion of derivatives serves to bring all biochemical material related 
to genetic resources within the scope of the Protocol, rather than being restricted to 
'functional units of heredity', as is the case of the CBD.610  The significance of this wider 
approach is that the ABS regime encompasses a broader range of industry uses of 
biochemical material derived from genetic resources but which do not involve functioning 
units of heredity.  Indeed, Nijar argues that without the inclusion of derivatives, the 
development of the Nagoya ABS regime might have been emptied of its value.611 
In the same vein as domestic access provisions, states parties may implement their 
benefit sharing obligations through legislative, administrative or policy measures, as 
appropriate.612  The sharing of benefits is to be on the basis of MAT,613 as is required for 
the grant of PIC.614  MAT can be understood to mean that the users and providers of 
genetic resources or associated TK have jointly agreed upon the conditions, obligations, 
procedures, types, timing, distribution and mechanisms of benefit sharing.615  While MAT 
is closely linked with PIC and the wording of the Protocol appears to assume that they will 
be negotiated simultaneously, this is not necessarily true as it is possible that MAT may 
need to be negotiated or renegotiated in the light of subsequent new forms of utilization, 
development or commercialisation.616 
States parties are also obliged to take measures with the aim of ensuring that the 
benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources originating from local and 
indigenous communities are shared in a fair and equitable way with those communities, 
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again on the basis of mutually agreed terms.617  This obligation is, in the same vein as 
article 6.2 concerning PIC, subject to the caveat of such local and indigenous communities 
having ‘established rights’ over the resources in question in domestic law. 
Thus, the Protocol breaks new ground by attempting to address the intra-state 
component of benefit sharing.  It is important to note however, that article 5.2 only 
extends local and indigenous communities benefit sharing rights arising from the utilization 
of genetic resources; this does not extend to ‘subsequent applications and 
commercialisations’ in the same manner as article 5.1.  A literal reading of article 5 could 
be interpreted as depriving local and indigenous of the benefits arising from any 
subsequent applications and commercialisations other than the initial utilization for which 
permission for access was sought.618  Given that the benefit sharing arising out of genetic 
resources generally and those controlled by local and indigenous communities are 
addressed separately in the Protocol, this interpretation may well be correct.  However, 
the benefits sharing obligations addressed in article 5.2 can be considered to constitute a 
subset of the benefit sharing obligations in article 5.1.619  The intra-state benefit sharing 
component elaborated in article 5.2 is complementary to, and forms part of the same 
benefit sharing system as the inter-state component outlined in article 5.1.  The successful 
balancing of inter- and intra-state benefit sharing will largely depend upon how this 
relationship is addressed in domestic ABS frameworks. 
Additionally, article 5.5 requires states parties to implement appropriate legislative, 
administrative or policy measures so that the benefits arising out of associated traditional 
knowledge are also shared in a fair and equitable way with the communities that hold the 
knowledge in question, again on the basis of MAT.620 
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Possible benefits are elaborated in Annex I to the Protocol, and include monetary 
and non-monetary benefits.621 This broadly reflects the list contained within Annex II of 
the Bonn Guidelines.622  Potential monetary benefits include forms of direct financial 
compensation;623 financial contribution towards research and biodiversity conservation;624 
and most pertinently, the joint ownership of relevant intellectual property rights.625  Non-
monetary benefits include, inter alia: the sharing of and participation in research and 
development;626 scientific collaboration;627 admittance to ex situ collections of genetic 
resources;628 institutional, human and material capacity building;629 access to scientific 
information relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity;630 ‘food and 
livelihood security benefits’;631 and again, the joint ownership of relevant intellectual 
property rights.632 
For the purposes of the present analysis, it is the opportunity for the joint ownership 
of intellectual property rights, as a potential monetary or non-monetary benefit, that is of 
greatest interest.  Despite the emphasis that was placed on IP based concerns during the 
negotiation of the Protocol, its presence in Annex I is one of very few appearances in the 
entire text.633634  To date, this option has received little academic commentary.  Indeed, 
even the comprehensive Explanatory Guide to the Nagoya Protocol produced by Greiber 
et al. only touches upon the potential for joint ownership of intellectual property rights as 
a means of monetizing benefits in the case that a product derived from either genetic 
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resources or associated TK is commercialised, or as a possible feature of an agreement for 
a joint venture in research and development.635  Equally, treatment of the non-monetary 
capacity of possible joint ownership of IPRs is simply suggested as a means of recognising 
and promoting local expertise, knowledge and institutions.636 
Nonetheless, the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) has highlighted 
a number of key issues that arise out of the potential joint ownership of IPRs.637  WIPO 
suggests that joint ownership of IPRs may be a preferable mechanism for benefit sharing 
as it provides a means of ensuring that the provider of genetic resources or associated TK 
retains a stake in the outcome of the access.638  However, WIPO also notes that it is 
important to recognise situations in which joint ownership of intellectual property rights 
are not the best means of benefit sharing, such as where the access provider is a 
government agency, public institution or other authority or a community organisation.639 
There are a number of practical considerations which need to be explicitly 
addressed, either at the original point of access, or failing that, as a part of the 
renegotiation of MAT.  Firstly, the possibility of joint ownership of an IPR needs to be 
available within the domestic law of the state in which the material originates.640 Second, 
it must be borne in mind that ownership of IPRs is accompanied by the costs and 
responsibility for securing, maintaining and enforcing the rights.641  As such, poorly 
implemented joint ownership of IPRs could be to the detriment of resource holders.  Third, 
it is incorrect to assume that joint ownership of an IPR automatically equates to equal 
benefits, particularly if monetary benefits arise as part of a licensing agreement or other 
commercial endeavours undertaken by one owning party.  Thus, an agreement containing 
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a provision for joint ownership of IPRS requires a comprehensive assessment of the full 
benefits of the IPR in question, including distribution and apportionment.642 
In the specific case of plant varieties, WIPO suggests that there are six IP centred 
concerns which need to be addressed as part of an access and benefit sharing agreement. 
It is pertinent to briefly consider them, as they serve to help illustrate the extent to which 
intellectual property concerns might form part of ABS agreements and which in turn, 
should help us identify the role of intellectual property protection in this field. 
The first point of concern is to establish whether access to genetic resources or 
associated TK is likely to result in the development of new plant varieties through breeding 
or other research activities.643  The second is identifying what form of IP protection might 
be available for this newly developed variety.644  This will vary dependent upon how a 
state party has opted to implement their obligation under article 27.3(b) TRIPS.  The 
specific form of IP protection available for a newly developed plant variety in a providing 
state may affect utility of joint ownership of IPR as a benefit sharing mechanism.  For 
example, the owners of the resources in question may not be capable of being recognised 
as an IPR holder. Third, parties should agree upon the circumstances in which IP protection 
should be sought for a new plant variety developed from accessed genetic resources.  
Fourth, the issue of ownership of the IPR must be comprehensively addressed, including 
how this may vary in different territories.645  This can also be linked with the second point, 
as the availability of different models of intellectual property protection for plant varieties 
may in turn shape decisions concerning IP ownership.  For example, if a plant variety has 
been co-developed utilizing genetic resources originating from a local community or 
indigenous group, it may not be possible within some states domestic framework to 
recognise such a group as the owner of an IPR.  As such, the issue as to in which states 
the developers are likely to want to pursue IP protection needs to be carefully thought 
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through at the outset, as 'joint ownership of IP protection' may not in fact be based upon 
equal ownership, but rather on a combination of joint and single ownership of IPRs, as 
appropriate.  This leads directly to the fifth point for consideration, which is how the IPR 
for the plant variety will be exploited in the various territories and by whom. Thus, there 
is a need to consider the role of licensing in the original access agreement.  Finally, the 
apportionment of benefits arising from the commercial exploitation needs to be considered 
and balanced against any other benefits arising out of the original access agreement that 
the owners of the genetic resources in question may continue to receive, regardless as to 
whether an IPR has been acquired or exploited. Thus, it is difficult to accurately 
characterise the role of IPRs as a benefit sharing mechanism within the Nagoya Framework 
as both the nature of its use and the extent to which it is employed will be widely variable 
subject to individual access and benefit sharing agreements.  Nonetheless, specific 
provision has been made by the Democratic Republic of Congo for the joint commercial 
venture and co-ownership of intellectual property rights involving both biological resources 
and traditional knowledge646 as a part of its wider part of its TK protection and governance 
strategy.647  However, it does not build upon the specifics of such arrangements. 
The range of possible benefits outlined in Annex I is in line with the flexible 
approach to ABS implementations envisaged in the Protocol and the bespoke nature of 
individual ABS agreements.  However, the broad ranging list of possible benefits contrasts 
considerably with the relatively specific criteria for access to genetic resources.  This makes 
it easy to criticise the ABS approach taken in the Protocol for being weighted in favour of 
ensuring access to genetic resources and associated TK, rather than guaranteeing certain 
benefits for the holders of genetic resources.  Ultimately, the determination of available 
benefits is dependent upon the resources available to the user.  As this is established by 
individual benefit sharing agreements, the success of article 5 depends upon fair and 
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balanced contractual negotiations between holders and the users of genetic resources and 
associated TK. 
5.3.3.2 Indirect Benefit Sharing: The Global Multilateral Benefit Sharing 
Mechanism 
Article 10 sets out the future task for states parties to consider the need for, and 
modalities of, a global multilateral benefit sharing mechanism (GMBSM).  While the 
concept of a GMBSM was discussed during the negotiation of the Protocol, it was a casualty 
of both the time constraints for reaching a final agreement and a lack of consensus, and 
therefore the task of evaluating the necessity and features of such a mechanism was 
entrusted to future debates. 
The idea of a multilateral benefit sharing mechanism is hinted at in the CBD, with 
the financial mechanism under the Convention potentially acting as benefit sharing 
instrument.648  Interestingly, article 10 refers to a ‘mechanism’ rather than a fund; this 
may be a result of an intention to include both monetary and non-monetary benefits.649  
Such an approach would be in line with that taken in the rest of the Protocol.  However, 
article 10 is silent on the institutional and technical aspects of a GMSBM, as the issues 
could not be resolved during the negotiation of the Protocol.650 
Article 10 sets out two key situations in the context of which the necessity of a 
GMBSM should be considered.  The first is for the distribution of benefits arising from 
genetic resources or traditional knowledge arising in transboundary situations.  The second 
is where it is not possible to grant or obtain PIC.  This then raises the question as to what 
situations in which it is not possible to grant or obtain PIC are envisaged by the Protocol.  
The application of the Protocol is restricted to genetic resources within the scope of article 
15 of the CBD.  Article 15.3 limits the application of the Convention to genetic resources 
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which are provided by Parties which are countries of origin651 or countries providing genetic 
resources652 in accordance with article 2. 
Therefore, any GMBSM cannot include pre-CBD collections of genetic resources or 
genetic resources or associated TK that has been illegally obtained. It is also necessary to 
consider the relationship between the mechanism and ex situ collections of genetic 
resources, since many of these collections contain unique germplasm that is also available 
from provider countries.653 Until the issue of ex situ collections is adequately addressed, 
there exists a potential loophole that will allow users of genetic resources to circumvent 
benefit sharing obligations.  In the case of agriculture, the need to clarify the relationship 
between ex situ collections of genetic resources and the GMBSM is somewhat mitigated 
by the existence of the Multilateral System of the ITPGRFA, because the focus of the 
system is germplasm (of Annex I crops and other voluntarily included species) included in 
ex situ collections, gene banks and other international institutions.654 
While article 10 leaves open to debate the necessity and format of a GMBSM, it 
somewhat curiously pre-emptively states how and with whom the benefits arising are to 
be shared.655  The benefits arising from the utilisation of genetic resources and TK that are 
accessed through the mechanism are to be used to support the conservation of biological 
diversity and the sustainable use of its components globally.  This implies, where the 
envisaged transboundary situation exists, that benefits will not be redistributed to the 
states parties or local communities from which the genetic resources or knowledge 
originated. 
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An interesting point of note is that article 10 refers to ‘benefits shared by users’ of 
genetic resources rather than states parties or user countries.656  This implies that article 
10 is intended to stimulate voluntary benefit sharing beyond specific obligations. 
The GMBSM has been considered on several occasions since the adoption of the 
Protocol.  An initial consultation took place in 2012,657 which attempted to identify the 
necessity for such a mechanism and to clarify the scope of its application.  A core aspect 
of the discussion was establishing the relationship between bilateral benefit sharing under 
the protocol and the multilateral global mechanism.  While the bilateral contract-based 
benefit sharing outlined in article 5 is obviously the primary ABS mechanism envisaged 
under the protocol, it remains to be determined how the multilateral system might ‘fill in 
the gaps’. 
Interestingly, among the submissions made by states parties was a list of technical 
questions which the submitting party considered needed to be resolved before the 
modalities of a GMBSM could be arrived at.658  The issues raised in the list serve to pinpoint 
several likely potential situations relevant to agricultural development; the resolution of 
which appears necessary in order to determine what role the GMBSM is to fulfil.  Among 
the issues highlighted were: how to address TK originating from more than one 
community; what is to happen in a situation in which the centre of diversity for a genetic 
resources is distinct from the centre of origin; what is to happen when a user cannot access 
a resource in situ but has access to the resource ex situ; how to distribute benefits where 
associated TK has been acquired through a publicly available text but the genetic resources 
have been obtained from a landrace; and how domesticated varieties will be addressed 
under the mechanism. 
This initial synthesis of the relevant issues was followed by the decision at the 
subsequent COP-11 to undertake a broad ranging consultation with states parties, other 
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governments, international organisations, local and indigenous communities and other 
interested stakeholders on article 10.659 Subsequently, the Meeting of the Parties (MOP) 
commissioned a study analysing, inter alia, experiences gained implementing the Protocol 
thus far; case studies relating to in situ and ex situ genetic resources; traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources and transboundary situations.660  The study 
was undertaken by the Expert Group Meeting on Article 10.661  Among the view expressed 
was that the bilateral approach to ABS was the most appropriate, as it is respectful to 
states’ sovereign rights over their genetic resources and as such, should be utilised 
wherever possible.  Consequently, the application of any multilateral system would be 
narrow.662 
Nonetheless, the Group considered it necessary in order to proceed with the 
examination of article 10 to identify situations in which it may not be possible to obtain 
PIC, and whether, in those situations a potential GMBSM would be the most appropriate 
tool for the distribution of the benefits arising from the genetic resources or TK in question.   
Alongside which, it considered the function of a GMBSM in the context of transboundary 
situations. 
Interestingly, the Group noted that in the case of ex situ collections, that many 
institutions had developed codes of conduct and best practices related to ABS.  It found 
that collections were often unwilling to share material where it was not possible to establish 
the original source.  Of particular note is the fact that many end users were unwilling to 
utilise genetic resources because in this case it may lead to legal uncertainty.663 Indeed, 
they suggested that it should be possible to develop the implementation of the Protocol in 
such a way that that it could steer potential users away from genetic where PIC is 
unavailable, or where possible, redirect users to the country of origin. 
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While it is logical to redirect end users to the country of origin where feasible, from 
the perspective of end users, it would be useful to develop an alternative means of 
establishing legal certainty for genetic resources where the origin of the material is 
uncertain.  Recalling that the purpose of the Protocol is the fair and equitable sharing of 
the benefits arising from the utilisation of genetic resources, thereby contributing to the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, it is necessary to recognise that 
it is only through the utilization of genetic resources that potential benefits arise. Whilst it 
would unquestionably be preferable for PIC to be granted by the state or community of 
origin, the realisation of a mechanism that would allow end users to access genetic 
resources held in ex situ collections with legal certainty could be advantageous to research 
and development, as well as generating benefits that could support biodiversity 
conservation globally, if it were tied to compulsory benefit sharing.664 
Concerning transboundary co-operation, the expert group was of the opinion that 
article 11665 should be sufficient to manage situations in which genetic resources or 
associated TK were found in situ in more than one state.  Additionally, based on what 
evidence was available, regional approaches appeared to be successful in handling 
transboundary situations.666 
The position of the Expert Group was definitive that where the grant of PIC were 
not possible because the states party in question had not yet developed procedures, then 
the GMBSM should not fulfil this role.  Rather, this should be addressed by means of human 
and institutional capacity building in line with article 22 of the Protocol.667  Similarly, in 
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several different situations668 where it was not possible to grant PIC for TK associated with 
genetic resources, the Expert Group felt that a participation and capacity building approach 
would be preferable to the automatic application of a GMBSM.  This is because a capacity 
building approach would allow for the participation of the local and indigenous communities 
in question and serve to help them engage with the ABS process.669 
Overall, the study and the synthesis of views of the parties highlighted the need 
for further information and study.670  This is true with regard to both the need for a GMBSM 
and the need to collect information concerning ABS practices.  What is clear is that any 
potential need for a GMBSM should be interpreted relatively restrictively,671 particularly in 
the light of its outcomes outlined above.  The issue of the necessity and modalities of the 
GMBSM has been left for further consideration by the Subsidiary Body for 
Implementation.672  
The position advocated by the Expert Group is entirely logical, as minimising the 
role of any potential GMBSM in favour of a capacity building approach should encourage 
the full and functional development of domestic ABS systems and consequently contribute 
to the widespread realisation of the spirit of the Protocol.  Nonetheless, however limited 
the role of the GMBSM may be, it does still appear that its inclusion within the Nagoya 
Framework would be of value.  The drawback of relying largely upon a capacity building 
approach through the adoption of domestic ABS systems is that it is a long-term solution.  
Determining definitively the role of the GMBSM will lead to enhanced legal certainty both 
for states parties in developing their ABS requirements and for users of genetic resources 
and associated TK. While no aspect of international law can be claimed to be swift, the 
introduction of a GMBSM, however restrictively interpreted, should serve to ensure that 
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some of the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic and associated TK are 
appropriately redirected. 
5.3.4.1 Compliance 
Under article 15.1 of the Nagoya Protocol, states parties are required to adopt 
‘appropriate, effective and proportionate’ legislative, administrative or policy measures to 
ensure that genetic resources used within its jurisdiction have been accessed in accordance 
with PIC and on the basis of mutually agreed terms as is required by the domestic ABS 
framework of the other party.  Thus, responsibility falls to the user state, rather than the 
state in which the genetic resources was accessed, to ensure compliance.  The wording of 
this provision closely reflects that of article 6.1 (concerning access to genetic resources). 
This emphasises the close relationship between access standards and national 
implementation measures.673  The approach taken in article 16.1 concerning compliance 
with ABS for associated TK effectively mirrors that of article 15.1, save the somewhat 
superfluous addition of local and indigenous communities ‘approval and involvement’.  
Both article 15.1 and article 16.1 concern compliance with ABS requirements at the time 
of access to the genetic resources and associated TK in question.674 
However, the onus on ensuring that TK is accessed in accordance with the domestic 
ABS framework is potentially more onerous, as proving the legal status of TK accessed is 
likely to be more problematic.  Firstly, because the definition of associated traditional 
knowledge will be derived from the domestic ABS regime, not the Protocol and therefore 
will be variable depending upon in which state party the knowledge originated.   Secondly, 
in the case of TK, grappling with the domestic ABS system of the state of origin is likely 
to be more complex as it may involve interacting with customary law systems.675   The 
involvement of customary law systems can be problematic on two fronts: the first is 
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intrinsic to the nature of customary law systems and the second is the interaction between 
the customary law system and the wider state framework in which it is located. 
The notion of customary and traditional legal systems in a domestic or regional 
context676 escapes precise definition, but can be summarised as encompassing the laws, 
practices and customs intrinsic to the life of indigenous peoples and local communities 
which govern the behaviour and relationships and are viewed within the community as 
having a binding quality.677  These may be express or implicit; they may be codified, 
however they are often held and transmitted orally.678  Customary law systems are of 
direct relevance to traditional knowledge as TK is developed, maintained and disseminated 
within traditional communities.  Accordingly, in the context of compliance with ABS 
requirements, this raises the issue as to how these systems are recognised and addressed 
by the domestic regime of state(s) in which the TRK in question is situated. 
One possible approach is that which has been taken by the Philippines.  The 
application of customary law systems is formally incorporated into the state's 
constitutional framework.  This was first achieved through the recognition of the economic, 
social and cultural rights of indigenous cultural communities in the Constitution, which also 
provides for the potential recognition of 'the applicability of customary laws governing 
property rights or relations in determining the extent of ancestral domain.'679  This 
provision was subsequently augmented by the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act 1997680 
(IPRA) which recognises the rights of indigenous peoples and communities to, inter alia, 
the right to ancestral lands.681  Within indigenous ancestral domains and land, indigenous 
peoples and communities are recognised as having the right to self-governance;682 and 
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the right to their own justice system.683 The IPRA also formally recognises the indigenous 
concept of ownership, which incorporates the notion that their ancestral domains and the 
resources found therein form the basis of their cultural integrity; the essence of which is 
that property is held privately but communal to the group.684  This extends to traditional 
resource rights.685 
Most relevant in the context of the Nagoya Protocol, are the right to protect their 
culture, traditions, institutions;686 the right to protect community intellectual rights;687 and 
the right to indigenous knowledge systems and to develop their own sciences and 
technologies, which grants indigenous peoples 'full ownership and control end protection 
of their cultural and intellectual rights.'688  Recognised indigenous communities have the 
right to develop 'special measures to control, develop and protect' their sciences and 
technologies, which includes genetic resources, which encompasses seeds and other 
derivatives and knowledge of flora and fauna.  This sits alongside the requirement for the 
free and prior informed consent of such communities in accordance with the applicable 
customary laws in the case of access to biological resources and indigenous knowledge.689  
Thus, the IPRA provides explicit evidence of formal interaction between customary law 
systems and domestic legislation and offers a clear model for compliance with arts. 15.1 
and 16.1 NP.  However, there is no provision concerning TK in the Intellectual Property 
Code of the Philippines.690691  As such, it is arguably limited in its utility for potential end 
users as it does not contain any explanation as to how to make the provision operational.692  
This highlights the difficulty in achieving compliance with arts. 15.1 and 16.1 that is 
practically viable for end users. 
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The Philippines is not the only example of the recognition of customary systems 
being formally recognised in national law; similar mechanisms are in the process of being 
developed by a number of African states.693  However, a question that arises from the 
example of the Philippines is whether it is possible to recognise the role of customary law 
systems within a national ABS regime without the wider domestic recognition of the rights 
of indigenous peoples and local communities, as is the case in this example. 
Both articles 15.2 and 16.2 require states parties to take appropriate and effective 
and proportionate measures to address situations of non-compliance.  Equally, both 
articles 15.3 and 16.3 call for states parties to cooperate in cases of alleged violation of 
articles 15.1 and 16.1, respectively. 
5.3.4.2 Compliance monitoring 
The inclusion of compliance measuring mechanisms in the Nagoya Protocol 
represents a considerable advancement of the global ABS framework, as the Convention 
on Biological Diversity does not contain specific measures intended to monitor 
compliance.694  While the Bonn Guidelines include references to monitoring and reporting 
and some means for verification695 they do not elaborate on specific compliance monitoring 
tools.696 
Article 17 sets out a non-exhaustive list of tools to aid monitoring compliance with 
the Protocol.  The two main tools elaborated in article 17 are: the use of checkpoints to 
monitor ABS compliance,697 and internationally recognised certificates of compliance.698  
The aim of these tools is to facilitate transparency in implementing the Protocol.  
Interestingly, the title of the provision is ‘monitoring compliance with the utilization of 
genetic resources’ and as such, states parties do not appear to be obliged to implement 
compliance monitoring mechanisms with regard to associated TK, as this is not addressed 
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in article 17 or elsewhere in the Protocol.  Consequently, the provisions of the Nagoya 
Protocol pertaining to associated TK are fundamentally weaker than those concerning 
genetic resources. 
5.3.4.3 Checkpoints 
The primary compliance monitoring tool introduced by article 17 is the use of 
Checkpoints.  States parties are to designate one or more checkpoints.  The purpose of 
the checkpoint(s) is to collect or receive information relevant to PIC, the source of the 
genetic resources in question, the establishment of MAT, and the utilization of genetic 
resources, where appropriate.699 
Article 17 does not list or designate specific agencies or institutions to act as a 
checkpoint.  It merely indicates that checkpoints should be ‘effective’ and have functions 
relevant to collecting and receiving the information outlined in art. 17.1(a).700  The issue 
as to whether to include a list of possible checkpoint authorities was debated during the 
negotiation of the Protocol.  Among the proposed options were customs checkpoints, 
patent offices, market approval offices, research funding agencies and indigenous and 
local community representatives.701  However, all of these options were eventually omitted 
from the final draft as a number of states categorically refused to support the inclusion of 
patent offices and alongside this, any suggestion of compulsory disclosure requirements 
in patent applications.  This was consistent with their position in the WTO to oppose the 
amendment of art. 27.3(b) TRIPS to eventually include a mandatory disclosure 
provision.702  As such, article 17 refers only to 'designated checkpoints'. 
In support of the mandatory checkpoint requirement, states parties are to require 
users of genetic resources to provide the information specified in article 17.1(a)(i) to the 
designated checkpoint.703  The inclusion of this provision is somewhat obvious in order for 
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the checkpoint to function.  It is potentially restricted by the appearance of the qualifier 
‘as appropriate’.  Whilst the inclusion does serve to provide flexibility, it can also serve to 
mitigate the strength of the checkpoint mechanism, as it makes it possible for states 
parties to limit the information required by the checkpoint.704  As a result, the importance 
of the role of the checkpoints can be significantly reduced.  Additionally, states parties are 
obliged to ‘take appropriate, effective and proportional measures to address situations of 
non-compliance’.705  This again, has the potential to be interpreted in a manner that limits 
the efficacy of the checkpoint system.  In such a case, it would fall to the state of origin 
to raise a complaint concerning the user state’s compliance.706 
5.3.4.4 Internationally recognised certificates of compliance 
The second specific compliance monitoring tool introduced by the Protocol is 
internationally recognised certificates of compliance.  The term is introduced in article 
17.1(a)(iii) as a potential source of information evidencing compliance with PIC to be 
produced to national competent authorities and the Clearing House Mechanism.707  
However the meaning of the term is not defined in article 2, nor does the Protocol provide 
a procedure for the issuance of an internationally recognised certificate of compliance, nor 
does it state what entities are responsible for granting such certificates.708  Nonetheless 
articles 6.3 and 13.2 indicate that the original domestic permit for access constitutes an 
internationally recognised certificate of compliance, provided that it contains the minimum 
information outlined in article 17.4, provided that information is not confidential.  This 
includes: details of the authority issuing the domestic access permit; the date of issuance 
of the permit; details of the provider of the genetic resources; a unique identifier of the 
certificate; the person or entity to whom prior informed consent was granted; details of 
the subjectmatter or genetic resources covered by the certificate; confirmation that 
mutually agreed terms were established; confirmation that prior informed consent was 
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obtained; and indication as to whether the proposed use of the material is for commercial 
and/or non-commercial use.  Of particular note are the requirements that the permit 
confirm the establishment of MAT709 and PIC.710 
5.3.4.5 The ABS Clearing-House Mechanism 
Article 14.1 of the Protocol establishes the ABS clearing-house mechanism as part 
of the clearing-house mechanism envisaged under article 18.3 CBD.  Its purpose is to 
facilitate the implementation of the Protocol by improving transparency and enhancing 
legal clarity.711  The ABS clearing-house mechanism is intended to serve as a platform for 
sharing information related to access and benefit sharing, in particular, the information 
supplied by Parties regarding their implementation of the Protocol.  The sharing of 
information relating to ABS implementation should serve not only as a means of 
monitoring states parties’ compliance with their ABS obligations but should also serve to 
assist parties in their implementation of ABS obligations.712  Equally, the availability of 
information concerning states parties ABS requirements should simplify the process of 
acquiring PIC for the potential users of genetic resources and associated TK.  Thus, the 
clearing-house mechanism is intended to support the realisation of the sustainable use of 
biological diversity. 
States parties are to make available information concerning the legislative, 
administrative and policy measures pertaining to ABS;713 information on the national focal 
point and nationally competent authorities714 and permits granted at the time of access to 
genetic resources or associated TK as evidence of PIC and MAT.715  The list is non-
exhaustive; however, states parties are not required to produce confidential information.  
States parties may opt to include, on a voluntary basis, additional information concerning: 
the relevant and competent authorities of local and indigenous communities where 
 
709 NP, art. 17.4(g) 
710 NP, art. 17.4(h) 
711 CBD, ‘The ABS Clearing House’ available at https://www.cbd.int/abs/theabsch.shtml (accessed: 15th July 
2020)  
712 Greiber et al. n573 above, at 150 
713 NP, art. 14.2(a) 
714 NP, art. 14.2(b) 




appropriate;716 model contractual clauses;717 methods and tools developed to monitor 
genetic resources;718 and codes of conduct or best practices.719  The modalities of the 
clearing-house mechanism were not agreed upon by the final draft of the Protocol; instead 
responsibility for its format and implementation was deferred to the MOP.720 This decision 
was made in the light of experiences from the CBD clearing-house and the Biosafety 
clearing-house established under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety;721 which suggested 
that those mechanisms had been haphazardly developed and consequently 
underutilised.722 Thus it was agreed that the Nagoya clearing-house should be 
implemented in a phased manner, which would allow its functions and activities to be built 
up in response to identified demands.723 
The pilot phase of the clearing-house was implemented shortly prior to the adoption 
of the Protocol,724 with the aim of it being fully operational by the time the Protocol entered 
force.725  Since its introduction, the clearing-house has gradually received submissions 
from contracting parties.  Most interestingly, the mechanism has also attracted 
submissions from non-parties to the Protocol.726  For example, a considerable number of 
non-parties (including non-signatories) have registered designated National ABS Focal 
Points.727 The significance of designating a competent authority should not be 
underestimated as the identification of an easy to locate national ABS contact point is 
essential from a research perspective.728 
 
716 NP, art. 14.3(a) 
717 NP, art. 14.3(b) 
718 NP, art. 14.3(c) 
719 NP, art. 14.3(d) 
720 NP, art. 14.4 
721 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 29 January 2000 
722 Morgera, Buck & Tsioumani (2014) n581 above, at 239 
723 ICNP 1 Recommendation 1/1 ‘Modalities of the Access and Benefit-Sharing Clearing House’ 
724 ibid 
725 ICNP 3 Recommendation 3/4 ‘Modalities of Operation of the Access and Benefit Sharing Clearing House’ 
726 See, for example, CBD, ‘ABS National Focal Point’ available at 
https://absch.cbd.int/search/nationalRecords?schema=focalPoint (accessed: 10th July 2020) 
727 The list of non-party-non-signatories include: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Chile, Cook Islands, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Dominica, 
Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Kiribati, Latvia, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, 
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However, states parties’ submissions continue to be limited in several key areas.  
This includes: the designation of national checkpoints; at the time of writing, only 45 states 
have submitted information concerning their national checkpoint to the clearing house 
mechanism.729  Similarly, information pertaining to internationally recognised certificates 
of compliance has only been supplied by a handful of states parties;730 and information 
concerning national websites and databases has only been published by 30 states.731 This 
is somewhat disappointing given that the clearing-house mechanism is intended to be one 
of the key methods of facilitating ABS under the Protocol.  Similarly, at the time of the 
introduction of the clearing-house mechanism, there existed relatively few domestic, 
regional or institution based access and benefit sharing databases.732  In order for the 
clearing-house mechanism to be successful, it is dependent upon the active participation 
of states parties.733 This includes both the development of domestic and regional 
databases on ABS requirements and the submission of relevant information to the 
clearing-house.  The availability of information through the clearing-house mechanism, 
should in turn, promote the fair access to genetic resources. 
5.3.5 Access and Benefit Sharing under the Nagoya Protocol and the 
International Treaty for Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
The Nagoya Protocol applies to genetic resources and traditional knowledge within 
the scope of article 15 of the CBD;734 thus it effectively applies to all types of genetic 
resources and all potential uses. However, genetic resources are frequently the subject of 
specialist access regimes.735  In the case of underutilised crop varieties and agriculture 
 
729 CBD, ‘The Access and Benefit-Sharing Clearing-House: Checkpoints’ available at 
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730 Thus far, 10 states parties have submitted 113 records of internationally recognised certificates of 
compliance, with India having submitted 86 of these. See, CBD, ‘Internationally recognised certificates of 
compliance’ available at https://absch.cbd.int/search/nationalRecords?schema=absPermit (accessed: 15th July 
2020) 
731 CBD, ‘National Websites and Databases’ available at 
https://absch.cbd.int/search/nationalRecords?schema=database (accessed: 15th July 2020) 
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Access and Benefit Sharing Portal; the African Regional Intellectual Property Organisation had its Swakopmund 
Protocol on the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (available at: 
https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/201022 (accessed: 5th May 2021)) alongside the combined decisions of the 
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generally, the specialist ABS regime in question is the Multilateral System of the ITPGRFA. 
For the purpose of the present analysis, it is pertinent to characterise the relationship 
between the regimes.  As the later of the two regimes, it is the Nagoya Protocol that 
expressly addresses the relationship between them. 
The preamble to the Protocol ‘acknowledges the fundamental role’ of the ITPGRFA 
with regard to genetic resources for agriculture and the importance of PGRFA for achieving 
food security and poverty alleviation.  Article 8(c) requires states parties to ‘consider the 
importance of genetic resources for food and agriculture and their special role for food 
security’.  There are two noteworthy features of article 8(c).  The first is that it does not 
make direct reference to the ITPGRFA or its Multilateral System.  The second is that while 
article 8(c) clearly affords an exemption for PGRFA,736 the choice of language of the 
provision is not particularly strong: ‘consider the importance’ does not require any specific 
action.737  Claudio Chiarolla et al. point out that on the face of the provision, states parties 
are equally free not to exclude PGRFA from their normal ABS requirements.  However, in 
combination with the preambular paragraph identifying the special role of PGRFA, it would 
be insupportable not to distinguish between PGRFA and other genetic resources.738  There 
is therefore a need to balance domestic ABS regimes so that specialist measures are not 
used to circumvent benefit sharing obligations.739 
Resolving the overlap between the regimes is simplified in a significant number of 
cases, as the divergence in membership between the ITPGRFA and the Nagoya Protocol 
automatically simplifies the relationship between the two ABS regimes.  At the time of 
writing there are 124 states parties to the Nagoya Protocol740 and 147 states parties to 
the ITPGRFA.741  Thus, where a state is only party to one regime, that regime will 
 
736 Claudio Chiarolla, Selim Louafi, Marie Schloen, ‘An Analysis of the Relationship between the Nagoya Protocol 
and Instruments related to Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture and Farmers’ Rights’ in Morgera, Buck 
and Tsioumani (eds) (2013), n574 above, at 100 
737 Greiber et al., n573 above, at 123 
738 ibid, at 101 
739 ibid 
740 Out of 126 ratifications. See, ‘Parties to the Nagoya Protocol’ available at: https://www.cbd.int/abs/nagoya-
protocol/signatories/default.shtml (accessed: 15th July 2020) 
741 FAO, ‘International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture’, available at: 




necessarily apply to plant genetic resources, and vice versa. Notably, a number of 
megadiverse742 countries and members of the group of Like Minded Megadiverse countries 
fall into this category.743 
Nonetheless, for the majority of states parties the issue requires resolution.  
Concerning the relationship between the Protocol and its relationship with other 
international agreements, article 4.4 states that where a specialised ABS instrument 
applies, the Protocol does not apply for parties to that instrument with regard to the 
specific genetic resources covered by that instrument for the specialised purpose of the 
instrument, provided its aims do not run counter to the Protocol or the CBD.  Thus, the 
ITPGFRA has precedence as a specialist instrument.  However, the effect of this provision 
is to frame the exception so that even where a specialist regime exists, it does not 
necessarily apply to a specific usage of genetic resources. 
Therefore, in order to accurately frame the application of the Nagoya Protocol to 
PGRFA, it is necessary to consider the application of the Multilateral System (MLS).744  The 
MLS under the ITPGRFA includes the genetic resources of the 64 Annex I crops and the 
genetic resources of any voluntarily included non-Annex I crops that are in the public 
domain and are held by local, national or international gene banks under the direct control 
of contracting parties.  Thus, where a state is party to both regimes, the Nagoya ABS will 
continue to apply to genetic resources outside the public domain, such as those in private 
in situ or ex situ collections, non-Annex I crops that have not been included in the 
multilateral system or those held by local or indigenous communities.  Accordingly, the 
 
742 The term ‘megadiverse’ was coined by NGO Conservation International in 1988. The concept refers to 
countries have both a high number of total species and that possess high degree of endemism at the species 
and higher taxonomic levels.  In order to qualify as megadiverse, a state must have: at least 5000 endemic 
species of plants; and have marine ecosystems within its borders.  Other secondary criteria, such as animal 
and invertebrate endemism and ecosystem diversity are also factored into the assessment.  There is no legal 
significance attached to the designation itself.  Rather, it serves to denote the fact that a relatively small 
number of countries bear a disproportionately large social and political responsibility for conservation and 
biodiversity management.  The terminology was adopted by Mexico when it formed the group of Like-Minded 
Megadiverse Countries in 2002.   See:  UNEP, ‘Megadiverse countries’, available at: https://www.biodiversitya-
z.org/content/megadiverse-countries (accessed: 9 May 2021) 
743 Of the 17 countries identified as being megadiverse by Conservation International, five (the United States, 
Australia, Columbia, Brazil and Papua New Guinea) have not yet ratified the Nagoya Protocol.  Similarly, of the 
20 members of the group of LMMD states, five (Brazil, Columbia, Costa Rica, Iran, and Venezuela) have not 
yet ratified the Protocol. 




Protocol continues to be of potential relevance to the research and development 
concerning underutilised crop varieties.  However, the applicability of the Protocol may be 
limited by the domestic implementation of access and benefit sharing requirements by a 
state party. 
Aside from its application to genetic resources, the benefit sharing regime under 
the Protocol also incorporates associated traditional agricultural knowledge.  Although the 
ITPGRFA recognises the contribution of local and indigenous communities to the 
conservation and development of PGRFA,745 it does not provide for benefit sharing on the 
basis of access to TK.  It seems reasonable to assert therefore, that the ABS provisions of 
the Protocol apply to access to traditional agricultural knowledge regardless of whether a 
state is party to the ITPGRFA or if the TK in question pertains to an Annex I crop, provided 
that the domestic implementation of article 5.5 and article 7 permits it. 
5.3.6 Summary 
At this stage in its implementation, it is difficult to attempt to assess the impact of 
the Nagoya Protocol.  This is in part, a result of the Protocol’s reliance upon domestic 
implementation of the ABS provisions.  As the development of states parties’ domestic 
ABS frameworks is slow, finding tangible evidence of the effect of the Protocol continues 
to be problematic.  It is also difficult to assess because of the use of heavily qualified 
provisions throughout the text of the Protocol.  Whilst these serve to add flexibility for 
states in choosing how to implement the Protocol, they also introduce ambiguity.  
Furthermore, several key aspects of the Protocol have been deferred for future debate and 
possible implementation.  This further complicates any evaluation of the Protocol’s 
success. 
The complete success of the Protocol would depend upon universal implementation, 
or as near as possible.  As it stands, this is a considerable distance from being achieved.  
This is unsurprising given the widespread and varying points of dissatisfaction with 
 




compromises made in order to produce the final text of the Protocol, as discussed in 
section 5.3.1.1.  Indeed, given the level of high level of discontent with the Protocol, the 
current level of membership may be viewed as a success. 
From a strictly legal perspective, it is certain that the Protocol represents progress 
from the ABS principles outlined in the Convention on Biological Diversity.  However, the 
discrepancies between the obligations of states parties concerning genetic resources and 
those concerning TK are a source of concern, particularly in the agricultural sphere.  
Although the negotiation of an international legal instrument(s) intended to ensure the 
effective protection of TK, traditional cultural expressions (TCE) and genetic resources 
continues within the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and 
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore,746 it has not yet produced an 
agreement concerning the sharing of benefits arising from the use of traditional 
knowledge.747  To that end, the inclusion of traditional knowledge within the Nagoya ABS 
regime represents an important milestone, at least for the contracting parties.  This is 
because plant genetic resources for food and agriculture and associated TK are particularly 
interrelated, especially in the case of farmers’ varieties and landrace crops. 
When evaluating the Nagoya ABS regime, it is important to consider it from all 
standpoints.  When considering the perspective of end users, we must not only consider 
the positions voiced by predominantly user states, but also of the actual end users, 
whether they be institutions or communities.  The primary ABS mechanism under the 
Protocol is bilateral, contract-based benefit sharing.  As such, the success of the Protocol 
rests not only on states parties’ implementation of their obligations but fundamentally on 
the success of those ABS contracts.  Consequently, Nagoya’s success also rests in the 
commercial contract sphere.748  Achieving the goal of fair and equitable benefit sharing 
 
746 WIPO, ‘Matters concerning the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic 
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore’ (Fifty-fifth Session, October 4-15, 2015) available at: 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/igc/pdf/igc_mandate_1617.pdf (accessed: 15th July 2020) 
747 WIPO, ‘The Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Draft Articles’ WIPO/GRTKF/IC/34/5, available at: 
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=368218 (accessed: 15th July 2020) 
748 Morten Walløe Tvedt, ‘Into ABS Implementation: Challenges and Opportunities for the Nagoya Protocol’ 30th 
September 2014, Biores vol. 8(8) available at: https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/biores/news/into-abs-




therefore relies upon the balance between negotiation and enforcement of contractual 
obligations; both of which require certainty as to the relevant states’ parties ABS 
requirements.  This is where the underdeveloped content of the Protocol falls short.  
Combined with the disorganised implementation of ABS requirements at the national level, 
this creates uncertainty for both users and providers.  Furthermore, without clarity as to 
who or what groups hold rights over resources at the domestic level, potential users are 
likely to find themselves unable to appropriately negotiate access in the first place.  While 
the final text of the Protocol is far from perfect, the possibility does exist for the ABS 
principles and mechanisms it establishes to operate effectively.  However, this will rely 
upon states parties explicitly addressing their stance on access to genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge, whether this is a comprehensive approach or by waiving access 
requirements.749  It is only then that it will be possible to approach practical issues such 
as whether the holders of genetic resources or associated TK are able to effectively 




























Chapter 6: Intellectual property protection for plant-based innovations and 
access and benefit sharing in Malaysia 
6.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapters, we have considered the scope of the international norms 
pertaining to plant-based innovations.  We have scrutinised the extent of the obligation 
contained within article 27.3(b) of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual 
Property (TRIPS) to provide intellectual property (IP) protection for plant-based 
innovations; and critiqued the de facto standard IP right for plant varieties provided by 
the Conventions of the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(UPOV).  We have also considered the access and benefit sharing (ABS) obligations arising 
out of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), its Nagoya Protocol and the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) in the 
context of facilitating the development of new subsistence crop varieties. 
The purpose of this chapter is to build upon the analysis of these international 
norms and to provide a commentary on the relevant legislative framework pertaining to 
intellectual property protection for plant-based innovations and access and benefits 
sharing in Malaysia.    It will consider how the international norms have been translated 
into the national and state level frameworks.  This will form the first half of the case study 
and provide the foundation for the specific examples considered in chapter seven. 
 
6.1.1 Background: Malaysia 
Situated just north of the equator, Malaysia comprises of 330,803 square 
kilometres of land located across two major landmasses, the Malay Peninsular and the 
island of Borneo, in addition to numerous small islands in the South China Sea.  As of 
2018, it is home to approximately 32.6 million people.750  Malaysia is one of the twelve 
 
750 Department of Statistics Malaysia, ‘Population & Demography’ available at: 
https://www.dosm.gov.my/v1/index.php?r=column/ctwoByCat&parent_id=115&menu_id=L0pheU43NWJwRW




mega biodiverse countries in the world.751  As such, it contains one of the highest 
concentrations of genetic wealth on earth.  In Asia, it is second only to its neighbour 
Indonesia.752  Malaysia also possesses high diversity between ecosystems.753  At present, 
there is no comprehensive checklist of the flora of Malaysia, however it is estimated that 
it is home to at least 15,000 plant species 754 with an estimated 8,300 species in peninsular 
Malaysia and between 8,000 and 15,000 species in the states of Sabah and Sarawak. 
In terms of agricultural biodiversity, it has experienced the same expansion and 
contraction that has taken place all over the world.  The gradual improvement of crop 
species through cultivation lead to the availability of a large number of varieties; however, 
the introduction of modern, high yielding varieties has caused a sharp decline in the 
number of varieties available for cultivation.  For example, the majority of rice cultivation 
in Malaysia is now produced from just three varieties.  Consequently, where traditional 
varieties have not been collected and stored in seed banks many have been lost. 
Malaysia continues to be highly dependent upon imports of both food and seeds,755 
and is a net importer of food.  The need to improve national food security and self-
sufficiency was highlighted during the economic crisis of 2008 when food prices reached 
an all-time peak.756  Indeed, the National Food Policy 2011-2020 suggests that in order to 
address the challenges of increased food demand, the increased cost of agricultural inputs 
and the challenges arising out of climate change,757 aspects of food and nutritional security 
should be emphasised in food production.758  The Policy also recognises that there is a 
need to emphasise the development of sustainable agricultural practices759 and that the 
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development of the agricultural sector should draw on the strength of the countries 
biodiversity and the ‘innovation of its ethnic diversity’.760   
There is little demographic data available on farming in Malaysia.761  From the 
information available, we know that farming in Malaysia is broadly split between large 
scale commercial plantations, often in excess of 500ha and dedicated to the production of 
commodity crops; and small scale farmers, with holdings in the range of 1-2ha.762  The 
majority of plant breeding activities in Malaysia are undertaken by agricultural research 
institutions, state agencies, public universities and private companies.763  Plant-based 
innovation also takes place as a part of on farm practices;764 indeed, the possibility of farm 
based developments is recognised by the Protection of New Varieties of Plants Act 2004 
(PNVP).765  This is where there exists potential for underutilised crop species to be of value 
in Malaysia: they have the opportunity to supplement existing agricultural practices, either 
as commodity crops in commercial production, or as a part of subsistence farming by small 
scale farmers. 
6.2 Implementation of article 27.3(b) TRIPS in Malaysia 
 
Malaysia has been a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) since its 
inception in 1995; as such, it is required to implement the minimum standards of IP 
protection mandated by the TRIPS Agreement.  In order to comply with its obligations 
arising out of article 27.3(b) TRIPS, the Protection of New Varieties of Plants Act was 
passed in 2004.  Indeed, Malaysia has cited TRIPS obligations as the primary reason for 
enacting PVP legislation.766  This provides a sui generis plant variety protection regime for 
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plant-based innovations.  Malaysia has opted not to make patent protection available for 
plant varieties.767 
Malaysia is not yet a member of the International Union for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants (UPOV); however, it has applied to join the Union.768 In addition, as 
discussed in section 2.4, TRIPS plus obligations have the potential to impact upon 
Malaysia’s freedom to implement article 27.3(b), including by mandating UPOV 
membership.  Therefore, its relationship to the UPOV system will be considered in section 
6.2.6, before considering the implications of TRIPS plus trade agreements. 
6.2.1 Intellectual Property Protection for Plant-Based Innovations in Malaysia: 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants Act 2004 
 
Prior to the introduction of the Protection of New Varieties of Plants Act in 2004,769 
protection for plant-based innovations in Malaysia was limited to an informal system of 
plant breeder variety registration, under which the Department of Agriculture registered 
new varieties of fruits for certification purposes.770 
  The PNVP Act encompasses all plants but excludes micro-organisms.  The 
objective of the PNVP Act is to provide for the protection of the rights of breeders of new 
varieties of plants, while recognising and protecting the contributions of farmers, local 
communities and indigenous peoples to existing plant varieties and to encourage the 
investment in and development of new varieties in both the public and private sectors.771  
According to the Department of Agriculture (DOA), the introduction of plant variety 
protection (PVP) legislation is expected to put Malaysian growers in a better position by 
making new and improved plant varieties more accessible, as the expansion of plant 
breeders’ rights to include harvested material had caused practical difficulties for Malaysian 
breeders and growers.772   
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The PNVP Act technically came into force on 1st July 2004, however the Act was not 
effective until the supplementary Protection of New Varieties of Plants Regulations entered 
into force until 20th October 2008. The Malaysian PVP office did not begin to receive 
applications for registration until 1st November 2008.  Since then, there has been a gradual 
uptake of PVP in Malaysia.773  This delay is unsurprising, as the passing of the Act is just 
one aspect of implementing PVP: the legislation also needs to be supported by a 
corresponding regulatory framework, as well as appropriate institutions and expertise.  
This is a common challenge shared by states with young and nascent systems of PVP. 
 The PNVP Act is a sincere attempt to balance the interests of various stakeholders.  
Indeed, the drafting of the act was conducted by the relevant government ministries and 
agencies in conjunction with non-governmental organisations, including Third World 
Network.774775  The PNVP Act is largely based upon the UPOV 1978 model. To that end, 
the main model of PVP that it contains is reflective of the international standard.  Plant 
variety protection is available for varieties that fulfil the criteria of new, distinct, uniform 
and stable.776   However, plant variety protection is also available for varieties that have 
been bred, discovered or developed by farmers, local communities or indigenous people 
where the variety can fulfil the criteria of being new, distinct and identifiable.777  Thus, the 
PNVP Act appears to contain two standards for the grant of PVP, dependent upon the 
applicant.  It is noteworthy that these are two separate standards for obtaining the same 
plant breeders’ right, rather than there being two different rights available; one for 
farmers, local communities and indigenous people, and one for all other plant breeders.  
The only other notable distinction between the two is that the plant breeders’ right 
available under s. 14(2) is for a shorter period.778   The implications of this are considered 
in chapter seven. 
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6.2.2 Scope of plant variety protection under the PNVP Act 
 
Provided a variety meets the requirements of either s. 14(1) or s. 14(2) for the 
registration of a plant variety under the PNVP Act and the grant of a plant variety 
protection, s. 30(1) of the PNVP Act entitles the holder of a breeders’ right to carry out the 
following acts on a commercial basis with respect to the registered variety: 
(a) Producing or reproducing; 
(b) Conditioning for the purposes of sale; 
(c) Offering for sale; 
(d) Marketing, inclusive of selling; 
(e) Exporting; 
(f) Importing; 
(g) Stocking the material for the purposes mentioned in paragraphs (a)-(f) 
S. 30(2) extends the plant breeders’ right to include: any propagating material or 
harvested material of the registered variety, entire plants or parts thereof where the 
propagating material of the plant variety has been obtained through unauthorized means 
from a registered variety; plant varieties which are essentially derived from the registered 
variety, if the registered plant variety is not essentially derived from another variety; plant 
varieties which are not distinguishable from the registered variety; the production of other 
plant varieties which require the repeated use of the registered variety.  This is reflective 
of the rights granted to a breeder under the UPOV Convention.  It is notable that the scope 
of a breeder’s right includes essentially derived varieties779 as this is not present in the 
1978 Enactment upon which Malaysian PVP was based.  This offers stronger protection to 
breeders as it prevents the commercial exploitation of minor variations780 upon a 
registered variety without the consent of the original breeder.  This can be argued to be 
encouraging the development and registration of plant varieties by offering stronger 
 
779 PNVP, s. 30(2)(c).  A variety is essentially derived if it is predominantly derived from the registered variety, 
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protection for innovators.  However, given the availability of protection for traditional and 
farmers’ varieties under s. 14(2), the inclusion of the concept of essentially derived 
varieties may also serve to afford greater protection for traditional and farmers’ varieties 
from appropriation, provided the owners of the variety in question have taken the 
opportunity to register it.  Thus, the inclusion of essentially derived varieties provides an 
additional means of ensuring that the contributions of small farmers, local communities 
and indigenous people are respected.  In this way, it may also represent a useful tool for 
addressing bio piracy concerns. To that end, the inclusion of essentially derived varieties 
supports the aims of the PNVP Act.  
6.2.3 Limitations of Plant Variety Protection  
The Act contains a number of exceptions to a plant breeders’ right.  These can be 
split into two categories: exceptions that apply to PVP generally, and exceptions that apply 
specifically to small farmers.  General limitations include acts done privately and on a non-
commercial basis;781 acts done for experimental purposes;782 acts done for the purposes 
of breeding other plant varieties; and acts that fall within the scope of the exclusive rights 
of the breeder783 in respect of those other varieties, except where the other varieties are 
considered to be essentially derived varieties.784  These three general exceptions reflect 
the compulsory exceptions included in the 1991 UPOV Enactment.785  The balancing act 
achieved by these provisions serves to support plant-based innovations by protecting 
breeders’ rights over their innovations while ensuring adequate material for further 
development.  This should meet the needs of both public and private commercial breeders.  
Limitations which apply specifically to small farmers include: acts of propagation of 
registered varieties done by small holders on their own holdings;786 the exchange of 
‘reasonable’ amounts of propagating material between small farmers;787 and the sale of 
farm-saved seed where the small farmer cannot make use of the farm-saved seed on his 
 
781 PNVP, s. 31(1)(a) 
782 PNVP, s. 31(1)(b) 
783 Exclusive rights of the breeder as outlined in PNVP, s.30(1)(a)-(g) and discussed in section 6.2.2 above 
784 PNVP, s. 31(1)(c) 
785 UPOV 1991, art. 15(1) 
786 PNVP, s. 31(1)(d) 




own holding due to an emergency, natural disaster or other factors beyond their control, 
provided that the amount sold is no more than what they can use on their own holding.788 
The term ‘reasonable’ is not defined by the Act or the Administrative Guidelines (AG); 
however given the restriction on the amount of seed that small farmers are permitted to 
sell is limited to the amount they are able to use on their own holdings, it seems plausible 
to suggest that this is likely the upper limit of what might be considered to be reasonable 
for the purposes of exchange between farmers. 
 The inclusion of these exceptions appears to fit within the optional UPOV 
exemption for farmers to save the seed of protected varieties for propagating purposes on 
their own holdings or seed that they have obtained by planting on their own holdings.789 
It demonstrates a balancing of national interests in the drafting of the legislation, as it 
achieves an equilibrium between providing and upholding breeders’ rights and policy 
considerations such as access to planting material and serving food security concerns. 
However, the Administrative Guidelines define a small farmer as one whose holdings do 
not exceed 0.2 hectares.790  According to the limited demographic data available on 
farmers in Malaysia,791 the average size of a small farm is between 1 and 2 hectares.  
Thus, based on this information, the exemption for small farmers in Malaysia appears to 
be quite strictly limited.  During the drafting of the Regulations, the size of holdings of a 
small farmer was proposed to be 1.2 hectares.  Again, based on limited demographic data, 
this would encompass a large number of small farmers in Malaysia.  As it stands, it appears 
that the size of a small farmer is perhaps intended to reflect individuals growing for their 
own purposes and is therefore calculated to permit seed saving and exchange for 
individuals who use their holdings to grow food for personal consumption or who engage 
in plant breeding activities as a hobby, although whether it has been decided on this basis 
is not clear.  Thus, the implementation of the PNVP appears to place greater emphasis on 
 
788 PNVP, s. 31(1)(f) 
789 UPOV 1991, art. 15(2) 
790 AG, s. 14 
791 Baki Hj. Bakar, Azirah Hashim, Che Wan Jasimah Mohamed Radzi & Peter Songan, ‘The New Malaysian 
National Agro-Food Policy: Food security and food safety issues’ (3rd International Conference on Global 
Environmental Change and Food Security, Marrakesh, November 2012) available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280495910_The_New_Malaysian_National_Agro-




plant breeders’ rights, by excluding small farmers from the privileges and flexibilities that 
have been carved out for them in the PNVP Act.  However, it is important to note that 
there is a considerable lack of demographic and sociological data on small farmers and 
farming in Malaysia,792 therefore it is very difficult how appropriate or successful this 
development of the PNVP Act might be.  
6.2.4 Plant variety protection under s. 14(1) 
Any individual plant breeder, company, or government or statutory body may apply 
for PVP under article 14(1).793  Plant variety protection is available for varieties meeting 
the criteria of new, distinct, uniform and stable (DUS).  A plant variety is deemed to be 
novel if it has not been sold or otherwise disposed of on a commercial basis with the 
breeder’s consent either within one year of the filing date in Malaysia.794  A plant variety 
is regarded as uniform where it is suitably uniform in its relevant characteristics.795 A 
variety is considered to be distinct if it is clearly distinguishable from any other plant 
variety, the existence of which is common knowledge on the date of filing the application 
for PVP.796  Finally, a plant variety is deemed to be stable if its relevant characteristics 
remain unchanged after repeated propagation.797  Thus, the criteria for a plant breeder’s 
right under article 14(1) track UPOV standards.  The successful applicant will be granted 
PVP for a period of 20 years from the date of filing.798   
The basis for determining whether a variety fulfils the DUS criteria is the DUS Test 
Guidelines; the availability of DUS test guidelines directly corresponds to the availability 
of PVP for a given species or genera.  These are produced by the Plant Variety Protection 
Office.  The process of developing DUS test guidelines is outlined below.  Thus, to the 
extent that DUS guidelines are available, the PVP provided by s.14(1) reflects the 
 
792 The absence of accurate social and demographic data on farming and farmers in Malaysia has been 
confirmed by a number of sources.  One organization that commented (Crops for the Future) was in the 
process of undertaking their own small scale, local study in order to begin the process of better understanding 
local farmers’ practices and needs. 
793 PNVP, s. 13(1) 
794 PNVP, s. 14(3)(a)(i) 
795 PNVP, s. 14(3)(c) 
796 PNVP, s. 14(3)(b) 
797 PNVP, s. 14(3)(d) 





international standard for plant variety protection.  As such, it should meet the needs of 
commercial breeders; its suitability for different types of plant breeders is considered in 
chapter seven.  
6.2.4.1 DUS Test guidelines 
The process of developing DUS test guidelines in Malaysia broadly follows the same 
process as the development of UPOV test guidelines.799   Test guidelines are developed by 
a technical committee of plant experts.  These experts may consist of plantation workers, 
crop scientists, other agricultural researchers, and officers from the relevant agricultural 
departments, depending upon the type of plant under scrutiny.  The technical committee 
will meet several times during the development of the test guidelines; these meetings will 
take place on site in farms, plantations or orchards where samples of the species are being 
grown.  The purpose of the meeting is to determine the appropriate DUS characteristics 
for a given plant species as well as the method and duration of testing.  The development 
of test guidelines takes on average around two to three years; this is dictated by the type 
of plant.  Sometimes existing test guidelines either produced by UPOV or by other countries 
are used as a basis for the development of the Malaysian guidelines.  This can potentially 
reduce the amount of time it takes to produce the guidelines to around one year.  Finally, 
the test guidelines are trialled to ensure that they are an accurate and useful tool for 
assessing the relevant aspects of a plant variety. 
6.2.5 Plant variety protection under s. 14(2) 
 
An alternative standard for plant variety protection is available under s. 14(2) of 
the PNVP Act.  This is sometimes referred to as protection for traditional or farmers’ 
varieties.  The availability of the alternative standard for PVP is a result of the advocacy of 
various members of the drafting committee to recognise the role of indigenous peoples 
and small farmers in the development of local agriculture.800  It also reflects the 
 
799 Description of the development of DUS Guidelines is compiled from several descriptions provided by the 
PVPO and crop scientists with relevant experience. 




contributions that farmers historically have made to the agricultural industry in Malaysia; 
this express recognition and protection fulfils one of the policy objectives of the Act. 801   
The alternative PVP is available to farmers, local communities and indigenous 
peoples.802  The definition of ‘farmer’ under the act is interesting, as it includes not only 
individuals who cultivate crops themselves or by directly supervising others but also 
anyone who preserves, jointly or severally a traditional variety of crops or who adds value 
to the traditional variety through their selection and identification of their useful purposes.  
This might suggest that the category is intended to be constructed more broadly than what 
is normally understood to mean.  This would allow for a wider group of potential applicants 
to protect their local and traditional varieties, which would be in line with the aim of the 
PNVP Act to recognise and protect the contributions of farmers, local communities and 
indigenous people. ‘Indigenous people’ are considered to be those who fall within the terms 
of ‘aborigine’ or ‘native’ as defined by Federal Constitution (FC).803  ‘Local communities’ is 
defined as a group of individuals that have settled together and who continuously inherit 
a production process or culture, or that live together under an eco-cultural system.  
Accordingly, the term ‘indigenous’ is linked with the heritage of the applicant whereas both 
‘farmer’ and ‘local community’ are centred upon a positive link to the genetic resources at 
issue. 
Thus, it is available to a limited class of applicants.  Where the applicant is a local 
community or indigenous people, the authority that represents the local community or 
indigenous people is responsible for submitting the application.804  In the same vein as s. 
14(1), a plant variety is considered new if it has not been made available for sale or 
otherwise disposed of in Malaysia for one year before the application,805 or for most plant 
varieties, for four years before the date of filing in other countries.806  Equally, the criterion 
of ‘distinct’ is considered to be where a new variety is clearly distinguishable from existing 
 
801 Azmi, n770 above, at 878  
802 PNVP, s. 14(2) 
803 ‘Aborigine’ means an aborigine of Peninsular Malaysia (FC, art. 160(2)).  The term ‘Native’ refers to 
individuals in either the states of Sabah or Sarawak, who belongs to one of a closed list of indigenous ethnic 
groups (FC, arts. 161(6), 161(7))  
804 PNVP, s. 13(3) 
805 PNVP, s. 14(3)(a)(i) 




varieties, the existence of which is common knowledge.807  Based upon these 
requirements, it is clear that alternative PVP in Malaysia is intended to the recipient of the 
same plant breeder’s rights as commercially developed varieties.  This approach differs 
from that taken in other states which have adopted a unique sui generis system of plant 
variety protection which also recognises existing traditional and farmer’s varieties.  For 
example, the approach adopted in India808 provides for two different alternative sui generis 
IP rights over traditional or farmers’ varieties: protection for extant varieties and 
protection for farmers’ varieties.  Protection for extant varieties provides registration for 
varieties that meet the DUS criteria but are not new.809810  It does not grant the applicant 
an IPR over the extant variety but assigns the rights to the extant variety to the Indian 
government.  Equally, protection for farmers’ varieties allows for the registration of 
varieties about which there is common knowledge among farmers or communities.811  
Applicant varieties are also required to meet a modified version of the DUS criteria.812  
Rather than operating as an intellectual property right in the strict sense, it provides for 
the registration of farmers’ varieties and the right for the registered owners of the variety 
to claim compensation for the use of their varieties.  Like the alternative plant variety 
protection encapsulated in s. 14(2), the aim of these provisions is to recognise the 
contributions of farmers, local communities and indigenous people.  There are other states 
besides India which have adopted a similar approach.813 The significance of this is that the 
Malaysian regime appears to provide a unique opportunity for the developers of farmers 
and traditional varieties by offering them the same intellectual property right as 
commercial breeders.  
Under the PNVP Act, a variety is identifiable if it can be distinguished from any 
other plant in the same grouping by the expression of one or more characteristics which 
 
807 PNVP, s. 14(3)(b) 
808 Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act, No.53 of 2001 (PPVFRA) 
809 PPVFRA, s. 2(j)  
810 Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights (Criteria for DUS Registration) Regulations 2009, available 
at https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/200387 (accessed: 15th July 2020) s.4 
811 PPVFRA, s. 2(l) 
812 PPVFRA, s. 5 
813 A similar example is Thailand, which provides for the registration of Local and Domestic Varieties, and 
General Domestic and Wild Varieties.  See, Plant Variety Protection Act, B. E. 2542 (1999) 
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is identifiable within individual plants and across the grouping;814 and characteristic can 
be identified by anyone skilled in the relevant art.815  The criterion of ‘identifiable’ is not 
subject to established test guidelines in the same manner as the Uniformity and Stability 
criteria; rather it is informed by the process of variety development reported by local 
farmers.  The inclusion of the Identifiable criterion is intended to support the possibility of 
applications for PVP from the identified individuals or groups who have considerable 
agricultural knowledge but do not have formal education or scientific knowledge about 
plant breeding.  In the process of drafting the PNVP Act, the committee examined the 
process by which local and indigenous farmers developed plant varieties.  They found that 
the breeding process undertaken by local farmers and indigenous peoples generally 
followed a cycle of discovery, selection, repeated breeding to encourage the desired 
characteristics, which in turn produces some degree of uniformity and stability, although 
this may not be akin to the standards of uniformity and stability demanded by the DUS 
test guidelines. 816  This is at least in part because of the influence of environmental factors 
upon the uniformity and stability.   Thus, the concept of identifiable functions more or less 
as the measure of distinctiveness: it is the measure by which a person skilled in the 
relevant art817 is able to assess that the relevant characteristic of an applicant variety is 
present across the sample group.  
The other way in which the alternative PVP under s. 14(2) differs from standard 
PVP under s. 14(1) is that it expands the scope of activities involved in producing a 
registerable variety.  Farmers, local communities and indigenous people may apply for PVP 
for a variety which they have ‘bred, discovered or developed’.818  This is distinct from 
s.14(1) which does not refer to the process by which the new variety has been attained. 
However, given the fact that PVP under s. 14(1) is reflective of the international or UPOV 
standard, it is not unreasonable to suggest that it is implicit that the production of the new 
variety is through traditional plant breeding techniques.  The term ‘discovered or 
814 PNVP, s. 14(3)(e)(i) 
815 PNVP, s. 14(3)(e)(ii) 
816 Personal communication, Department of Agriculture, (January 2019) 
817 PNVP, s. 14(3)(e)(i), s. 21 




developed’ is somewhat interestingly defined as ‘activities which lead to the desired 
phenotypic expression and affect the crop genotype and which may or may not entail the 
deliberate or artificial creation of genetic variability’.819  This suggests that the alternative 
PVP is intended to capture plant varieties which are created through means other than 
formal or scientific breeding processes and thus make protection available for traditional 
or farmers’ varieties.   
The references to the phenotype and the genotype of the variety are particularly 
interesting.  The term ‘genotype’ refers to the complete hereditary information of an 
organism.820  The term ‘phenotype’ refers to the sum total of an organism’s observable 
characteristics (including its morphology) as a consequence of the interaction between its 
genotype and its environment.821  This suggests that the provision is intended to 
encapsulate a more flexible standard than that espoused in s. 14(1), as it appears to 
contain an allowance for the effect of the local environment on the physical manifestation 
of a traditional or farmers’ variety.   The relevance of this is that while traditional or 
farmers’ varieties are highly likely to have been selectively bred for identifiable traits, 
those traits may also be influenced by the local environment in which they are cultivated.  
Therefore, they may not be likely to produce the same traits in a uniform or stable manner 
if cultivated elsewhere.  This is reflected in the Administrative Guidelines,822 which sets 
out the testing process for traditional or farmers’ varieties.  The Administrative Guidelines 
require the inspection of a minimum of five plants possessing the same characteristics.823  
This testing can take place either on site (i.e. at the applicant or breeders’ premises) or at 
a DUS testing station; whereas the testing of an applicant variety under s. 14(1) requires 
both on site testing and testing at a DUS testing station.  This arguably factors in any 
environmental or ecological influences into the variety testing process.  Therefore, 
 
819 PNVP, s. 2 
820 ‘genotype’ Oxford English Dictionary Online, available at: 
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/77623?rskey=GWHgvw&result=2&isAdvanced=false#eid (accessed: 15th July 
2020) 
821 ‘phenotype’ Oxford English Dictionary online, available at: 
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/142359?rskey=DzHmaR&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid (accessed 15th July 
2020) 
822 DOA, ‘Administrative Guidelines on the Application and Registration of New Varieties of Plants’ (2008) 
available at: http://pvpbkkt.doa.gov.my/ (accessed: 15th July 2020)  




divergences in phenotype caused by the influence of a variety’s local environment should 
not impede registration under s. 14(2).  The effect of this is that it should make it easier 
for farmers and local communities to register their varieties.  
The phrase ‘bred, discovered or developed’ is also used in the definition of a plant 
breeder in the 1991 UPOV Enactment.824  Interestingly, this definition is not present in the 
1978 UPOV Enactment upon which the Malaysian PVP law was based.825  UPOV has 
provided explanatory guidance as to the meaning of ‘discovered and developed’ within the 
UPOV system.   It distinguishes the notion of ‘discovery’ from ‘development’: it suggests 
that discovery may refer to the initial step in breeding a variety, and that development is 
the necessary quality to make a variety eligible for a plant breeders’ right.826  In effect, 
they are both requirements of the plant breeding process.  The special relevance of the 
inclusion of the concept of discoveries to the UPOV system is that it is one of the key 
conceptual differences between patent protection and sui generis systems of protection 
for plant varieties.  Patent protection requires an inventive step; whereas sui generis plant 
variety protection was originally devised to encourage all forms of plant improvement, 
which includes discoveries.827  This is because it is possible for a natural variation to be 
the source of a new plant variety as well as deliberate work on the part of the breeder.  
The term was reintroduced in the 1991 Enactment, as it was felt that it was necessary to 
recognise the role discoveries (i.e. natural variations) play in plant variety development.  
It was, however, emphasised that both discovery and development are required in order 
to produce a registerable variety.828  The curiosity here is that in the PNVP act this phrase 
has been used for alternative PVP under s. 14(2) but not for standard PVP.   This suggests 
that the meaning of the term ‘discovered and developed’ has been constructed somewhat 
 
824 UPOV 1991, art. 1(iv) 
825 According to UPOV, the word ‘discoveries’ is omitted from the 1978 Enactment as the possibility of natural 
mutation being the source of initial variation is implicit in article 6(1)(a), which suggests that the origin of a 
potentially registerable variety may be natural or artificial. Similarly, the 1978 Enactment does not define 
‘breeder’ or ‘breeding’. See, n826 below, at paras. 11-13 
826 UPOV, ‘Explanatory guidelines on the definition of breeder under the 1991 UPOV Convention’ 24th October 
2013, available at: https://www.upov.int/edocs/mdocs/upov/en/caj_67/upov_exn_brd_draft_6.pdf (accessed: 
15th July 2020)  
827 UPOV Council, ‘The notion of breeder and common knowledge’ 19th Extraordinary Session, Geneva, 19th 
April 2002, at paras. 5-10  




differently under the PVP than under UPOV.  It is possible to interpret this drafting as an 
indication that conventional PVP is intended to serve the results of formal breeding 
activities and that the inclusion of ‘discovered and developed’ under s. 14(2) encapsulates 
a more flexible approach to the development of traditional and farmers’ varieties.  It also 
seems likely that it may be intended to provide a certain degree of flexibility, as PVP for 
traditional or farmers’ varieties under s. 14(2) requires applicant varieties to be new, 
whereas other models for the registration of local, traditional or farmers’ varieties do not 
include a novelty requirement.829  Thus, the inclusion of ‘discovered and developed’ in s. 
14(2) may serve to soften the novelty requirement for traditional and farmers’ varieties.  
6.2.6 The Protection of New Varieties of Plants Act: Compatibility with UPOV 
 
As is noted in section 6.1.1 above, although Malaysia is not a member of UPOV, it 
has applied to join the Union.   It has been suggested by Ida Azmi that the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants Act is 90% UPOV compliant.830  However, if this is the case, the 
remaining 10% appears to be something of a sticking point.  The Malaysian Act was drafted 
based upon the 1978 UPOV Enactment, as opposed to the 1991 UPOV Enactment. 831  
However, since the 1991 Enactment came into force on 24th April 1998 it is no longer 
possible to accede to the 1978 Enactment.  Nonetheless, the PNVP Act contains a number 
of the key features of the 1991 Enactment, most notably the inclusion of essentially 
derived varieties.  The issues concerning UPOV compatibility can be broadly placed into 
two categories: those concerning technical compliance with UPOV standards and the 
availability of PVP for traditional and farmers’ varieties under s. 14(2). 
Concerning technical compliance, Malaysia has attended UPOV meetings as an 
observer and has received UPOV technical assistance since the Act was in the process of 
being drafted.832   Such assistance has been focused on achieving compliance with the 
standards required by the 1991 Enactment, as it is only possible to accede to the UPOV 
 
829 See, section 5.3.2.1 above, for discussion of protection of Extant and Farmers’ varieties in India.  See also, 
registration of Local and Domestic varieties, and General Domestic and Wild varieties in Thailand, n813 above. 
830 Azmi, n770 above, at 878 
831 Suzi Fadhilah Ismail, ‘Intellectual property protection for agricultural biotechnological inventions: a case of 
Malaysia’ (PhD Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2011) 




system if the Council has reviewed the conformity of the laws of the applicant state and 
its view is positive.833834   Some of this guidance can be considered to be mere procedural 
requirements. For example, the original UPOV Council advice on the PNVP highlighted the 
fact that it failed to include the required list of at least 15 genera or species of plants to 
be protected,835 which could be achieved in line with national needs and priorities.  Indeed, 
since the Act came into operation, the PVP Office has implemented DUS guidelines for 24 
crop species,836  effectively making protection available the under the Act. 837  The species 
for which protection was introduced clearly reflect Malaysia’s existing agricultural 
priorities: they include financially lucrative crops such as ornamental flowers and popular 
fruits; industrial crops such as oil palm and commodity crops, such as rice.  
However, other elements of the guidance and suggestions provided by the UPOV 
Council pertain to more fundamental changes to the Act, and as a result are more difficult 
to reconcile with the fact that the PNVP Act is an attempt to design a PVP system that 
caters to Malaysia’s unique set of needs.  Of particular note is its objection to s. 15, 
concerning prohibition of the registration and grant of a breeders’ right.  The UPOV Council 
has suggested that the restriction of the grant of a PBR where it may affect public order 
or morality, or where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the cultivation, 
production or use of the plant variety may produce a negative impact on the environment, 
is an additional restriction on the grant of a breeders’ right, beyond those permitted by 
UPOV (which only allows for a breeder’s right to be denied where the variety does not 
meet the DUS criteria).  The Council suggested that this provision should be deleted and 
perhaps replaced by separate legislation, which would apply to commercialised varieties 
regardless of whether they were registered.838 
 
833 UPOV 1991, article 34(3) 
834 It is to be recalled that the UPOV system provides a model system for plant variety protection rather than a 
directly applicable regime. 
835 UPOV Council, Twenty-Second Extraordinary Session; Geneva, April 8 2005 at para. 7  
836 The species for which PVP is currently available in Malaysia are: Durian, Papaya, Guava, Mango, Pineapple, 
Rambutan, Pitaya, Dabai, Nangka, Chilli, Dendrobium, Chrysanthemum, Lily, Mokara, Vanda, Paddy, Acacia, 
Teak, Cocoa, Oil Palm, Pepper, Rubber, Kelapa, Sweet Potato (Accurate as of June 2020) 
837 PVPO, ‘DUS Test Guidelines’ available at: http://pvpbkkt.doa.gov.my (accessed: 15th July 2020)  




The UPOV Council’s critique of the alternative plant variety protection regime set 
out in s. 14(2) suggests that in its view, the alternative PVP should be set out in a separate 
part of the Act and clearly identified as a different PVP regime as it pertains to a restricted 
group of applicants and has a different subject matter and conditions for protection and 
has a different duration.839  This can be viewed in two separate ways.  The first is that the 
notion of a plant breeder’s right or plant variety protection should be reserved for 
traditionally styled plant variety protection (which the right outlined in s.14(1) can be said 
to be) and correspondingly, a right that is designed around manifestly different qualities 
does belong in a separately identifiable regime.  It is also arguable that this approach also 
makes practical sense for end users. 
On the other hand, it can be argued that the suggestion that the alternative form 
of plant variety protection should not be recognised as the same plant breeders’ right is 
contradictory to the stated aims of the PNVP Act, and undermines the purpose of offering 
alternative PVP, particularly if protection for traditional and farmers’ varieties is intended 
to be the same IPR that is available for commercial plant breeders, as opposed to a 
different or equivalent right.  
6.2.7 TRIPS Plus and Plant Variety Protection in Malaysia 
 
As we have seen in this chapter so far, Malaysia has adopted an interesting, hybrid 
sui generis approach to it implementation of article 27.3(b); although this remains in its 
infancy and the possibility remains that it may be reconceived in the near future.  It has 
also been observed that, at present, Malaysia’s relationship to the UPOV Conventions 
continues to be open but with significant obstacles to its potential accession to the Union.  
The situation as it currently stands is underdeveloped, however, there is sufficient 
flexibility in the existing legislative, administrative and regulatory framework for it to be 
moulded to national plant breeding and food security needs. 
However, there is a spectre looming over the current status quo.  The spectre in 
question is the possibility of Malaysia adopting a TRIPS Plus trade agreement which will 
 




oblige Malaysia to become party to the 1991 UPOV Enactment.   This has been a very 
realistic prospect for some time: as outlined in section 2.4 above, the now defunct Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), which Malaysia had signed,840 but not ratified, would have 
required it to implement UPOV 1991 standards within three years.841  Similarly, its 
successor, the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), to which 
Malaysia is also signatory,842 but has not yet ratified, also imposes the same obligation.843   
At the time of writing, the future of the CPTPP, and therefore the obligation to 
implement UPOV 1991 in Malaysia is uncertain.844  Dependent upon the political success 
of this TRIPS Plus agreement, there are two possible outcomes.  The first, is that should 
it elect to ratify the CPTPP, is that Malaysia will be obliged to implement UPOV 1991.  As 
discussed in section 6.2.6 above, achieving UPOV compliance is dependent upon significant 
modification of the existing Malaysian formulation of plant variety protection, including the 
removal of the alternative form of PVP contained in s. 14(2) of the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants Act.  Therefore, the new Malaysian plant variety law will be strictly 
limited in its ability to implement unique sui generis solutions for plant variety protection.   
The utility of the revised plant variety law will also be limited to the suitability of UPOV 
style PVP for supporting developments in underutilised crop varieties and addressing food 
security concerns, which was considered in chapter three, and will be returned to in 
chapter seven.   
Alternatively, if the ratification of the CPTPP does not come to fruition in Malaysia, 
then it will be free to either continue with the current PNVP Act as it stands or revise it in 
a way that reflects what it perceives to be its needs and priorities. 
Thus, it may prove to be the case that the form of revisions to the PNVP Act will 
not be dictated by their suitability for domestic plant breeders and national food security 
concerns, but as a consequence of wider trade ambitions. 
 
840 Malaysia signed the TPP on 4th February 2016 
841 TPP, article 18.7.2(d) 
842 The CPTPP was signed on 8th March 2018; it entered into force on 30th December 2018, 60 days after the 
ratification of the agreement by 50% of the signatories.   
843 CPTPP, article 18.7.2(d) 
844 Due to the historic change in the Malaysian government in early 2019, Malaysia’s subscription to the CPTPP 
is under review and no date has been set for ratification. See, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 





6.2.8 Possible reform of the Protection of New Varieties of Plants Act 
 
At the time of writing, the possibility of reforming the PNVP Act is being deliberated 
by Parliament and the relevant government agencies in Malaysia.  There are a number of 
reasons why reform is being considered.  The first is the overhanging threat of an 
international trade agreement that will necessitate PVP reform in order to bring it into line 
with UPOV standards, as considered in section 6.2.6 above.  At the same time, there are 
those who believe that the Malaysian framework should align itself more completely with 
UPOV, notwithstanding any trade-based obligations.  Of particular relevance is Malaysia’s 
membership of the East Asian Plant Variety Protection forum (EAPVP); an organisation 
established to encourage information exchange and compliance with UPOV 1991 among 
East Asian nations.845   
Also relevant is the fact that despite the national seed sector in Malaysia being 
relatively nascent, the uptake of PVP since the introduction of the PNVP act to has been 
slow.  On the other hand, it is neither proper nor useful to lay all of the blame for the 
limited uptake of PVP at the foot of the legislative framework, as lack of relevant expertise, 
high turnover of staff, budgetary constraints and administrative delays in granting PVP 
have all been cited as factors that have impeded its success so far.846 
At present, reform of the Act is likely although it is very difficult to speculate upon 
when this might take place given how long it normally takes for new legislation to be 
developed and enacted in Malaysia.  The recent flip-flopping of the Malaysian 
government847 is also likely to be a factor in when or if this might be achieved.  Reform of 
the PNVP Act does not necessarily require Malaysia to abandon its alternative plant variety 
protection, although it may need to be considerably repackaged in order for its existence 
alongside traditional PVP to be acceptable to the UPOV Council. 
 
845 EAPVP is composed of the ten member states of the Association of South East Asian Nations, plus China, 
Japan and Korea. 
846 DOA, ‘Malaysia’s implementing of EAPVP 10 year strategic plan’; Personal communication, Department of 
Agriculture (February 2019) 
847 Johnathon Head, ‘How Malaysia’s government collapsed in two years’ BBC News, available at: 




6.3 Access and Benefit Sharing in Malaysia 
6.3.1 Malaysia and the Convention on Biological Diversity 
 
Malaysia signed the Convention on Biological Diversity at the Rio Earth Summit848 
and subsequently ratified the treaty on 24th June 1994.  This brought into effect the 
obligations of the CBD, including inter alia the requirement to create conditions to facilitate 
access to genetic resources on the basis of mutually agreed terms (MAT) and subject to 
Prior Informed Consent (PIC), and to encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits 
arising from the use of genetic resources849 and associated traditional knowledge.850    
In response, Malaysia established a National Committee on Biological Diversity 
charged with the development of appropriate ABS principles and producing a draft bill, 
which was completed in 1999.851  The draft bill was scheduled to go through the national 
consultation process between 2000 and 2001 and for subsequent approval by parliament.  
However, its progress with national consultation proved to be much slower than 
anticipated.   Delays in the consultation of the ABS bill can also be attributed to the fact 
that the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment prioritised enacting the draft bill 
on Biosafety852  over the ABS bill.  As a result, the ABS bill lost momentum.  It continued 
to face a number of serious conceptual difficulties, including addressing the challenge of 
dividing ownership and management of resources between state and federal 
governments.853 Issues pertaining to indigenous and community held resources, 
knowledge and innovations; and controversy over a proposed sui generis system of 
community intellectual property rights also remained unresolved.854 
As a result of the difficulty resolving these issues, the original national ABS bill 
never passed.  There were some piecemeal measures in place to regulate access to 
biological resources in peninsular Malaysia, predating the CBD, although these served 
 
848 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 3 to 14 June 1992 
849 CBD, art. 15 
850 CBD, art. 8(j) 
851 Santiago Carrizosa, ‘Scenarios of Policymaking Progress’ in Santiago Carrizosa, Stephen B. Brush, Brian D. 
Wright & Patrick E. McGuire (eds.) Accessing Biodiversity and Sharing the Benefits: Lessons from Implementing 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (IUCN, Gland, 2004) at 57  
852 as required by the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
853 Mohamad Osman, ‘Malaysia: Recent Initiatives to Develop Access and Benefit-Sharing Regulations’ in 
Carrizosa, Brush, Wright & McGuire (eds.) n851 above, at 245-246 




more of the function of monitoring access to genetic resources rather than acting as 
required permission. 855   Crucially, these measures lacked the necessary benefit sharing 
component.  However, the east Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak, which are home 
to a greater proportion of the nation’s biodiversity, took the initiative to develop their own 
state level ABS regimes, centred on state biodiversity centres in order to conserve the 
states’ genetic resources.856   
Due to the soft nature of the provisions of the Biodiversity Convention, Malaysia 
remained in compliance with its obligations under the CBD even in the absence of a 
national ABS framework.  However, the delays in implementing a national legislative 
framework regulating access to biological diversity demonstrates the difficulty of balancing 
such complex interrelated concerns, even in a mega biodiverse state with a desire to 
protect its resources. This situation was potentially beneficial to developers, as there were 
no issues accessing biological resources for experimentation and development.  However, 
it left both state and privately owned biological resources open to bio piracy and 
appropriation of associated traditional knowledge.   
6.3.2 Malaysia and the Nagoya Protocol 
 
The early stages of Malaysia’s relationship with the Nagoya Protocol were not 
particularly easy.  Malaysia participated in the negotiation of the Protocol as a part of the 
group of Like Minded Megadiverse Countries (LMMC) and the group of Like Minded Asia 
Pacific Countries (LM APAC).  As is noted in chapter five, the late stages of drafting the 
Protocol were polarised between a group of parties including Japan, the EU, Brazil, Namibia 
and Norway, which produced and presented their own, complete draft of the protocol 
behind closed doors, from which Malaysia was excluded.857  When the final compromise 
 
855 A scheme was administered by the Economic Planning Unit, which required foreign prospectors to acquire a 
permit.  Such a permit did not mitigate the need to acquire relevant permits at the state level.  In Peninsular 
Malaysia, prospecting in the forest also required a licence under the National Forestry Act 1984 (Act no. 313).  
The export of biological resources is governed by the Customs Act 1967 (Act 235) 
856 The majority of state held collections of germ plasm are in Sabah or Sarawak. State authorities with ex situ 
germplasm collections are: Sabah Parks; Department of Agriculture, Sabah; Department of Forestry, Sabah; 
Department of Agriculture, Sarawak; Department of Forestry, Sarawak; Sarawak Botanical Garden; and the 
Sarawak Biodiversity Centre.  The only exceptions are the Penang Botanical Garden and the Kedah Regional 
Development Authority. 
857 This approach to achieving a draft protocol was heavily criticised by the LMMC, including the Malaysian 
delegation registered their protest with the manner in which the negotiations had been conducted.  Nijar, n763 




text of the Protocol was presented on a ‘take it or leave it basis’, it received protestations 
from the Malaysian delegation as it did not consider the text to represent a balanced 
protocol. 
It was unsurprising then, that Malaysia did not choose to adopt the final text of the 
Protocol at Nagoya.  It did however later opt to sign the Protocol on 5th November 2018 
before acceding to the Protocol on 3rd February 2019, as a means of fulfilling its ABS 
obligations under the Convention on Biological Diversity.  One of the fundamental concerns 
espoused by the delegations of developing states during the negotiation of the Protocol 
was that should key issues not be adequately addressed, they would be left in a worse 
position than they had been under the CBD alone.858  This is a significant factor that 
contributed to Malaysia’s slow adoption of the Nagoya Protocol, and is reflected by the 
prolonged negotiation of a national ABS framework under the CBD, as discussed above.   
The reason why states and biologically rich states in particular, would likely find 
themselves worse off under the Protocol is that the CBD requires that parties wishing to 
access a biological resource to obtain the consent of the contracting party in which that 
resource is located, unless that obligation has been waived by the contracting party 
concerned.859  The CBD does not require the enactment of a domestic law; whereas the 
Nagoya Protocol appears to require the enactment of a relevant law as a precondition for 
the consent of the country in question.860  This has been viewed by developing states as 
onerous as it presents the choice between implementing an ABS regime and ceding 
sovereignty over its genetic resources.  This also creates pressure on both time and 
resources to craft an appropriate national ABS framework.861  Given this, it is entirely 
understandable that states, including Malaysia, have been reluctant to adopt the Protocol 
until adequate domestic ABS measures are in place.  This is evidenced by the fact that 
Malaysia did not adopt the Protocol until a year after the Access to Biological Resources 
 
858 The Malaysian Minister of Natural Resources and Environment, Douglas Unggah emphasised that LMMC 
states should not rush to adopt a weak protocol, as it would be detrimental to the long term interests of the 
group and would undermine progress already achieved with ABS issues.  See, Nijar, n763 above, at 10 
859 CBD, art. 15.5 
860 Gurdial Singh Nijar, ‘The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing: Analysis and Implementation 





and Benefit Sharing Act was in place: otherwise, up until that point it would have only 
been possible to require consent for access to genetic resources in the states of Sabah 
and Sarawak, which had already implemented state level ABS regulation. 
6.3.3 Access to Biological Resources and Benefit Sharing Act 2017 
 
The Access to Biological Resources and Benefit Sharing Act 2017 (ABRBS) entered 
into force on 17th October 2017.  The act applies nationally across the countries 13 states 
and three federal territories and operates in conjunction with the existing state level access 
and benefit sharing solutions.  It concerns all genetic and biological resources which are 
not the subject of another specialised instrument to which Malaysia is party.  Thus, the 
Act does not apply to the genetic resources which fall within the multilateral system of the 
ITPGRFA, or PGRFA that are within the state’s control and in the public domain.  This 
means that the gene banks of the Malaysian Agricultural Research and Development 
Institute (MARDI) and the Department of Agriculture fall outside of the scope of the ABRBS 
Act. 
The ABRBS Act introduces a tiered scheme of competent authorities responsible for 
access to biological resources in Malaysia.  It introduces a national competent authority 
responsible for coordinating the implementation and enforcement of the ABS requirements 
of the Act.862  Its role includes, inter alia, coordinating the implementation and 
enforcement of the Act and implementing and fulfilling the requirements under any treaty, 
agreement, convention or protocol relation to access and benefit sharing to which Malaysia 
is party.863  This is supported by competent authority in each state or federal territory 
which has jurisdiction over all matters relating to the biological resources in its territory.864  
The competent authorities are responsible for dealing with all applications relating to 
access for biological resources and associated traditional knowledge.865  Thus, 
responsibility for access and benefit sharing resides primarily at the state level.   
 
862 The national competent authority consists of the Secretary General of the Ministry Natural Resources and 
the Environment, now the Ministry for Natural Resources and the Environment was restructured into the 
Ministry of Water, Land and Natural Resources (KATS); and their chosen appointees (ABRBS, s. 7(2)) 
863 ABRBS, s. 8 
864 The Ministry of Federal Territories is the competent authority for the federal territories of Kuala Lumpur, 
Labuan and Putrajaya.   




This approach reflects the tiered, federal political structure in Malaysia and creates 
appropriate leeway for the competent authorities to tailor how they implement their ABS 
obligations to local needs and requirements.  It also allows the ABS framework to retain 
some flexibility, which is useful given the difficulties experienced in the earlier attempts to 
create such a framework.  However, the success of this approach relies upon equal uptake 
at the local level.  This includes the establishment of regulations governing access and 
benefit sharing, as well as the existence of appropriate local institutions and expertise.  As 
we will explore in this chapter, the uptake of this has been asymmetrical among the states 
and federal territories.  Although a certain degree of asymmetry is fitting, given the 
variation in biodiversity between the states, failure to address this may create uncertainty 
for end users and result in a lack of benefit sharing with the holders of biological resources.  
6.3.3.1 Biological Resources and Traditional Knowledge 
 
 As is stated explicitly in the title of the Act, access and benefit sharing is concerned 
with biological resources, rather than genetic resources as expressed in the Nagoya 
Protocol.  Both the terms ‘biological resources’866 and ‘genetic resources’ are used in the 
Convention on Biological Diversity; however, so far as utilization, the third aim of the 
Convention is concerned, this is limited to genetic resources.867  The definition of biological 
resource adopted in the s.4 of the ABRBS Act includes: genetic resources, organisms, 
microorganisms, derivatives and parts of thereof; populations and any other biotic 
components of ecosystems with actual or potential use or value for humanity; and any 
information relating to these.   The ABRBS Act does not explicitly define traditional 
knowledge; however, s.4 refers to traditional knowledge as being a resource that 
originates in indigenous and local communities.  This generally reflects the approach taken 
in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).   While 
s. 31 UNDRIP does provide examples of what may constitute traditional knowledge, the 
emphasis is on the link between the originators of the knowledge, rather than the 
 
866 The CBD defines biological resources as including ‘genetic resources, organisms or parts thereof, 
populations, or any other biotic component of ecosystems with actual or potential use for humanity, art. 2 




substance of the knowledge itself.868  Therefore, the provisions relating to TK relate to 
closed groups. 
Given how ‘biological resources’ has been constructed under the ABRBS Act, its 
scope Act is potentially much broader than that of either the CBD or the Nagoya Protocol.  
Under the Act, genetic resources are one possible manifestation of a biological resource.  
There are two particular points of interest in the definitions here: the first is the explicit 
inclusion of derivatives, which was a point of contention during the negotiation of the 
protocol.  The second is the inclusion of information relating to biological resources.  This 
is particularly interesting as it appears that it may extend the application of the ABS 
principles established by the Act to include knowledge associated with biological resources 
other than traditional knowledge.   There are two possible implications of this: the first is 
that the definition is intended to capture knowledge relating to a biological resource that 
does not originate from a group identifiable as a local community or an indigenous people 
within the operational definitions in Malaysia.869 This might include knowledge held by 
individuals who fall outside the defined groups. 
Alternatively, the inclusion of the term ‘any information relating to’ biological 
resources in the definition of biological resources may effectively subject a new type of 
knowledge to the requirements of the ABS regime, as arguably, research data relating to 
biological resources may come within the scope of information relating to biological 
resources and therefore fall within the definition of biological resource.  The effect of this 
is that the scope of the ABRBS Act is much wider than that provided for by the Nagoya 
Protocol.  This represents a significant success of the Act, as it clearly integrates Malaysia’s 
national focus of a broad interpretation of ABS obligations into its solution.  Thus, the 
construction of ‘biological resources’ creates considerable flexibility in the interpretation of 
the Act, which may go beyond the extent intended by the drafters.  The extent to which 
 
868 Article 31 UNDRIP outlines the rights to maintain, control, protect and develop inter alia, their traditional 
knowledge, including manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures, including human and genetic 
resources, seeds, medicines and knowledge of the properties of flora and fauna. 
869 Indigenous communities are defined by the Act as persons recognised by the Aboriginal Peoples Act 1954 
(in Peninsular Malaysia) or natives as defined by Clause (6) of Article 161A of the Federal Constitution (in 
Sabah and Sarawak) (s.4).  Local communities are defined as a group of individuals who have settled together 




this flexibility actually exists can only be determined through use based evidence, and the 
Act and its implementation are relatively nascent.  This issue will be returned to in chapter 
seven. 
6.3.3.2 Access to Biological Resources and Traditional Knowledge 
 
Access to biological resources under the ABRBS Act is defined as the taking of a 
biological resource from its natural habitat or other place where it is kept, grown or 
found870 for the purpose of research and development.871  It also includes situations where 
the competent authority deems there to be a reasonable prospect that a resource accessed 
will be subject to research and development.872    This introduces a safeguard, to ensure 
that the Malaysia’s biological resources are not subject to biopiracy.  The act does not 
apply to biological resources that have been cultivated or tended for any purposes other 
than research and development.873  Notably, it also excludes the use and exchange of 
biological resources by indigenous and local communities in and among themselves in the 
exercise of traditional and customary practices.874 
Interestingly, the Act cites adverse impact upon food security as a reason for 
refusing access to biological resources.875  It is not clear what type of situation access to 
biological resources might have such an impact, however the inclusion of this provision in 
the Act is consistent with Malaysia’s national agricultural priorities. 
The Act distinguishes between applicants who wish to apply for access to biological 
resources for commercial research and those who wish to apply for non-commercial 
research purposes.  Applicants who wish to apply for access for commercial or potentially 
commercial purposes are required to establish a benefit sharing agreement with the 
resource provider, on the basis of MAT and PIC, before permission for access will be 
granted by the relevant competent authority.876  Once a permit has been granted under 
s. 13(1) of the Act, no change in use of the biological resources is allowed.  If the permit 
 
870 The provision also includes commercially available biological resources – ‘in the market’ 
871 ABRBS, s. 5(1) 
872 ABRBS, s. 5(1) 
873 ABRBS, s. S.5(2)(c) 
874 ABRBS, s.5(2)(g) 
875 ABRBS, s. 12(2)(i) 




holder wishes to change their use of a biological resource, they are required to make a 
new application and reacquire permission from the competent authority.877  The Act does 
not specify exactly what constitutes a change in use.  The significance of this is it will be 
necessary for permit holders to continue to reflect upon and evaluate whether their 
research is likely to have a commercial application throughout the research process.   
Applicants who wish to apply for access for non-commercial research can apply to 
the relevant competent authority, provided that: the applicant themselves is a non-profit 
organisation based or registered in Malaysia; local researchers are involved in the activity; 
and that a programme for capacity building is included in the activity.878  The necessary 
condition of the involvement of Malaysian researchers and/or organisations demonstrates 
the emphasis placed on developing Malaysia’s own ability to benefit from its genetic 
wealth.   Provided that these conditions are met, non-commercial access to biological 
resources or associated TK does not trigger automatic benefit sharing obligations under 
the Act, although indirect benefits will be achieved through the capacity building 
requirements.  Applicants who can satisfy the competent authority that the application is 
not for commercial purposes and that they have acquired PIC, should be able to access 
genetic resources.  Finally, no permission is required for non-commercial research carried 
out in Malaysia by, or on behalf of a public higher education institution, public research 
institution or government agency.879  This again reflects the priority placed upon Malaysia 
developing its own exploitation of its genetic resources.  The relevance of the distinction 
access for commercial and non-commercial purposes is considered in section 7.3.1 below. 
6.3.3.3 Prior informed consent 
 
Access to biological resources is subject to the requirement of prior informed 
consent.  However, the PIC requirement is limited to relevant indigenous and local 
communities, where the biological resource in question occurs on land to which the 
indigenous or local communities have a right established in law, or traditional knowledge 
 
877 ABRBS, s. 13(2) 
878 ABRBS, s. 15(2) 




that is held by a local or indigenous community.880  Beyond this, the Act does not impose 
a PIC requirement.  Both article 6.1 of the Nagoya Protocol and article 15.5 of the CBD 
refer to the ‘prior informed consent of the party providing such resources….unless 
otherwise determined by that party’. 
The Act does not set a standard or procedure for acquiring PIC, although it does 
dictate who is capable of giving informed consent.881  PIC must also be acquired in 
accordance with the customary laws and practices, protocols or procedures of the 
appropriate local or indigenous community.882   
The significance of this for agricultural development is that a plant variety which is 
not the subject of PVP will be brought within the scope of the ABRBS whereas a plant 
variety that has been granted PVP is not.  This creates a situation in which there is the 
potential for the same plant variety to be treated very differently under the regime 
dependent upon whether it is the subject of PVP.  Where it is not the subject to a breeders’ 
right, access to the biological resource will be controlled by the relevant competent 
authority (in conjunction with the appropriate local or indigenous communities, where 
relevant); whereas there is no such regulation of access to a variety which has been 
granted PVP.   It is worth remembering that a variety being the subject of PVP is not a 
requirement in order to sell that variety.  It is also relevant that plant variety protection 
continues to only be available for a limited number of genera in Malaysia.   Thus, it is 
possible for developed plant varieties to fall within the scope of the ABS regime.   
Therefore, it is possible that non-PVP varieties may be better off, in terms of benefit 
sharing, than PVP protected varieties, as the former requires some form of benefit sharing 
at the point of access. 
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6.3.3.4 Exception for protected plant varieties 
The access provisions of the Act do not apply to the taking of a biological resource 
for which plant variety protection has been granted and subsists under the protection of 
new varieties of plants act.883  This approach is also consistent with the Nagoya Protocol, 
as it requires states parties that require PIC for access to genetic resources to provide for 
legal certainty, clarity and transparency in their domestic ABS regime;884 the Protocol does 
not require states parties to automatically allow the genetic resources within their control 
to be accessed through the ABS regime.   It also treats plant varieties that are the subject 
of PVP as privately controlled inventions, rather than genetic resources.  This approach 
makes sense: the exclusion of protected plant varieties from the access requirements is 
in line with the UPOV exceptions to a breeders’ right, allowing for acts done privately and 
for non-commercial purposes, experimental purposes or for the purpose of breeding other 
varieties, which is reflected in the PNVP Act.885   
6.3.3.5 Benefits available under the ABRBS Act 
 
Under the act, any applicant for permission to access a biological resource or 
associated TK (for commercial or potentially commercial purposes) must enter into a 
benefit sharing agreement with the resource provider;886 this is to be on the basis of MAT 
and provide for fair and equitable benefit sharing.887  This provision echoes article 5.1 of 
the Nagoya Protocol. 
The Act prescribes that any monetary benefits paid under benefit sharing 
arrangements are to be deposited into a fund established by the state or federal 
government.888  If the Federal Government or State Authority is not the resource provider, 
they may require the applicant to pay a percentage of any monetary benefits arising under 
 
883 ABRBS, s. S.5(2)(h)(ii) 
884 NP, art. 6.3(a) 
885 UPOV 1991, art. 15(1); PNVP, s. 31(1) 
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the benefit sharing agreement.889  Any payment made is to be used towards the 
conservation of biodiversity and the sustainable use of its components.890 
The Act does not automatically prescribe monetary benefits; it merely sets out the 
format where financial benefits are the agreed method of benefit sharing.  Beyond this, 
the Act does not describe or prescribe any other means of direct benefit sharing.  It does 
not restrict the sharing of other benefits (such as those outlined in Annex I of the Nagoya 
Protocol) as a part benefit sharing arrangements; it merely means that determining where 
non-monetary benefits are appropriate is left to either be prescribed by state level ABS 
frameworks or to be agreed on a case by case basis in individual benefit sharing 
arrangements.  In the latter case, this means that reaching a fair benefit sharing 
arrangement will be dependent upon the negotiation skills of the parties to the agreement.  
In most cases, one of the parties will be the competent authority for the state in which the 
biological resource is found, and thus be in a relatively strong negotiating position, given 
the role of the competent authorities in granting permission for access to biological 
resources.  The scope of redistribution of benefits will be considered in section 7.3.1 below. 
6.3.3.6 Intellectual property protection under the ABRBS 
s. 31 of the Access to Biological Resources and Benefit Sharing Act requires anyone 
applying for a patent in relation to a biological product or traditional knowledge, whether 
in Malaysia or another state, to notify the National Competent Authority within thirty days 
of the application.  Failure to do so is an offence subject to imprisonment or a fine.891  The 
provision does not contain any reference to applications for plant variety protection.892  
The natural inference from this is that it is not legally necessary for those developing 
commercial plant varieties from biological resources accessed in Malaysia to notify the 
National Competent Authority of their application, either in Malaysia or overseas.  This 
 
889 ABRBS, s.22(3) 
890 ABRBS, s.22(5) 
891 Under s. 31(2), Individuals found to have contravened s.31(1) is liable for a fine not exceeding 100,000 
ringgit or a term of imprisonment not exceeding seven years or both; corporations responsible for contravening 
s.31(1) are liable for a fine not exceeding 500,000 ringgit. 




appears to create a gap in the regulation of access to and the monitoring of the use of 
Malaysia’s biological resources.   
There are a number of possible explanations for this: it may be because of the fact 
that the development of the PVP system in Malaysia has been a slow journey,893 and that 
its national seed market is juvenile.  Consequently, it is possible that the view has been 
taken that applications for PVP using biological material accessed in Malaysia would be 
quite limited, if any might be made at all.  However, this does not mitigate the fact that it 
is possible under the Act for plant variety protection to be acquired for a commercial plant 
variety developed using biological material acquired in Malaysia anywhere else in the 
world, without notifying the National Competent Authority.  Another possible explanation 
is that as a matter of priority, the drafters of the Act considered that the research and 
development using biological resources and TK in activities other than traditional plant 
breeding, such as pharmaceutical development, to be of greater concern for the holders 
of biological resources than traditional plant breeding.  This viewpoint may have some 
merit, as the ABS experiences in Malaysia have demonstrated that there is considerable 
interest in commercialising non-agricultural innovations based upon Malaysian biological 
resources.  However, this explanation only stretches so far, as the commercial production 
of non-agricultural products derived from Malaysian biological resources may require the 
upscaling in production of the biological resources from which they are derived.  This in in 
turn will likely require the plants from which those resources are derived to be developed 
in the same manner as industrial crops, which are often the subject of PVP.   
A further possible reason for the emphasis on patent applications over other forms 
of IP protection is that the standard of an inventive step required to acquire patent 
protection for genetic material varies significantly among states.  Thus, even though it 
may not be possible to acquire patent protection for certain biological inventions in 
Malaysia, it may be possible elsewhere.  If nothing else, the requirement to notify should 
 




provide the relevant authorities with information as to how Malaysian biological resources 
are being utilised, and where, beyond that supplied in the original access agreement. 
It is arguable that the effect of this gap is limited, as the successful acquisition of 
an IPR for an invention involving biological resources or traditional knowledge sourced in 
Malaysia does not trigger any additional benefit sharing obligation under the Act, beyond 
those specified in the original access license.  Furthermore, dependent upon how access 
agreements are framed in the individual states and federal territories, the obligation to 
notify upon application for plant variety protection may be imposed anyway. 
Indeed, s. 31 appears to be something of an odd provision, as while it requires 
applicants for patent protection to notify the National Competent Authority, it does not go 
any further.  It is neither a provision relating to access or benefit sharing; it is merely an 
additional requirement for those who are developing biological resources or traditional 
knowledge to undertake in order to maintain compliance with the law.  For context, the 
Nagoya Protocol refers to the distribution of intellectual property rights as a component of 
clear and mutually agreed terms for access to genetic resources;894 on paper, s.31 appears 
to be somewhat at odds with this.  
6.3.4 Access to Biological resources and benefit sharing in Sabah  
Access to genetic resources and traditional knowledge in Sabah is regulated by the 
Sabah Biodiversity Enactment 2000 (SBE).895  The Enactment establishes the Sabah 
Biodiversity Centre, which is responsible for, inter alia, managing and sustaining the 
utilisation of the biodiversity of the state896 and establishing a system for the protection of 
biological resources so that indigenous and local communities shall be recognised as the 
legitimate creators users and custodians of traditional knowledge.897  In also established 
the Sabah Biodiversity Council, whose functions include the regulation the access to 
 
894 NP, art. 6.3(g) 
895 No. 7 of 2000 
896 SBE, art. 9(1)(b) 




biological resources of the state, including the removal of biodiversity from the state898 
and to approve and issue access licenses for access to genetic resources.899 
An application for access to genetic resources is required for anyone wishing to 
conduct research in the state, regardless of whether they wish to collect biological 
material.900  Applicants are also obliged to name a local Malaysian institution as a 
collaborator in the research as a condition for an access license.901   The intention of this 
provision is that local institutions remain involved in research pertaining to biological 
resources originating in Sabah, and this stand to benefit from the research. 
Under the Enactment, the conditions for access are not subject to explicit benefit 
sharing obligations.  Applicants are required to provide details of any benefits, including 
economic, technical, social, scientific, environmental or other which the state or affected 
communities may receive as a product of the intended research and any proposed benefit 
sharing arrangements in their application for access to the Sabah’s biological resources.902  
It seems implied therefore that benefit sharing is a necessary condition for access to the 
state’s biological resources.  Thus, while the Sabah Biodiversity Enactment established a 
gatekeeping mechanism to protect the local and state interests in their biodiversity, it 
stops short of implementing a prescriptive benefit sharing requirement.   
The Enactment does not touch upon the issue of the commercialisation of 
developments based upon biological resources accessed in the state: commercialisation is 
defined within the scope of ‘access’ to biological resources,903 although applicants wishing 
to commercialise any information or developments resulting from an access activity are 
required to declare this on applying for a license.904  Nor does it make any reference to 
the issue of intellectual property rights over innovations developed from biological material 
accessed in the state.  It is interesting to note that in avoiding these issues, the approach 
taken in Sabah circumvents a number of the issues which impeded the development of a 
 
898 SBE, art. 8(2) 
899 SBE, art. 8(1) 
900 SBE, art. 16; this includes biological resources located on reserves, native customary lands or any sites over 
which indigenous and local communities exercise community-based or customary rights.           
901 SBE, art. 23 
902 SBE, art. 17(1)(b)(viii) 
903 SBE, art. 2 




national ABS framework under the CBD.  To that end, it provided a useful, intermediate 
solution which allowed the competent authority to serve as gatekeeper to the state’s 
biological resources and to implement benefit sharing arrangements of a discretionary 
basis.  The issue that arises as a result of only defining benefit sharing obligations as part 
of the access license is that it does not provide a guarantee of any benefits arising out of 
subsequent research activities or commercialisation, including the grant of IPRs if this is 
not anticipated by the terms of the original access licence.  Equally, access to biological 
resources under the Enactment does not explicitly operate on the basis of prior informed 
consent or mutually agreed terms.   Although concerning, this can be somewhat reconciled 
by the fact that access to biological resources is subject to the terms and conditions agreed 
by the competent authority.  This approach is in line with the MAT requirement contained 
in article 15.4 of the CBD.  Similarly, it can be argued that the terms and conditions for 
access can be viewed as the PIC of the contracting party, as is required by the CBD.905  
Although this does not necessarily equate to the PIC of the owners of the biological 
resources in question, this can be explained by the fact that this is a more recent 
development and is not referred to in the CBD.   However, in the absence of a national 
ABS framework, the protection afforded to Sabah’s biological resources by the Sabah 
Biodiversity Enactment is a noteworthy contribution to the regulation of access to genetic 
resources.  From the perspective of developing genetic resources, it serves to clarify 
researchers’ obligations in establishing consent for access to biological resources, although 
its failure to address IP concerns is potentially problematic.  This issue is considered further 
in section 7.3.1 below.  
6.3.5 Access to biological resources and benefit sharing in Sarawak 
 
The other Malaysian state to implement its own ABS regime is Sarawak.  It first 
passed the Sarawak Biodiversity Centre Ordinance (SBO) in 1997 and the Sarawak 
Biodiversity Regulations (SBR) in 1998.  As of 2016, the Biodiversity Regulations have 
 




been amended to incorporate the ABS standards of the Nagoya Protocol.906  Sarawak opted 
to create a responsible body, the Biodiversity Council, to inter alia, regulate and control 
public access to the state’s biological diversity.907  It also created the Sarawak Biodiversity 
Centre which acts not only as a gatekeeper to Sarawak’s biological resources, but also 
takes a proactive approach to investigating and documenting the biological diversity and 
associated traditional knowledge of the state.908 
Sarawak has opted to implement a more detailed legislative regime than in Sabah 
or under the ABRBS Act.  In terms of access to biological resources, the basic requirements 
are fairly standard909 and reflective of the international norms.  However, the Sarawak 
scheme possesses a number of noteworthy features.  First is the fact that permission is 
also subject to the requirement that applicants submit both a sample of the material that 
they have collected and a copy of the data, reports or manuscripts that have resulted 
therefrom.910  This is a rather clever inclusion that allows the Biodiversity Centre’s 
documentation project to be a passive beneficiary in any access agreement. 
Second, it is mandatory for a fair and equitable benefit sharing agreement to 
already be in place before a permit will be granted in cases where there is a likelihood of 
commercial use or the acquisition of intellectual property rights.911  This strong, clear and 
defined link serves to secure the interests of local stakeholders, especially given that the 
formation of the benefit sharing agreement is to take place prior to access.  It is also 
valuable for the consumers of biological resources to have their obligations dictated in 
such clear terms.    
Where this also involves the traditional knowledge associated with the biological 
resources in question, it is necessary to acquire the prior, informed consent of the 
natives912 in which that knowledge is vested, and that they be made beneficiaries to the 
 
906 Concerning benefit sharing, the latest version of the regulations has explicitly includes the same monetary 
and non-monetary benefits as are set out in Annex I to the Nagoya Protocol.   
907 SBO, s. 6 
908 SBO, s.6.  The centre currently operates five research programmes in support of its aims. 
909 SBR, s. 3-18 
910 SBR 6.2(f) 
911 SBR s. 14(1) 




benefit sharing agreement.913  Interestingly, the 2014 amendment to the Biodiversity 
Ordinance made the Biodiversity Council legally responsible for ensuring that such an 
agreement is concluded.914  This additional measure is a firm manifestation of the states’ 
commitment to ABS principle and serves as an additional safeguard for local and 
indigenous interests.  Furthermore, there is an assumption that, unless agreed otherwise, 
research and development that has the potential to result in commercial gain or intellectual 
property rights will take place in a Sarawak laboratory, institution or hospital unless 
specifically agreed with the Biodiversity Council.915 
The regulations also provide for community agreement where the resource at issue 
is their property.916  In addition, they set out detailed requirement for PIC, including inter 
alia, a minimum time period for considering the access request;917 that the relevant 
community understand the request;918 and that local cultural norms, customary rules and 
protocols are observed.919  The burden for ensuring that these requirements are observed 
is on the applicant.920  The level of detail of the requirements for PIC is evidence of the 
proactive approach to ABS taken by the Sarawak  government, and again, the plain and 
clear manner in which the requirements for access is set out in the regulations should 
serve not only the holders of biological resources and associated TK but also potential 
users. 
The regulations are explicit on the point of ownership of intellectual property: no 
one may claim IPRs over developments based upon biological material accessed in 
Sarawak unless entitled to do so under a pre-existing benefit sharing agreement;921  and 
then only with permission.922 They also establish right of the Sarawak government, as well 
 
913 SBR 14.1 
914 SBO, 6(bb) 
915 SBR 13(a) 
916 SBR s. 14.4 
917 SBR s. 22.1(b) 
918 ibid 
919 SBR s. 22.1(d) 
920 SBR s.22(2) 
921 SBR, s. 17.1; s. 33.1 




as the originators of the biological resources in question to benefit from any intellectual 
property rights or licensing agreements.923  This will be returned to in chapter seven. 
6.4 Summary  
The legislative framework pertaining to plant-based innovations in Malaysia contains 
some unique features which may serve to support development.  Intellectual property 
protection for plant-based innovations remains a separate, but interrelated concern to 
access to genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge.  While the future of the 
PNVP Act is uncertain at the moment, what can be said in the meantime is that it provides 
an interesting, hybrid system of plant variety protection.   The PNVP Act can be described 
as a hybrid approach, because it contains PVP that looks very much like the international 
standard (UPOV) alongside a unique sui generis approach.   On paper at least, these look 
like they should be able to fulfil a spectrum of plant breeders needs, including small and 
local breeders.   However, some evidence, such as the slow uptake, suggests that this 
might not be the case.  This will be considered in more depth in chapter seven.  With the 
overhanging threat of TRIPS plus agreement and with it, inevitable membership to UPOV 
1991 the question remains as to whether any future revisions to or replacement of the 
PNVP Act will still permit this degree of flexibility, or multiple types of plant variety 
protection to exist side by side and the answer is decidedly uncertain. 
Concerning Malaysia’s ABS framework, the recent Access to Biological Resources and 
Benefit Sharing Act appears promising.  It has fleshed out the ABS principle set out in the 
Nagoya Protocol in a manner that appears to have set the foundation for future ABS 
success.  It remains to be seen whether the seemingly wider flexibilities built into the 
ABRBS Act will actually prove to be so in practice.  Sarawak in particular, has managed to 
achieve a level of clarity in its ABS framework that should support the holders of genetic 
resources, the state government and end users at the same time.  However, this may in 
part be due to the fact that it predates the ABRBS Act considerably, and the regime has 
been gradually strengthened over a number of updates.  In order for the ABRBS Act to be 
 




truly successful, it needs to be more thoroughly and consistently implemented throughout 

















































Chapter 7 – Case study: developing the Bambara groundnut in Malaysia 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to return to the original research question: what role 
can intellectual property protection play in the development of underutilised crops?  This 
is realised by examining the legal frameworks considered thus far in the context of the 
development of underutilised crops and food security.  This is achieved through a case 
study focused upon the development of underutilised crops in Malaysia, and how those 
activities intersect with the legal framework.  The case study is informed by qualitative 
research.  This consisted of semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in underutilised 
crops and subsequent correspondence with participants.  Participants included crop 
scientists;924 food product development and quality professionals;925 experts in the field of 
intellectual property protection and access and benefit sharing in Malaysia; and officials 
from the Malaysian Plant Variety Protection Office.926  
The qualitative aspect serves to ground the analysis in the reality of developing 
underutilised crop varieties.  As is noted in the first chapter, this discussion is primarily 
focused on a single underutilised crop species, the Bambara groundnut.  Bambara is an 
effective lens through which to conduct the analysis, as it has potential for both 
subsistence and for commercial usage and therefore allows us to explore the range of 
related IP and ABS issues more fully.  
In the ideal version of this exercise, it would be possible to discuss the pertinent IP 
and ABS concerns using one example from start to finish, i.e., with one crop species.  
However, due to a range of factors, this has not been possible in this case.  Therefore, in 
order to fully explore the range of issues it has been necessary to draw upon a range of 
 
924 The term ‘crop scientists’ is used as an umbrella term here to encompass various crop related roles, 
including agronomists, crop geneticists, agricultural management experts, and crop technicians, among others. 
925 The term ‘food development product development and quality professionals’ refers to individuals whose 
roles is focused on post-harvest management and products developed from underutilised crops.  They form the 
link between the crops and the consumer and are necessary for the process of developing the Bambara 
groundnut as a possible means of addressing food security concerns. 
926 Interview participants have not been identified as a condition of participation.  Interview data has been used 
to compile the description of the crop development process.  It has also informed the theme and direction of 




examples.  This is achieved through a mixture of ethnographic descriptive text,927 drawn 
from a range of sources, with particular reference to qualitative interview data. The case 
study is structured as follows: the first part will contain the descriptive text which will 
highlight IP and ABS concerns.  This will be followed by a summary of the key IP and ABS 
concerns which will map out the discussion in the second part of the chapter. 
7.2.1 The role of the Bambara groundnut in Malaysia 
As is described in the first chapter,928 the Bambara groundnut is a highly nutritious, 
widely cultivated underutilised crop species, which is drought tolerant and is suitable for 
intercropping practices.929  To recap, although demographic data on small farmers in 
Malaysia is limited, there is a considerable scope for it to supplement subsistence 
agriculture. 
In addition to the direct consumption of Bambara and its role in subsistence 
agriculture, it is also a potential replacement for wheat flour and other similar ingredients 
in commercial food production. This potential is particularly relevant to Bambara’s role in 
addressing food security concerns in Malaysia: due to its high annual rainfall and low soil 
quality, the country’s agricultural land is almost entirely unsuitable for wheat cultivation. 
Malaysia is therefore heavily reliant upon imports of wheat flour. However, the climate in 
Malaysia is largely amenable to Bambara cultivation.  Bambara flour is also of a higher 
nutritional content than wheat based flour; therefore using Bambara as a substitute for 
wheat flour also has the benefit of improving nutritional security.  It is possible to 
substitute up to 50% of the wheat flour in many baked goods with Bambara flour without 
adversely affecting food products.  Thus, imported wheat flour could be significantly 
supplemented by locally sourced flour derived from Bambara groundnut.  Such a 
substitution would be in line with the food and nutritional security goals set out in the 
National Food Policy, by improving the nutritional content of food and decreasing 
 
927 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (4th ed., Oxford University Press, 2012) at 432  
928 See, section 1.3 above 
929 The term ‘intercropping’ refers to planting and cultivating a two or more crops in close proximity.  This is a 




dependence upon imported food.930  In order to make such a substitution possible, 
production farming of Bambara is required.  This will require a stable, commercially viable 
variety of the Bambara groundnut to be available.  
7.2.2 Developing Bambara in Malaysia 
  The first stage of developing new crop varieties is to acquire suitable germplasm.  
This can be achieved either through direct acquisition, through collaboration with other 
research projects or through gene banks.  Each of these methods introduces a potential 
ABS related access concern. 
The direct acquisition of genetic resources involves seeking out in situ samples of 
the crop varieties in question.  It is undertaken directly by the farmers or researchers 
developing new varieties of Bambara in Malaysia.  Direct acquisition by farmers is what 
would normally be conceived as traditional seed exchange practices.  Direct acquisition by 
breeder or researchers involves obtaining samples from local farmers and other locations 
where the crop can be found, such as farms, self-seeded plantings or wild relatives of the 
cultivated crop.  The information necessary to find samples is reliant upon word of mouth, 
i.e. through direct contact with farmers in a particular area, or through information 
provided by other researchers or previous encounters.  It is preferable to obtain both wild 
relatives and samples of farmed varieties of underutilised species931 for use in selective 
breeding programmes, as this will provide a larger pool of diverse genetic and physical 
traits. The process of obtaining sufficient genetic material through direct acquisition is 
inherently time consuming.  Once germplasm has been acquired, it is necessary to 
cultivate and reproduce the material in order to ensure that its traits are stable, as these 
will be the basis for its selection in breeding and development activities.  This process can 
take a number of years. 
Germplasm is also acquired through collaboration with other linked research 
projects.  In the case of Bambara, material is available through, local universities affiliated 
 
930 Ministry of Agriculture and Agro-based Industries Malaysia, Dasar Agromakanan Negara 2011-2020 
(National Food Policy) (Putrajaya, Malaysia, 15th December 2011) 




with the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA) involved in researching the 
crop in Nigeria, Ghana and Tanzania. This germplasm is acquired by the institutions as a 
result of their collaboration with local farmers. This exchange is mutually beneficial, as not 
only do local farmers provide researchers with germplasm, they also receive varieties 
through the collaboration.  
Direct acquisition is advantageous during the early stages of research as it can 
circumvent the need to secure import and export permits for germplasm acquired from 
gene banks.  This is not only a result of the bureaucratic weight of applying to the gene 
banks for access to the genetic material and for the relevant permits, it is also a result of 
extended time frame for acquiring germplasm suitable for development via this route. It 
can take between one to three years to access and acquire germplasm from a gene bank, 
quarantine and cultivate the material to the point where it is useful for further research 
activity.932  However, acquiring material through gene banks is advantageous as it offers 
guaranteed diversity which is highly useful at a later stage in the research, when the value 
of undertaking the research and development activity has been established.  This is 
relevant as it is necessary to establish the likely potential value of an underutilised crop 
species before investing time and resources into securing the necessary genetic diversity 
for productive breeding activities. 
After the acquisition of genetic material, it is necessary to plant and cultivate the 
seeds in order to provide a workable volume of material for the purposes of further 
breeding and selection processes.  It is also appropriate at this stage to evaluate the 
characteristics of the individual sample specimens.  At this point, it is then possible to 
cross germinate samples with other varieties based upon the desired characteristics as a 
part of the selective breeding development process.  This can take place either in a 
laboratory setting or through traditional field based selection.933  Desirable traits include: 
yield, both in terms of number of nuts produced and weight of nuts produced; protein 
 
932 Germplasm acquired either through gene banks or from overseas needs to be grown and reproduced under 
controlled conditions in the local climate as it may not survive direct exposure to the local conditions 
933 Both processes take around the same amount of time, approximately 5 months.  Lab based cross 
germination is a more costly process, however it has the advantage that it offers a greater degree of control 




content of nuts; the morphological traits of the plant, as this will impact upon whether a 
developed variety is suitable for a given growing environment;934 date of maturity of the 
crop; response to drought.  It is noteworthy that the desirable traits being assessed are 
those which are clearly linked to food and nutritional security concerns.  It is probable that 
selected samples will be subjected to multiple measures of evaluation.  Much of the on 
farm selection of Bambara is based around the colour of the seeds, although the link 
between the colour of the nuts and any nutritional or culinary advantage has not yet been 
established. 
Sample varieties then need to be bred and cultivated over several growth cycles.  
They are then tested using bio molecular techniques in order to ascertain whether the 
samples acquired actually provide genetic variance required for breeding purposes.  This 
is then scaled out into field trials, in order to assess the stability of a variety’s 
characteristics over several breeding cycles and in varying environmental conditions.  This 
process which may take a number of years and is essential to producing a variety that fits 
within the legal concept of a plant variety, as traditionally conceived.  Once the field trials 
are complete, it is possible to disseminate the newly developed variety among farmers.  If 
the variety is intended to be sold or grown commercially, it is at this stage that it would 
be appropriate to acquire plant variety protection for the newly developed variety.   
 As noted above in section 7.2.1, flour produced from the Bambara groundnut is a 
potential supplement for wheat flour in food production.  Should Bambara flour or other 
Bambara based products prove successful, it will become necessary to upscale production.  
This would involve contracting commercial growers so that sufficient quantities can be 
cultivated for food production purposes.  Therefore, it is advantageous for developers to 
acquire intellectual property protection, such as plant variety protection, over their new 
variety in order to protect their investment and research efforts. 
The development of a new variety raises the issue as to how the benefits arising 
out of its development are distributed.  In the case of a variety that has been 
 
934 For example, varieties of Bambara which spread as they grow are useful as a coverage crop; whereas more 




commercialised and maybe the subject of intellectual property protection, this will invoke 
direct benefit sharing obligations. The absence of a commercialised variety however, does 
not mean that there are not benefits linked to plant variety development activities.  In 
fact, given the somewhat circular nature of plant breeding and development, those 
benefits may directly feed into the crop development process.  This is the case for benefits 
which do not arise out of a specific ABS agreement, such as those available under the 
Multilateral System of the International Treaty for Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture, which are redirected on the basis of calls for funding.  Thus far, two projects 
have been funded under the MLS in Malaysia.  The first is focused on the development of 
Bambara.  While the second is centred around a different underutilized crop species (taro), 
the rubric of the project is more specific to Malaysia and it highlights different aspects of 
the ABS dynamic.  An outline of the projects follows.  
7.2.3 Benefit sharing projects funded in Malaysia 
 The first project to be funded through the benefit sharing mechanism in Malaysia 
concerned the Bambara groundnut and received funding in 2014.935 The research 
undertaken as part of this project is linked with the discussion of the development of the 
Bambara groundnut that forms the wider theme of this research.  The aim of the project 
is to, inter alia, conserve, develop and evaluate the crop’s genetic diversity and are a step 
towards developing climate change tolerant varieties that will be capable of producing 
yields in agricultural land that is unsuitable for major crops.   The research used material 
sourced from farmers’ landraces, recently developed novel lines and crosses and varieties 
hosted by gene banks.  The project is a multi-country co-development and transfer of 
technology project936 which involves research institutions and personnel in Ghana, 
 
935 The title of the project is: ‘Genetic trait characterisation of farmer and gene bank sources of Bambara 
groundnut for the development of drought tolerant lines in sub-Saharan Africa and South East Asia’.  FAO, ‘Full 
project proposal: Third call for proposals under the Benefit Sharing Fund’ (2014) available at: 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/faoweb/plant-treaty/Project-Proposals/W3B-PR-26-Malaysia_-
_Technical_Proposal.pdf (accessed: 15th July 2020) 
936 Under the third call for applications to the Benefit Sharing Fund, applicants were invited to apply either as 
an ‘Immediate Action Project’; these projects could receive up to 300,000 USD over three years for a single 
country application or up to 800,000 USD over three years as multi country application; or applications could 
be made as a ‘Co-development and transfer of technology project’ which were eligible to receive up to 150,000 





Indonesia, Malaysia and Nigeria, and on farm development in Ghana, Indonesia and 
Nigeria.  It aims to increase overall food security in these regions, through developing and 
distributing improved lines of Bambara, which are drought resistant and possess other 
useful traits such as pest resistance and shorter cooking time.937  The newly improved 
genetic material achieved through these research and development activities will be 
contributed to the gene banks of the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) 
and all seed will be made publicly available with an emphasis on distributing the seed to 
resource poor farmers.  The germplasm will be available for wider release upon the 
completion of the project.  The information generated on the Bambara groundnut and its 
cultivation by the project will contribute to the information exchange aim of the ITPGRFA. 
The genetic material used in this project is acquired from a mixture of sources, 
including directly from farmers involved in the project and accessions to the gene banks 
of the IITA.  The material is refined through a breeding and growing process in which it is 
planted and grown both on farm and in controlled conditions.  Varieties are selected for 
development on the basis of trait selection and their responses to cultivation conditions.  
The process of evaluating and developing the varieties necessarily incorporates both the 
traditional agricultural knowledge (TK) adjacent to the varieties involved in the project and 
the observations made by the farmers and growers during the project.  This includes not 
only knowledge about the characteristics of the varieties, but also knowledge pertaining 
to optimal growth management, and the interaction between the crop genotype and 
various environments.  The selection of valuable traits relies upon a cycle of feeding 
information back into the development process.  This knowledge will be formalised over 
the course of the development process through conducting controlled field trials, which 
render the feedback and other agricultural knowledge into scientific data.  Throughout this 
process, the transfer of material between crop scientists and farmers continues to take 
place.  This particular project does not have a specific end goal; rather it is aimed towards 
the overall improvement of the quality and availability of Bambara germplasm, the only 
 
937 Shorter cooking time is identified as one of the key concerns affecting uptake of the crop.  It will help food 
and financial security concerns by reducing associated food and labour costs.  It also mitigates the 




restriction is that funding support from the benefit sharing mechanism is only available for 
a set period of time. 
The second underutilised crop development project based in Malaysia was funded 
under the fourth call for proposals of the benefit sharing fund in 2018.938  The project is 
centred on research and development of Taro (colocasia esculenta)939 and is being 
undertaken by MARDI.940  Malaysia is in the early stages of promoting the wider cultivation 
of taro as a staple crop.  The purpose of the project is to strengthen and sustain on farm 
and community level conservation, utilisation and management of taro genetic resources.  
The project is multi-country in nature, and will take place across Fiji, Indonesia, Malaysia 
and the Philippines.  It will use traditional taro varieties.  These will be cultivated and 
screened for cultivars with promise for climate change mitigation and resilience to pests, 
diseases and drought and saline tolerance.  Existing research on varieties sampled in 
Malaysia has predominantly taken place in Peninsular Malaysia.  The project will involve 
on farm evaluation of local and farmers’ varieties based upon a participatory approach; 
this will include surveying traditional knowledge concerning taro production and post-
harvest management in order to establish best farming practices.   The intended 
beneficiaries of the project are the small scale farmers who grow the crop for subsistence 
and potentially commercial purposes; the availability and redistribution of improved 
germplasm is intended to aid the development of domestic and export markets for the 
crop. 
 
938 Under the calls for proposals to the Benefit Sharing Fund, applicants were able to apply as either a single 
country or a multi country project.  Single country projects can apply for up to 250,000 USD on the fourth 
cycle.  Multi country projects can apply for up to 450,000 USD on the fourth cycle.   
939 Taro is a starchy root vegetable and one of the most ancient cultivated crops.  It is included in Annex I to 
the ITPGRFA as one of the 64 most important crops; it continues to be a staple crop in the Asia Pacific region.  
High end estimates suggest that up to 500 million people are dependent upon the crop as a part of their 
dietary requirements.  It can grow in marginal soils and can be cultivated under variable climatic conditions, 
and can be successfully cultivated on small farms of less than 0.25 ha (0.61 acres).  This makes it particularly 
suitable for subsistence farming; it is popular in Indonesia, the Philippines and Fiji for this purpose. 
940 FAO, ‘Conservation and sustainable utilization of Taro to increase food security and livelihood in 
marginalised communities faced with climate change: Fourth call for proposals of the Benefit Sharing Fund’ 




7.2.4 IP/ABS related issues arising out of the development of the Bambara 
ground nut in Malaysia 
From sections 7.2.2. and 7.2.3 above, it is possible to identify a number of key 
areas to examine while considering the suitability the Malaysian ABS/IP framework for 
developments in underutilised crop varieties.  The first set of concerns pertain to access 
to genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge.  This can be divided into direct 
access, and indirect access through collaboration or partnership.  Direct access to genetic 
material falls within the scope of the principles established by the Nagoya Protocol as 
embodied by the Access to Biological Resources and Benefit Sharing Act and the 
corresponding state ABS frameworks.  It has to be noted that, it is not possible to entirely 
separate access and benefit sharing obligations from one another, and indeed, it is 
arguable that the existence of benefit sharing can be viewed as a measure of the success 
of access requirements.  To that end, where benefit sharing is directly related to access to 
genetic resources, it will be considered alongside it. 
The second concern is how suitable the intellectual property rights available in 
Malaysia are for developments in underutilised crop varieties. The two forms of plant 
variety protection available in Malaysia are considered in turn.  Third, there are benefit 
sharing considerations which are not necessarily directly linked to access to genetic 
resources or associated TK.  These benefit sharing activities, feedback directly back into 
the research and development of new plant varieties, or biological products.  Thus, the 
sharing of benefits continues to support research and development. The analysis that 
follows will reflect this structure of concerns.  
7.3.1 Issues arising out of access to genetic resources 
 
Direct access falls within the scope of the ABRBS Act, and depending upon location, 
the Sabah Biodiversity Enactment and the Sarawak Biodiversity Regulations. As is noted 
in section 7.2.2, direct access is a preferred method of acquisition during the early stages 
of research and development, as it allows the collection potentially wide variety of samples, 
and is theoretically quicker and less bureaucratic than accessing material through gene 




taking a biological resource from where it is kept, grown or found for the purposes of 
research and development.941  This concept is fairly straightforward.  However, the next 
stage becomes more complex, as the ABRBS Act distinguishes between research and 
development for commercial (including potentially commercial) and non-commercial 
purposes and imposes different obligations upon the party accessing the biological 
resources accordingly.  Anyone engaging in commercial or potentially commercial research 
is required to have entered into a benefit sharing agreement with the relevant competent 
authority before a permit to access the resources is granted.942  The Act does not define 
commercial or potentially commercial purposes, however it does define ‘non-commercial’ 
as academic or non-profit oriented.943   
Although this distinction looks relatively clear-cut on paper, in the context of the 
development activities described above, it can be seen that it is not so straightforward.  
The argument can be made that users of biological resources should err on the side of 
caution, and assuming that any research and development activity that has any possibility 
of resulting in a commercial development should be treated as such.  However, we can 
see in section 7.2.2 above, that in the initial stages of the research, which includes the 
stage in which the material is being collected, the value of the exercise may well be 
unknown.  Collected samples of plant genetic material have the potential to prove useless 
for the breeding activities for which they were intended. Thus, the suggestion that anyone 
undertaking research and development involving biological resources that may have 
remote potential commercial value, could create a significant burden for researchers at 
the risk of no reward.  It also means that there may be no advantage for researchers to 
undertake the direct collection of germplasm.  If the administrative efforts required to 
access local germplasm are too great, then it simply will not provide any advantage for 
developers over using material accessed through indirect means, such as through seed 
banks, as material acquired through seed banks has the advantage of guaranteeing a 
certain quality of samples. 
 
941 SBE, art 15; SBR, art. 4  
942 ABRBS, s. 12.2(a), S. 22(1) 




This is not intended to criticise this framing too harshly, as it is clearly intended to 
serve the interests of Malaysian owners of biological resources.  However, if there is a 
presumption that the use of genetic resources will be commercial, then this needs to be 
supported by a simple ABS framework that makes clear the obligations of users and is 
widely accessible.  Progress towards this can be seen in the ABS frameworks in Sabah and 
Sarawak; however, this is not matched in peninsular Malaysia.  The need for an accessible 
ABS framework is central to supporting research and development utilizing genetic 
resources, including developments in underutilised crop species.  Difficulties in 
understanding the obligations linked to accessing genetic resources were repeatedly cited 
by research scientists as an obstacle to research and development, especially in the early 
stages.944  This included both the clarity of the pertinent legal framework and the relevant 
administrative arrangements.  The discrepancies in the federal arrangement were also 
cited as a factor; as crop development activity taking place in one part of Malaysia will 
frequently rely upon resources gathered in another state or federal territory.  
The effect of this is that it curbs the material gathering activities that researchers 
are willing to undertake; as they did not wish to fall afoul of their ABS obligations.945  
Participants also commented that they did not understand how their obligations had 
changed specifically as a result of the introduction of the ABRBS Act.  This was especially 
true in the case of associated traditional knowledge, as the ABS provisions pertaining to 
accessing TK were considered to be more nebulous, both in terms of what constituted TK 
and in terms of what might constitute a use of that TK.946  Indeed, some participants 
suggested that in situations where they were certain that they were able to take and use 
physical samples of genetic resources, they would still actively avoid discussing farming 
and breeding practices with its owners in order to ensure compliance.  This was the case 
even where farmers or owners were willing to share their insights.  It is particularly 
interesting to note researchers concerns about mishandling TK, as in Malaysia traditional 
knowledge is defined as knowledge originating in a specific group.  This indicates quite 
 
944 Participant comments; Interview January 2019 
945 Participant comment; Interview January 2019 




clearly that there is a need for wider understanding as to what is classified as traditional 
knowledge.   
This is unfortunate for research and development involving underutilised crops, as 
this lack of understanding of ABS obligations appears to be serving to limit access not only 
to necessary biological resources, but also to agricultural knowledge that may prove useful 
whilst being confident that they are not infringing their ABS obligations.  As a consequence, 
this has the effect of limiting or reducing their potential to help address food security 
concerns.  It also prevents benefits from feeding back into the development cycle.  It is 
important to note that this does not necessarily mean that the ABS framework is failing 
here.  It seems more likely that this indicates a lack of outreach or education by the 
relevant authorities to ensure that the potential users of biological resources are aware of 
their ABS obligations.  Without effective awareness of these, it is difficult to further gauge 
whether the access requirements under the ABRBS Act serve to support of limit research 
and development.   
There are two branches to indirect access to biological resources.  The first is access 
to material from an institution, and the second is access to material through a facilitating 
institution.  Accessing material for development through gene banks or associated 
institutions requires little comment as it is based upon an established process - material 
transfer agreements, in particular, the standard material transfer agreement established 
under the multilateral system to the ITPGFRA.  The main barrier to accessing this material 
is appropriate expertise to navigate the application and potentially the bureaucracy 
associated with importing or exporting the material, or moving it between states.  
However, despite this, participants with the relevant expertise commented that generally, 
this process was straightforward, if time consuming.  It was noted that this method was 
essential to the continuation of established Bambara research programmes.947  It is 
therefore fairly obvious to state that the greater availability of germplasm facilitated 
through the MLS serves to support developments in underutilised crop species and in turn, 
 




helps to address food security concerns, even if the mechanism is only useful to a 
restricted group of applicants. 
The alternative means of indirect access to biological resources through an 
intermediary institution, such as through the Sabah or the Sarawak biodiversity centre.948  
This overlaps somewhat with direct access to biological resources.  To a large extent, this 
is the type of access that appears to be envisioned by the ABS framework.  Both of these 
institutions appear to have clear and accessible systems for applying for access permits 
either for the collection of material found in the state or in their collections.949  It was 
noted earlier that participants, in this case researchers, had difficulty understanding their 
obligations when it came to their treatment of genetic material and associated traditional 
knowledge, and therefore adjusted their behaviour accordingly.  However, the same 
participants remarked that they had no issues either with understanding the need for, or 
the means of obtaining an access permit.  These points appear to be somewhat at odds 
with one another.  This juxtaposition is interesting, as it serve to pin point where the ABS 
framework is troublesome for the users of biological resources.  If users understand the 
necessity of permission for access, but have difficulty navigating their behaviour towards 
biological resources and its holders while conducting research, then it seems that the 
critical area in which improvements could be made that would facilitate access to and use 
of biological resources is the clarification of the obligations and restrictions placed upon 
users.  The ABRBS Act does not govern users’ behaviour towards biological material that 
they have accessed, beyond the general principles of ABS.  Similarly, the Sarawak 
Biodiversity Regulations does not establish any specific behavioural obligations for 
researchers beyond the general principles of access and benefit sharing and the normally 
applicable restrictions, such as permit requirements, regulation of exports or rights over 
discoveries.950  Nor does the Sabah Biodiversity Enactment.  Rather, what seems to be 
 
948 Also relevant is the genetic material stored by MARDI.  However, the genetic material held by MARDI is 
primarily contains industrial crops.  
949 Sabah Biodiversity Centre, ‘Access License Application’ available at: 
https://sabc.sabah.gov.my/content/access-licence-application (accessed 15th July 2020); Sarawak Online 
Research Application System; available at https://www.sbc.org.my/research-regulations-permit/research-
permit-application (15th July 2020) 




missing is a broader, general understanding of users’ obligations towards biological 
resources.   
What appears to be the most explicit direction as to users’ obligations is the 
requirement in Sarawak to notify the Biodiversity Council in the case that a discovery is 
made based upon biological resources accessed in the state.951  The phrasing of the 
provision is such that: 
 
 ‘where research and development leads to the discovery of any compound, chemical or 
curative agent, molecule or product which has pharmaceutical, medicinal, therapeutic, nutritional, 
industrial or agricultural value, properties or potential, the person or body undertaking the research 
shall notify the Chief Executive Officer and an application for intellectual property rights in regard to 
the discovery shall be made in accordance with the benefit sharing agreement’. 
 
This provision is interesting because it does describe a specific obligation of users 
towards biological resources they have accessed; a duty to notify once a discovery is 
made.  However, the formulation of this provision is fairly vague.  Presumably, the 
development of a crop variety is considered to be a ‘product’ as none of the other 
descriptors fits well.  At least on paper, the triggering requirement does not fit well with 
the agricultural research and development paradigm that is being explored here.  As is 
explored in section 7.2.3 above, the process of developing viable crop varieties takes place 
over several breeding cycles and it is not always possible to determine the impact or 
influence of specific genetic material on the resultant variety.  Similarly, the use of 
agricultural knowledge in the development of crop varieties is a process of feeding 
information into the breeding and development process.  It is not necessarily possible to 
weigh the value of individual contributions.  There is the possibility that the original use of 
the material and the commercially viable variety may be separated by years of 
development.  In the same vein, it is unlikely that there is a triggering moment in which 
 




the value of any particular biological or knowledge based contribution to the breeding 
process becomes apparent.   
The complexity of these issues, combined with the fact that they are likely to 
change on a case by case basis, is presumably the very reason why they are not more 
comprehensively addressed in the legislative and regulatory framework.  It can also be 
argued that these details are absent from the legislative and regulatory provisions because 
it is intended to be determined on an individual contractual basis, as an access agreement 
is effectively a contractual mechanism.  However, the two ideas are not mutually exclusive. 
It is possible to develop general principles or guidelines governing the behaviour of users 
towards biological resources and to impose specific obligations through individual ABS 
agreements.  More importantly, this would need to be supported by some form of outreach 
or educational programme, to make sure that this information is communicated.  This 
aspect is critical, as it is a lack of understanding that needs to be addressed. Greater 
certainty in this regard would surely serve to help address food security concerns, as 
addressing researchers concerns and encouraging their use of Malaysia’s biological 
diversity will provide a wider resource base for the development of new crop varieties and 
increase the likelihood of the development of new and useful crop varieties.  It would 
further serve to safeguard the interests of the holders of biological resources.  
Furthermore, based upon the comments made that researchers would actively avoid 
engaging in discussion with the holders of biological resources, it might serve to facilitate 
the incorporation of agricultural traditional knowledge in to the research and development 
process.   
A linked but separate issue is the requirement under the ABRBS Act, to distinguish 
between commercial and non-commercial use.  It has already been noted that based upon 
the definitions of commercial and non-commercial use in the ABRBS Act, it seems to be 
necessary to assume that a use of biological resources is commercial unless undertaken 
by certain applicants and that such applications require a benefit sharing arrangement to 
be in place as a condition of access.  This strict construction has the potential to be 




particularly crop variety development, as we have already explored, the viable commercial 
product may be considerably distant in time from the accessed biological resources.  At 
the point of access, the utility of any given biological resources for variety development 
remains unknown. 
There is limited evidence as to how this challenge might be navigated.  It is useful 
to consider how this has been addressed by existing benefit sharing arrangements; 
however, there are few examples to draw upon.  Indeed, the only benefit sharing 
agreement that has been concluded in Malaysia since its implementation of the Nagoya 
Protocol concerns access to Litsea Cubeba or LitSara, as it has since been trademarked.952   
The agreement is between the Sarawak Biodiversity Centre and five indigenous 
communities.953  Although the exact terms of the benefit sharing agreement are 
confidential, it is publicly known that it pertains to the use of litsea in product development 
and the sustainable harvesting of litsea.  It is unfortunate that the confidential nature of 
the benefit sharing arrangement limits the extent to which it is possible to extrapolate, 
more generally, how benefit sharing arrangements might work out.  Although the 
intellectual property right associated with LitSara, the trademark of the name, is registered 
to the Sarawak government,954 in line with the Sarawak Biodiversity Regulations, the 
Sarawak Biodiversity Centre has declined to comment on the how the benefits arising out 
of the sales of trademarked goods might be distributed.  This prevents us from engaging 
in a detailed analysis of how the agreement reflects the six elements IP aspects of 
successful and effective benefit sharing identified by WIPO.955  It is however, interesting 
to note that the approach taken by this benefit sharing agreement, i.e. that the trademarks 
 
952 Litsea Cubeba is a member of the laurel family which thrives in the wild in Sarawak.  Locally known as 
pahkak or tenem, different parts of the plant are traditionally used by the indigenous people of Sarawak for a 
number different of purposes, including as a flavouring for food or as a natural medicinal remedy for 
stomachache or back ache.  The essential oil derived from the plant is trademarked as LitSara for Sarawak. It 
has a range of uses, including personal care products which are free from additives, such as antibacterial wet 
wipes, natural insect repellent, body wash, cleansing oils and soap.   
953 the Bidayuhs of Kpg Kiding, Padawan; the Lun Bawangs of Long Telingan and Long Kerebangan, Lawas; and 
the Kelabits of Pa’Ukat and Pa’Lungan.  
954 LitSara has been trademarked in a number of categories for various products.  See, ‘Intellectual property 
rights: LitSara trademark’ available at: https://www.litsara.com/index.php/r-d/intellectual-properties 
(accessed: 15th July 2020) 




are held by the Sarawak government, is in line with WIPO’s suggestion that it may not be 
appropriate for government agencies to apply for IPRs jointly with resource holders. 
What we do know about the LitSara benefit sharing agreement is that it did not 
emerge overnight.  In fact, the benefit sharing agreement was the product of a relationship 
established and developed between the Biodiversity Centre and the resource holders over 
a period of several years, and which involved multiple periods of consultation and feedback 
from the resource holders, including on how the benefits are distributed.956 
The LitSara case is not wholly applicable to the crop development paradigm being 
considered here, as it pertains to the development of biological resources and traditional 
knowledge at least partially undertaken by the Sarawak Biodiversity Centre itself.   It is 
also different from the crop development paradigm in the sense that some of the 
applications of LitSara are established in the traditional knowledge of the resource holders.  
Nonetheless, it brings into focus a significant distinction between ABS on paper and in 
practice: that access to biological resources is not necessarily a one-off event, and that 
the successful negotiation of a benefit sharing agreement may take a considerable period 
of time.  Thus, while a benefit sharing agreement may come first on the literal meaning of 
the legislative provisions, the reality of investigating the potential of biological resources 
is a process and it is possible that the benefit sharing arrangement may come about after 
the potential of the biological resources has been established. 
 Prior to its adoption of its ABS framework, the Sarawak government was also party 
to a series benefit sharing agreement concerning calanolides.957  Calanolides are naturally 
occurring compounds that can be isolated from trees indigenous to Sarawak, and have 
anti-HIV properties.  They were discovered as the result of a bioprospecting expedition.958  
Although there was no ABS framework in place in 1986, a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) was reached between the NCI and the Department of Forestry of Sarawak, allowing 
 
956 Personal communication, Sarawak Biodiversity Centre (February 2019) 
957 Calanolide A is derived from Calophyllum lanigerum var austrocoriaceum, a rare member of the Guttiferae 
or mangosteen family.  The samples were obtained from the forests near Lundu, in the south of Sarawak.  
Forest Department of Sarawak, ‘The Calophyllum Story’ available at: https://forestry.sarawak.gov.my/page-0-
170-603-The-Calophyllum-story.html (accessed: 15th July 2020) 
958 The bioprospecting expedition was undertaken by the National Cancer Institute, a branch of the National 




the study and supply of the material. However, the Sarawak State government was 
unhappy with the distribution of benefits arising from the MOU.959  The agreement was 
renegotiated by a legal team led by the State Attorney General and the assistant director 
of research of the Forestry department.  The new MOU set out detailed terms for the 
contentious aspects of the agreement, including capacity building future financial benefits 
and intellectual property rights.960  Subsequently, a synthetic route to producing 
calanolides was developed.  Per the terms of the MOU, this triggered the negotiation of a 
benefit sharing agreement between the company developing potential pharmaceutical 
products from the synthetic calanolides and the Sarawak Government.  The ad hoc benefit 
sharing agreement took over a year to be negotiated and included provisions which 
distributed future intellectual property rights and resulting royalties allowed for continued 
local involvement though capacity building.961 
Although the calanolide example does not exactly parallel the agricultural research 
and development paradigm, it perhaps resembles it more closely than the LitSara benefit 
sharing agreement, as it is an outside party seeking to access biological resources through 
the local institutions.  It highlights two relevant points. First, that the commercial viability 
of a development changes over time and with research.  Second, it reiterates the 
significance of a continued relationship between the institutional and the developers in 
negotiating a successful benefit sharing agreement. 
It is arguable that two examples are insufficient to draw truly meaningful 
conclusions.  However, what can be taken away from these examples is the importance of 
the dialogue between the holders of the biological resources at issue and the potential 
 
959 In particular, the distribution of the future potential benefits of the research and development activities.  At 
issue were intellectual property concerns, including patents and right to issue licenses for subsequent drug 
developments, as well as other financial benefits from the use of the biological resources, including royalty 
payments.  See, n957 above, confirmed in communication with Sarawak Biodiversity Centre, February 2019.  
960 The agreement included, inter alia, co-inventorship and the distribution of the financial benefits arising out 
of the use of the compounds for research and provided for the future payment of royalties should a drug be 
synthesized from the compound.   It also included capacity building provisions, including creating the obligation 
for the NCI to assist the state in the development of local capability to undertake isolation, screening, 
fractionation and structural elucidation of naturally occurring compounds - capability with the potential to 
support further local investigation and development of the state’s biodiversity. 
961 Mohamad Osman, ‘Malaysia: Recent Initiatives to Develop Access and Benefit-Sharing Regulations’ in 
Santiago Carrizosa, Stephen B. Brush, Brian D. Wright & Patrick E. McGuire (eds.) Accessing Biodiversity and 





user.  Nonetheless, it is important that we note that they are relaying the same message 
about the process of access. Namely, that the situation is not as black and white as it 
appears in the legislation.  Rather than being a onetime transaction, it might be more 
appropriately viewed as a dialogue.  This is particularly true in cases where an actual 
product does come to fruition.  
7.3.2 Issues pertaining to intellectual property protection  
 
7.3.2.1 - The suitability of plant variety protection under s. 14(1) for 
innovations in underutilised crops 
 
As discussed in chapter 6, s. 14(1) of the PNVP Act contains the Malaysian 
formulation of traditional plant variety protection and conforms closely to the international 
standard.  There is nothing about this per se which prevents it from being useful in 
supporting the development of underutilised crop varieties. The availability of PVP can 
provide an incentive for the development of crop varieties, and the acquisition of a plant 
breeders’ right over a variety is arguably a necessary measure if the developer of a crop 
variety wishes to use their variety for any kind of food production.  This is relevant to 
Bambara’s potential to be used in commercial food production or as a supplement for 
imported food supplies such as wheat flour.  This is reflective of the traditional justification 
for the existence of intellectual property protection:  the availability of PVP serves to assure 
developers that their efforts and investment are protected.  Along these lines, the 
availability of IP protection for underutilised crop varieties can help address food and 
nutritional security concerns by protecting breeders’ rights while facilitating the 
commercialisation of underutilised varieties. 
The difficulty with applying conventional plant variety protection to underutilised 
crop varieties is that the availability of PVP is dependent upon the availability of DUS Test 
Guidelines for the variety in question.  Due to the fact of being underutilised, it is unlikely 
that DUS Test Guidelines are available for any given underutilised species.  Test guidelines 
are not available for the Bambara groundnut in Malaysia.  This effectively renders 




Guidelines severely limits the utility of conventional plant variety protection for supporting 
the development of underutilised crop species. 
The development and implementation of test guidelines by the PVP Office generally 
follows greatest perceived need: i.e. where there is greatest commercial need.  This is 
reflected by the species for which guidelines are already available.  For example, test 
guidelines exist for a number of ornamental species which have considerable export 
value.962  Thus, the onus falls upon developers to work with the PVP office in order to 
establish the need for guidelines for a particular species. 
It is important to note here that DUS test guidelines are not normally developed in 
isolation.  In Malaysia, they are usually developed with reference to existing UPOV test 
guidelines, or alongside other states’ PVP bodies, in particular, members of the EAPVP.963  
This means that one option is to look for guidelines elsewhere; if these are available then 
this will considerably streamline the process of developing and implementing Test 
Guidelines in Malaysia.  A systematic search has failed to turn up test guidelines for the 
Bambara.964  This is not particularly surprising given its status as a niche crop.  Thus, any 
hope for PVP under s. 14(1) supporting innovations in underutilised crop species would be 
dependent upon the development of new, suitable guidelines.  Given the fact that the 
Malaysian PVP system is still in the process of getting on its feet, especially where the 
development of test guidelines is concerned, it is unlikely that the development of test 
guidelines for niche crop species will become a priority for the Plant Variety Protection 
Office in the near future.  If we recall that in terms of underutilised crop species, Bambara 
is in fact widely cultivated, this does not leave much scope for traditional plant variety 
protection to support innovations in lesser cultivated underutilised and niche crop species.  
This assertion can be extended to apply beyond Malaysia.  Whilst it is difficult to generalise 
given the unique situations of individual states and their PVP systems, traditional UPOV 
style plant variety protection is relatively homogenous.  Therefore, it can be stated with a 
considerable degree of certainty that the absence of appropriate test guidelines precludes 
 
962 These are: Dendrobium, Chrysanthemum, Lily, Mokara and Vanda 
963 Personal communication, Department of Agriculture (February 2019) 




traditional PVP from supporting developments in underutilised crops or being a useful tool 
for addressing food security concerns. 
7.3.2.2 The suitability of plant variety protection under s. 14(2) for innovations 
in underutilised crops 
 
On paper, the possibility of PVP for traditional and farmers’ varieties provides a 
useful opportunity for developments in underutilised crops, as it offers the potential for 
farmers, local communities and indigenous people to protect and exploit varieties that they 
have bred or discovered and developed.  Thus, by virtue of the comprehensive nature of 
the protection afforded traditional and farmers’ varieties under the PNVP Act, it has the 
potential to encourage developments in subsistence agriculture and support local food 
security by offering the breeders of these varieties the same IPR as commercial breeders. 
The criterion of ‘identifiable’ has the potential to be particularly useful as it allows 
traditional and farmers’ varieties to be assessed without reference to DUS test guidelines; 
it may also allow local environmental factors to be accommodated in assessing an applicant 
variety.  In the case of the Bambara groundnut, it would be possible for applicants to 
register their variety on the basis of identifiable traits, such as colour, seed size or plant 
morphology.  The registration of the variety is then able to serve as an assurance of seed 
quality, in addition to protecting the breeder’s interests.  
It is unfortunate that any opportunity offered by s. 14(2) is strictly hypothetical.  
To date, no farmers, local communities or indigenous peoples have applied to protect their 
plant varieties under s. 14(2).965  Because of this, it is not possible to truly scrutinise the 
utility of the alternative criteria of new, distinct and identifiable for developments in 
underutilised crops.  The fact that no applications have been received also means that it 
is not possible to assess whether there are practical or technical barriers to registering a 
traditional or farmers’ variety.   
However, the lack of uptake does not necessarily mean that the form of the 
alternative PVP as expressed in the PNVP Act is in itself inappropriate.  It is useful to 
consider the possible reasons for the lack of uptake of PVP under s. 14(2).  The Plant 
 




Variety Protection Office (PVPO) has suggested that where farmers are interested in 
registering a variety for the purposes of commercialisation, then they have applied for 
conventional PVP under s. 14(1).966  This suggests that where farmers are aware of the 
benefits of registering a variety, they are also sufficiently knowledgeable about the 
technical requirements of conventional plant variety protection.  The lack of applications 
from local communities and indigenous peoples may be the result of practical difficulties 
experience in making those groups aware of the availability of plant variety protection for 
their varieties; it also may be a consequence that potential applicants have not yet been 
convinced of the benefits of registering their varieties.  Participants have indicated that 
both are relevant factors, with emphasis on the latter.  If this is the case, then we can 
conclude that it is the implementation and operation of the PNVP Act that is the issue, 
rather than its content.  Indeed, conducting effective outreach programmes has been cited 
as a significant challenge to the implementation of the PNVP Act.967 
 Participants have also observed that farmers, including small farmers and farmers 
situated in rural communities, are generally creative and will vary their uptake of crop 
species to meet their own needs or what they consider to be market niches, and often 
engage in selective breeding and development practices to emphasise the traits which 
they consider desirable.968  It is clear that variety development practices are a regular 
feature of small scale farming in Malaysia. It is also apparent that there is a gap between 
the availability of the IPR and its uptake.  The DOA is aware of this issue.969  This then 
raises the question as to what are the barriers to uptake of PVP for traditional and farmers 
varieties?  It is not possible to speculate on the answers to those questions without further 
information from the relevant stakeholders. This presents a substantial challenge due to 
the lack of demographic data on farmers and farming practices in Malaysia.   
 
966 Personal communication, Plant Variety Protection Office (January 2019). View also expressed by in a 
comment by a participant not directly associated with the PVPO, in an interview in January 2019. 
967 Personal communication, Department of Agriculture (February 2019) 
968 Observations of farmer creativity in breeding and farming practices include: observing market place trends 
in both available crops and their characteristics  




Another likely contributing factor is that ten years is not a particularly large amount 
of time for a system of plant variety protection to have been in place.  The PVP regimes 
of many European states predate UPOV.970  Similarly, patent protection has been available 
in its modern form in Malaysia since 1983,971 although various notions of patent protection 
have been available in select parts of Malaysia since 1871.972  Thus, the system is juvenile 
in nature and likely requires further time to allow it to properly serve all of the relevant 
stakeholders.  As discussed above, the PVPO’s efforts during this time have been focused 
upon developing adequate DUS Testing Guidelines for priority crops.  It has also been 
noted that there is limited demographic data available on farmers in Malaysia, including 
the extent to which farmers cultivate their own or local crop varieties.  Given this, the 
amount of effort required on the part of the PVPO to ensure that the local communities 
and indigenous people are aware of the availability of protection for traditional and 
farmers’ varieties is considerable.  In the light of the lack of uptake of PVP under s. 14(2) 
and the other competing priorities in establishing the Malaysian system of plant variety 
protection (such as establishing DUS test guidelines) it is perhaps not surprising that 
protection for traditional and farmers’ varieties has failed to successfully launch.  
7.3.2.3 Plant variety protection in Malaysia so far 
 
The uptake of PVP in Malaysia has been gradual since its introduction.  To date, 
there have been 111 grants of plant variety protection. It is important to note that this 
figure is likely to be inaccurate, as the current information published by the PVP Office is 
out of date.  Updated information has been requested and promised by the PVP Office 
several of times, however it has not materialised.  For this reason, this section is limited 
to making general remarks on the trends on the uptake of plant variety protection.973  The 
applicants have primarily been a mixture of public research institutions and commercial 
 
970 Sean C. Butler, A guide to UK and EU plant variety rights (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 
3-9 
971 Patents Act 1983 (Act 291) 
972 Ida Madieha bt. Abdul Ghani Azmi & Jeong Chun Phuoc, Patent Law in Malaysia: Cases & Commentary (2nd 
Ed., Sweet & Maxwell Asia, Subang Jaya, 2015) at 1-3 
973 According to the PVP Office, the reason for the information being out of date is personnel and institutional 




breeders.974  The main type of plant variety for which PVP has been granted is ornamentals 
with 61 protected varieties, followed by forest plants (19) and cereals (14).  The remaining 
registered varieties are a mixture of fruits, vegetables and industrial crops (such as cocoa).   
Thus, based upon this information, plant variety protection does not yet play a substantial 
role in supporting developments in food crop varieties in Malaysia.  This is true for both 
commercial crop species, such as rice and underutilised species.  However, it does not 
disprove the link between the availability of PVP and plant-based innovation, as the clear 
uptake in PVP for ornamental demonstrates that developers seek IP protection where there 
is a commercial market for the resulting plant.  It is also likely that commercial agricultural 
staple crops, such as rice, are protected as registered as protected varieties elsewhere, 
especially given that Malaysia is reliant upon the import of seed for food supply.   
The other important take away is that there are, based upon the available 
information, only five varieties registered to individuals.  This raises questions as to PVP 
is accessible to farmers who develop varieties; whether they are aware of the option to 
apply for PVP or whether they simply do not believe it to be of value.  When reconciling 
this data with the assertion by the PVP Office that where farmers are interested in 
registering a variety for the purposes of commercialisation, then they have applied for 
conventional PVP under s. 14(1)975 there are two possible explanations: either there is 
little interest in farmers or other agricultural developers registering their varieties for 
commercialisation, or the information does not convey the complete picture of farmers’ 
understanding of PVP.  Unfortunately, deducing an answer to this query would require 
input from farmers, which due to the lack of demographic data has not been possible to 
procure.   
7.3.4 The role of Benefit sharing in supporting developments in underutilised 
crops in Malaysia  
 
It is difficult to comment on whether benefits arising directly out of ABS agreements 
in Malaysia serve to support agricultural innovation, including innovations in underutilised 
 
974 Including: MARDI, Sabah Forestry Development Authority, and the National University of Malaysia. 




crop species, due to both the country’s limited experience with ABS agreements and the 
limited information available.  At present, there are only two concrete examples to draw 
from, the historic Calanolide agreement and the Litsara agreement (considered in section 
7.3.1 above), the only ABS agreement to be concluded in Malaysia since the entry into 
force of the Nagoya Protocol, under the amended Sarawak Biodiversity Regulations.  
Neither of these examples pertains to agricultural development specifically.  However, it 
is possible to make some general observations.  
It can be observed from the historic Calanolide agreement that the appropriate 
transfer of technology and capacity building facilitates research and development involving 
biological resources.  It might also be inferred that the presence of a clear agreement on 
future royalties derived from intellectual property rights and royalties serves to encourage 
the continued research and development of the biological resources in question; however, 
this is a speculative suggestion.  The relevance of any observations drawn from the 
Calanoloide case is limited by the ad hoc nature of that agreement. 
In the Litsara case, the exact terms of the benefit sharing arrangement are 
confidential.   Thus, while the Sarawak Biodiversity Centre is willing to disclose some 
details of the functioning of that arrangement, it is not possible to comment upon how and 
whether any financial, rights or royalties based benefits serve to support research and 
development involving litsea cubeba.  The superficial evidence would suggest that the 
existence of the benefit sharing arrangement does support research and development, 
based upon the availability of various LitSara products.976  However it is difficult based 
upon this limited information, to make any kind of assertion that the benefits arising 
directly from a similar arrangement might support agricultural innovations, including those 
involving underutilised crop species, or support improvements in food security.  
From these two cases, we can deduce that the existence of these benefit sharing 
arrangements supports research and development using biological resources generally, 
and that they appear to support that research and development taking place in the 
 




communities in which the resources are located.  Prima facie, both agreements adhere to 
the benefit sharing principles set out in the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol; thus, if the 
principles of access and benefit sharing are sound, then it is reasonable to assert that the 
availability of benefits will serve to support research and development involving biological 
resources, including underutilised crop species.  However, based on these two cases alone, 
there is insufficient evidence to make such a concrete assertion, beyond the fact that the 
availability of benefits may facilitate access to genetic resources and therefore support 
research and development in that manner. 
It is more straightforward to analyse the relationship between indirect benefits, 
such as those arising out of the MLS to the ITPGRFA and to assess their utility in supporting 
agricultural developments, including developments in underutilised crops in Malaysia.  As 
outlined in section 7.2.2 above, there is a clear link between the benefits distributed 
through the multilateral system and the facilitation of the exchange of germplasm and 
financing of breeding activities.  This is true for both at the subsistence level and potentially 
commercial varieties, even if the registration and commercialisation of the varieties is on 
the distant horizon.  Clearly, this mechanism supports the addressing of food security 
concerns, as intended, by facilitating access to germplasm and improved varieties.  
Indeed, the availability of funding from the multilateral system has been cited as necessary 
to stimulate research into producing improved varieties of underutilised crop species.977  
It is possible to hypothesise as to the impact for those directly involved in the 
funded projects: access to improved varieties will improve crop quality and yield for the 
farmers that grow these varieties and contribute to both their own food and nutritional 
security and more widely in their communities.  Equally, improved access to germplasm 
and funding of research and development activities for researchers should continue to 
make further improved varieties available and support food and nutritional security more 
widely.  This is true for both the Bambara and Taro projects. 
 




It would be very difficult to measure the scale of this in any definitive way; 
however, it seems reasonable to surmise that there is an overall net positive impact.  The 
main criticism that can be levelled at indirect benefit sharing as a means of encouraging 
innovation in underutilised crops is the fact the impact of these benefits is limited, as only 
certain projects are selectively funded under the multilateral system.  
7.4 Summary 
 From the exploration of the process of developing underutilised crop varieties, we 
have learnt that the development of a stable and useable variety is an extended process, 
taking place over numerous growth cycles that relies upon both the exchange of 
germplasm and information.  Additionally, we have discovered that it is difficult to establish 
the value of the genetic material when it is added into the breeding process; therefore, it 
may be difficult to pinpoint the value of a given contribution with absolute certainty. 
Concerning access, it is clear that direct access to genetic resources is problematic 
in the context of the ABRBS Act.  Greater awareness of users’ responsibility towards 
biological resources and a greater understanding as to what constitutes traditional 
knowledge would serve to encourage and reassure researchers when collecting crop 
samples.  Such improvements do not necessarily need to be incorporated into the 
legislative regime; however, they do need to be adequately communicated to the users of 
biological resources. It is probable that this would lead to greater uptake of germplasm in 
to the crop variety development process and produce an overall positive contribution to 
addressing national food security concerns.  Additionally, indirect access to material 
through institutional links is essential to the continuation of formal breeding programmes 
for underutilised crop species.  This appears to be the most important mechanism for 
promoting developments in underutilised crops. 
Furthermore, it has become apparent that the distinction between commercial, 
potentially commercial and non-commercial research is not as clear cut as it appears on 
the statute; and that access to biological resources is not a onetime event.  In order for 




relationship between the providers and the users of biological resources.  Thus, in all 
probability the success of access and benefits sharing depends upon extra-legal factors. 
 With respect to intellectual property protection for innovations in underutilised 
crops in Malaysia, while traditional plant variety protection under s. 14(1) is a potentially 
viable option for developed varieties, it lacks the necessary technical support, including 
DUS test guidelines.  What is more, it does not seem likely that these will become available 
in the near future.  The alternative plant variety protection under s. 14(2) appears to be 
almost perfect for underutilised crop varieties developed by indigenous or local people.  
However, given the total lack of uptake and its uncertain future, it does not seem to be of 
any real use.  Therefore, for the time being, the intellectual property rights available in 
Malaysia do not support innovations in underutilised crop species and cannot be said to 
incentivise their development.  Accordingly, it is not possible to state that IP protection, 
as constructed in Malaysia, is a useful tool for addressing food security concerns.  Yet it is 
not possible to disprove the potential link between IP protection for underutilised crop 
species and improvements in food security concerns, as the available IPRs are insufficiently 
realised to discredit them entirely. 
 Finally, it has been noted that it is difficult to assess the contribution of individual 
benefit sharing agreements generally.  Perhaps the most that can be said is that based 
upon the existing cases in Malaysia, successful benefit sharing arrangements have the 
potential to be useful in supporting developments in underutilised crop species and in turn 
helping to address food security concerns.  However, it is possible to state with confidence 
that the benefits arising out of the multilateral system to the ITPGRFA are essential to the 
continued research and development of useful varieties of underutilised crop species in 








Chapter 8: Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter will bring together the findings and conclusions of the previous chapters.  
It will recap the process of the work thus far.  It will discuss the strengths and weaknesses 
of the research and make recommendations for future study. 
8.2 Thus far 
It has been the purpose of this study to investigate the position that intellectual 
property protection should be a useful tool in addressing food security concerns.  This has 
been analysed through the lens of supporting developments in underutilised crop species.  
Exploratory in nature, it has set out to understand how the relevant legal framework serves 
stakeholders in underutilised crops, on the basis that this should be able to encourage 
innovation and in turn lead to improved food security.   
The study has sought to define the true scope of the obligation under article 27.3(b) 
of the Agreement on Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS); it has 
scrutinised the utility of protection for plant varieties as provided for by the International 
Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV); it has considered how 
biodiversity regulation has developed the concepts of access and benefit sharing as a 
counterbalance to biopiracy and the appropriation of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge.  A key theme has been the interaction between the required standards of 
intellectual property protection and the mechanisms governing access to genetic resources 
and the benefits arising from their use.  Additionally, it has examined the interaction 
between the two major access and benefit sharing regimes, namely those of the Nagoya 
Protocol and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(ITPGRFA).  Finally, it has examined the national framework for both IP protection for 
plant varieties and access and benefit sharing in Malaysia, before turning its attention to 
how that applies to the actual processes involved in researching and developing 




This thesis has produced an answer to the question: Can intellectual property 
protection support developments in underutilised crops? And the answer is yes, provided 
that the system of IP protection is constructed in such a manner as to accommodate 
underutilised crop species.   The second question whether intellectual property protection 
is a useful tool for addressing food security concerns is less straightforward to answer.  As 
indicated in chapter one, definitively proving the utility of intellectual property rights for 
any given purpose requires arguing against a set of counterfactual scenarios.978  Therefore, 
we must return to the original premise: that the availability of appropriate, useful and 
accessible intellectual property protection will help address food security concerns.  On 
that basis, and given the current state of the Malaysian PVP legislation, the answer must 
be no, at present.  However, that answer is of course, limited to Malaysia.   The answer is 
likely to be yes elsewhere: either in states where UPOV plant variety protection is suitable 
for the crop species used to meet its food security needs, or in states where the IP 
framework that accommodates its diverse farming practices. 
8.3 Strengths and limitations of research 
 
The fundamental strength of this research is that it is unique in the intersectional 
nature of the inquiry.  There is an existing body of research which considers the utility of 
underutilised crop species as a tool for addressing food security concerns, both on a small 
and large scale.  There is a very limited amount of research that considers the issue of 
underutilised or niche crop species and intellectual property protection.  There is also a 
considerable material on the relationship between intellectual property and food security.   
However, this work is novel in addressing these issues in a linked manner.  It has cut 
across the issues from a new vantage point, and sought to analyse them in a balanced 
and comprehensive manner. 
A further strength of the research is the mixed-methods approach used in the 
investigation.  It has combined doctrinal and qualitative approaches to critically examine 
not only the relevant legislative framework from the standpoint of an academic lawyer, 
 




but more importantly the standpoints of key actors.  The qualitative aspect, achieved 
through semi-structured interviews and observation, is vital to the success of the work.  It 
serves to introduce the first hand evidence of stakeholders selected on the basis of vested 
interests in either the success of IP protection for plant-based innovations or access and 
benefit sharing in Malaysia.  Their contribution has provided reliable input on the 
challenges faced in the development of underutilised crop species that would have not 
otherwise been available.   
The extent of the success of the qualitative aspect is limited by participants that were 
available and willing to take part in the study.  It would have been beneficial to incorporate 
the views of other stakeholders, such as small farmers who farm underutilised varieties 
directly into the analysis. Unfortunately, the researcher did not have the opportunity to 
organise field-based research to gather qualitative data from these stakeholders, despite 
considerable and consistent efforts.   To a certain extent, the analysis has also been limited 
by the disruption caused by the changes in personnel at the Malaysian governmental 
bodies surveyed.  Nonetheless, the author believes that that the contributions of the 
participants were essential to the outcome of the research. 
The study is also limited in that it is restricted to plant variety protection and alternative 
plant variety protection.  Considering the role of other IPRs, such as patent protection or 
geographical indicators as tools for supporting either developments in underutilised crops 
or addressing food security concerns has been beyond the scope of the present research.  
8.4 Research findings 
 
Having examined the pertinent legal framework in the previous chapters, we have seen 
that they bear potential to be useful for supporting developments in underutilised crop 
species.  On paper, the concepts of access to genetic resources, the sharing of the benefits 
arising from their use, and intellectual property protection for plant-based innovations 
appear to be distinct from one another.  Yet, the investigation of the crop development 





To recap: while it is possible to construct article 27.3(b) TRIPS as being linked with 
interrelated ABS concerns, the Agreement provides for the minimum standard of an 
enforceable intellectual property right.   This can be achieved either through patent or sui 
generis IP protection.  However, the increasing use of so called ‘TRIPS plus’ bi- and 
multilateral trade agreement is effectively reducing member states options to implement 
their own sui generis IP solution, by requiring member states to accede to the UPOV 
system of plant variety protection. 
 UPOV provides the de facto standard for plant variety protection.  This is potentially 
compatible with underutilised plant varieties that have been sufficiently developed to be 
useful as a commercial variety, provided that appropriate technical support is available.   
It is likely not suitable for smaller scale developers of underutilised or niche crop species; 
however there is insufficient information to state this definitively.  The fundamental 
concern with UPOV is the resistance of its governing bodies to allow states parties to 
implement other plant variety protection solutions alongside UPOV PVP. 
Concerning access and benefit sharing, the Convention on Biological Diversity offers 
guiding principles, rather than a firm ABS regime.  It is clear that the availability of plant 
genetic material through the multilateral system of the ITPGRFA serves to stimulate and 
encourage developments in underutilised crop species listed in Annex I.  It is less clear at 
this stage to establish a link between the access principles set out in the Nagoya Protocol 
and facilitating the development of underutilised crop species.  However, it is certain that 
the two regimes should serve a complementary role, in order to ensure that access to both 
publicly and privately held germplasm are adequately governed and regulated.  This will 
benefit both providers and users of genetic material. 
Regarding intellectual property rights, it is clear that there is potential for plant variety 
protection, as it is constructed under the PNVP Act, to support developments in 
underutilised crop varieties.  However, this potential has not been matched by the 
implementation of the act, both institutionally and in the development of appropriate test 
guidelines.  It is disappointing that there is no evidence to support the utility of the 




supporting developments in underutilised crop species.  As we have in chapter six, 
alternative plant variety protection has an uncertain future in Malaysia.  Thus, the ability 
of either type of plant variety protection as envisaged under the Protection of New Varieties 
of Plants Act to support innovations in underutilised crop species remains speculative for 
now. 
In terms of access to biological resources, we have seen that while the principles 
governing access are sound, greater clarity and awareness of access obligations are 
obstacles to research and development involving underutilised crop species in Malaysia.  
Resolving this is essential to both supporting further development activities, and 
respecting the rights of resource holders. 
With respect to benefit sharing mechanisms, it is difficult to comment upon the utility 
of individual benefit sharing agreements as a means of supporting research and 
development activities in Malaysia, due to the novelty of the ABS regime and the 
confidential nature of the benefit sharing agreement that has been concluded under it.  
Nonetheless, there is a clear link between the benefits funded under the multilateral 
system to the ITPGRFA and both the formal development of underutilised crop species and 
the increased availability of germplasm and improved varieties to farmers.  Given this, it 
is clear that the multilateral system is a useful tool for addressing food security concerns, 
in line with its aims. 
8.5 Opportunities for further research 
 
It is noted that this research has been undertaken when the both the plant variety 
protection system in Malaysia is in a state of suspended animation and the access and 
benefit sharing framework is in the early stages of its life.  Thus, it would be worth 
revisiting the questions addressed here once the ambiguity surrounding the PVP system 
has been resolved and there has been greater development and use of the ABS framework, 
as the same question may well produce a different outcome.  It would also be able to 
provide greater certainty for stakeholders. 
231 
It would also be worthwhile to transplant this investigation elsewhere.  While 
this research has analysed the issues from the vantage point of the Bambara ground 
nut in Malaysia, it would be useful to build upon the foundations of the research 
considering the international regimes in chapters two to five, as a basis for an analysis 
either of the IP/ABS framework of another state where underutilised crop species are a 
potential food security solution; or the lens could be used to assess the viability of IP 
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